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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF IDAHO

Reed J. Ta y lor,
Plaintiff-Appe l l ant,

FILED . CI

v.

II I

AlA Services Corpora t ion, et a I,
Defendants-Respond ents.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
VOLUME III

Appealed from the District Court o f the
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho ,
in and for the County of Nez Pe rce
The Honorable Jeff M. Brudie
Supreme Court No. 36916-2009

RODERICK C. BOND
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
GARY D. BABBITT
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT AlA CORP-RESPONDENTS

__

L~========================================_==_==========~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant) SUPREME COURT NO. 36916-2009
Cross Respondent,
)
v.
)
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
) TABLE OF CONTENTS
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
) VOLUME III
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
)
TAYLOR, individually and the community
)
property comprised thereof, BRIAN FREEMAN, )
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person )
and JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
)
)
Defendants-Counterclaimants)
Respondents-Cross Appellants-Cross
)
Respondents,
)
)
)
and
)
)
CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.,
an Idaho corporation;
)
)
Defendant -Respondent-Cross Respondent, )
)
)
and
)
)
401(k) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR THE
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION,
)
)
Intervenor-Cross Appellant-Cross
)
Respondent.
)
)

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
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Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-AppellantCross Respondent,
) SUPREME COURT NO. 36916-2009
)
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)
) INDEX
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
) VOLUME III
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)
TAYLOR, individually and the community
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a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person )
)
and JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
)
)
Defendants-Counterclaimants)
Respondents-Cross Appellants-Cross
)
Respondents,
)
)
and
)
)
CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.,
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an Idaho corporation;
)
Defendant-Respondent-Cross Respondent, )
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and
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)
)
401(k) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR THE
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TA YLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,
v.

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

NOTICE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY
THAT PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY
MOTION IS ALSO A MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Defendants.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") hereby provides notice for purpose of
clarity that his Emergency Motion to Enforce Shareholder Vote and Board of Directors
NOTICE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARlTY THAT PLAINTIFF'S
EMERGENCY MOTION IS ALSO A
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - I

33~

ORIGI Al

Resolutions, in conformity with footnote 10 to said Motion, is also a Motion for
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin Defendants from acting in any way contrary to the (1)
Consent In Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance, Inc., Exhibit K to
the Affidavit of Reed 1. Taylor In Support of Emergency Motion, and (2) Consent In Lieu
of Meeting of the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc., Exhibit L to the Affidavit of
Reed 1. Taylor In Support of Emergency Motion, and that Defendants be Ordered to
comply with the terms of such Consents.
DATED this 2ih day of February, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

1

Pau
ressman, Jr.
Ned A. Cannon
Attorneys for Plaintiff

NOTICE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY THAT PLAINTIFF'S
EMERGENCY MOTION IS ALSO A
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of the Notice for Purpose of Clarity that Plaintiffs Emergency Motion is
also a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on the following parties via the methodes)
indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Signed this 2ih day of February, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.

NOTICE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY THAT PLAINTIFF'S
EMERGENCY MOTION IS ALSO A
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 3

F/L
!1fJ7 FEB 29 R{Yf 1D [(j
1

2
3
4

5

CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB# 4837

6

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

8
9

REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,

10
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 07-00208

11

12

13
14

15
16

vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person

AFFIDA VIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR IN
OBJECTION TO "MOTION FOR
EMERGENCY MOTION"

17
Defendant.

18
19
STATE OF IDAHO

20
21

County of Nez Perce

)
) ss.
)

22

CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

23

1. I am one ofthe defendants in this action, and make this affidavit from my own personal

24

knowledge.

25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR

1
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

2. John Taylor and I jointly own 1,034,835 shares of AIA Services Corp., which is the sole

1

shareholder in AlA Insurance, Inc. Our combined interest in AlA Services Corp. is appraised at
We also jointly own a substantial share of CropUSA, a separate

2

approximately $900,000.

3

corporation with offices also located at Lewis Clark Plaza. The approximate value of our interest

4

in that corporation is over $600,000.

5

3. I informed counsel for the Plaintiff of my ownership interest in these entities by both

6
telephone and e-mail on January 19, 2007. A copy of that e-mail is attached as Exhibit A to this

7
8
9

10
11

Affidavit.
4.

I have never been provided with notice of any of the "special shareholder meetings"

which Reed Taylor claims to have called, and am extremely concerned with the actions which have
been taken by Reed Taylor, both individually and though his counsel, which are essentially an

12
attempt to make an end-run around the entire legal process without regard to the civil rules. His
13
14

attempt to usurp the power of the court and unilaterally seize control of the AlA offices is alarming,

15

and could have an extremely adverse impact on the value of my personal ownership interest in the

16

above corporations. If the Preliminary Injunction is removed or changed in any way to allow Reed

17

Taylor to assert any type of control over AlA and its properties, the companies will be unable to

18

operate and my interest in the shares of these corporations will be irreparably damaged.

19

5. I ask that the Court maintain the status quo until these complex factual and legal issues

20
21

can be fully investigated through discovery, briefed thoroughly, and presented to the Court in an

22

orderly, professional manner. If the status quo is to be changed in any way, I ask that the Plaintiff

23

be required to post a bond sufficient to cover my ownership interest in these corporations.

24

6. The Plaintiffs "Motion for Emergency Motion" and the voluminous attachments were

25
26

AFFIDA VIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR

2
LAW OFFICES OF"

539

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

apparently delivered to my office on Monday, February 26, while I was in Boise for a hearing on a
1
2

3
4

5

6

birth injury case.

I received a copy of Plaintiffs Notice of Hearing late on February 27,

scheduling a hearing on March 1, 2007.
7. I cannot be present for that hearing, as I will be in Spokane participating in the mediation
of a 42 USCA § 1983 wrongful death case which is scheduled for trial in federal court in April.
Even if I did not have a scheduling conflict, it would be absolutely impossible to prepare for a
hearing on this extremely short time frame, especially considering the complexity of the issues and

7

8
9
10

11

the law concerned in this matter.
8.

I respectfully request that this Court deny the Plaintiffs "Motion for Emergency

Motion," for the following reasons:
a.

12

The Motion fails to cite any civil rule or statute under which it is filed, as is
required by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1). I am unaware of any rule or statute which

13
allows the extremely broad relief requested;
14

15

b.

which are incorrect, misleading, and in dispute;

16
17

The Motion and accompanying documents set forth a great many allegations

c.

18

The Motion essentially is asking that the Court enter an order granting
Plaintiff all the relief requested in his Amended Complaint, as well as

19
additional relief which was not even requested in his Amended Complaint,

20
without giving the Defendants the opportunity to respond or engage in any

21

discovery whatsoever.

22

23

24

d.

The Motion for Emergency Motion is in the nature of a Motion for Summary
Judgment, which requires at least 28 days notice of hearing and also requires

25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR

3
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

that all facts be construed in favor of the nonmoving party.
1

2

e.

The Plaintiff has not provided sufficient time to allow me to defend my
interests in this matter.
/J

3

viii

DATED this _LLl_/_",Jay of February

4

5

Connie Taylor

6

'1

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

y1i1

IAJ day of February, 2007.

7
8
9
10
11

Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho.
Residing at
~rl{/t./;JIZD / ,./ the~ein._~"
My commission expires:
t..)(/..~!
()
1

u3!

J

12

l3
14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22

23
24

25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR

4
LAW OFFICES OF

341

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1

2
3
4

5
6

7

8
9
10
11

12

13
14
15

16

2fHf

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2007, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith and Cannon
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for Reed Taylor
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Ave., Ste. 3100
Seattle, WA 98104
Attorneys for Reed Taylor
Michael McNichols
Clements, Brown & McNichols
321 13 th Street
PO Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
David A. Gittins
Law Offices of David A. Gittins
843 7th Street
PO Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorneys for Duclos and Freemen

o

o
o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

0
0
0

,

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

~

P0
0
0

?

17
18

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

Q

I

lar and Feeney
Attorneys for Connie W. Taylor

19
20

21

22
23
24
25
26

AFFIDA VIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR

5

3'-12FEENEY

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND

LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

Page 1 of 1

Connie
From:

Connie

Sent:

Friday, January 19, 2007 3:29 PM

To:

'rod@scblegal.com'

Subject: Reed Taylor - AlA

Rod:
I'd like to confirm our conversation of this afternoon, in which I advised you that I still
own an undivided one-half interest with John Taylor in all shares oCAlA Inc., AlA
Services, and CROP USA. My approval is required prior to entering into
any agreement which would impact those shares. I understand you wiII provide me
with a copy of any documents which are filed with the court.
Connie

343

EX
AFFIDA VIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR

2/27/2007

.'

IT /~}

/

FILED;
1fIJ7 FEB Z8 API 11 Lf'J1
1
2
3

4
5

6
7

CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB# 1329

8

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

9
10

REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,

11
Plaintiff,

12
13

vs.

14

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person

15
16
17

Case No. CV 07-00208

ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT

18
Defendant.

19
20
TO:

ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

21
22

This Answer is provided for Connie Taylor individually.

23

1.

Defendant admits paragraphs 1.1 through 1.4.

24

25
26

ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT

1
LA W

OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

2.

Defendant is without sufficient information to determine the truth or falsity of
paragraphs 1.5 and 1.6 of plaintiff s Amended Complaint and therefore denies the

1

same.

2
3

3.

Defendant admits paragraphs 1.7 and 1.8.

4

4.

Defendant denies paragraph 2.1.

5.

Defendant is without sufficient information to determine the truth or falsity of

5
6

paragraphs 2.2 through 2.24 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and therefore denies
7

the same.

8
9

10

6.

Defendant denies each and every other allegation set forth in said Amended
Complaint not specifically admitted herein.

11

12

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
By pleading certain defenses as "affirmative defenses," Defendant Connie Taylor does not

13
intend to suggest that she carries the burden of proof for any such defenses. Furthermore, by failing
14

15

to raise any affirmative defenses, Defendant Connie Taylor does not intend to waive such defenses

16

and specifically reserves the right to amend her Answer to include additional affirmative defenses

17

if such are justified by discovery or by the law in this action.

18

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

19
The Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against the Defendant Connie Taylor upon which
20

21

22

23
24

relief may be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Defendant affirmatively alleges that the Plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to
mitigate his claimed or alleged damages, if any.

25
26

ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT

2
LA W

OFFICES OF

6~

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

1
2

Plaintiff is barred from recovering under any claims based in equity pursuant to the cleanhands doctrine and on the grounds that the plaintiff breached his covenant of good faith and fair

3· dealing.

4

5

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, laches and failure to

6
mitigate damages.

7
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

8
9

10
11

12

Defendant Connie Taylor has been required to retain counsel to defend her interests in this
matter and is entitled to the recovery of attorney fees and costs.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that the Court enter an order granting the following relief:
1.

That the claims ofthe Plaintiff be dismissed and that he take nothing thereby.

2.

That the relief requested in the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint be denied.

15

3.

That the Plaintiff s request for costs and fees be denied.

16

4.

That the Defendant Connie Taylor be reimbursed her costs, expenses and reasonable

13
14

17

18

attorney fees necessarily incurred in defending the action.
5.

F or such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances

19
of this lawsuit.

20
21
22

n,-"

Iii

DATED this ~ day ofFebruary, 2007.
CLARK and FEENEY

23
24

. ally, a member ofthe firm.
orneys for Connie W. Taylor

25
26

ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT

3
LA W

OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1
2

2'1#t

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2007, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

3
4

5
6

7

8
9
10
11

12

13
14

15

16

17

Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith and Cannon
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for Reed Taylor
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Ave., Ste. 3100
Seattle, W A 98104
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

0
0
0
~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

(

g

/

Michael McNichols
Clements, Brown & McNichols
321 13 th Street
PO Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

David A. Gittins
Law Offices of David A. Gittins
843 7th Street
PO Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorneys for Duclos and Freeman

0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

&;t

q
~

18
19

20
21
22

23
24

25
26

ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT

4
LA W

OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

02/28/2007 WED 13:24

1d!00l!003

FAX

FI
Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law

ED

2l1lI Ffl3 19 PM II 00

th

321 13 Street

Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
\IS.

AlA SERVrCES CORPORATION, an Idaho
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community properly comprised therc:of:
BR YAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person:

Defendants.

STATE OF KANSAS

)
)

Case No: CV 07-00208

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDA VIT OF
KENT A. PETERSEN

)
)
)

)

)
: ss.

County of Johnson

I, Kent A. Petersen, being duly sworn, state:
I.

I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify

as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge.

AFFIDA VIT OF KENT A. PETERSEN

02/28/2007

WED 13: 25

2.

~002/003

FAX

I am the President and Chief Operating Officer of Crop USA Insuram.:e

Agency, Inc., an Idaho corporation.

CropUSA has offices in Lewiston, Idaho, and

Overland Park, Kansas.
3.

CropUSA is a Managing General Agency under the federal crop insurance

program for Cleaf\vater Insurance Company of New York, New York. Clearwater holus
a Standard Reinsurance Agreement with the Risk Management Agency of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Under the terms of the Standard Reinsurancc Agreement,
CropUSA has significant duties and responsibilities to those farmers who purchase their
federal crop insurance through the CropUSA agency.
4.

Our responsibilities include the issuance of policies, taking acreage and

production repol1s, ildjusting clilims, pilying indemnities, and collecting prcmium on
behalf of the USDA.
5.

This time of year is a very busy time of year for CropUSA anu it.s farmer

customers because most farmers must report their intent and select cqverages for their
crop insurance under the federal program by March 15.
6.

CropUSA is required

to

process information submitted by the fanners and

remit the information to the RMA in order for the farmer customers of Crop USA to
obtain crop insurance coverage. In addition, on behalf of Clearwater Insurance, we must
make selections for reinsuring all or part of the business submitted by cach farmer by
April 14.

All of the processing for the offices in Overland Park and our agencies

throughout the country are enabled by servers housed in Lewiston, Idaho at the Lewis
Clark Plaza, III Main Street. We expect to process business in excess of $30 million
this year, which is approximately $300 million in potential indemnity for crop losses.
7.

During 2006, CropUSA made payments of $47,800 to ALA Insurance for

rental space in the Lewis Clark Plaza. Crop USA has exclusive use of an area on the first
floor of the building, and in conjunction with ALA Insurance, CropUSA uses an area of
the second floor. If it is determined that for CropUSA is not entitled to this usc of the
premises, fairness requires that CropUSA be allowed to vacate the premises, in an
orderly, businesslike fashion during regular business hours to avoid unfair and
unnecessary disruption of CrapUSA's business and undue interference with CropUSA's
obligations to its customer farmers and Clearwater Insurance.

AFFIDA VIT OF KENT A. PETERSEN

V~I .t..UI £.vu I

WJ:,U

.L.5: L:J

8.

IdJ003/003

r'AX

Many documents, including financial records, computer programs,

computer equipment, and other personal propeliy (including our sensitive business
propeIiY) are housed in the Lewis Clark Plaza.
9.

Plaintiff has no interest in CropUSA Insurance. CropUSA is not a paJ1y to

this lawsuit, but it must protet.:t its properly located in the Lewis Clark Plaza.
Dated February

,d 1

,2007.

--;::1/
p

(;..-

etA. Petersen

f\()-tb .
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this

AFFIDAVIT OF KENT A. PETERSEN

C:)... \)

day of February, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
NedA. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

_ _ _ _ _ u.S. MAIL
- - - - - HAND DELIVERED
________ OVERNIGHT MAIL
_---'X
TELECOPY (FAX)

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
Michael E. McNichols

AFFIDA VIT OF KENT A. PETERSEN
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ED
Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13 th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993
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Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof:
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person:
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 07-00208

AFFIDAVIT OF
STEPHANIE MCFARLAND

)
: ss.
)

I, Stephanie McFarland, being duly sworn, state:
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify as a
witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge.
2. I am the Executive Assistant of AlA Insurance, Inc., and my job includes
greeting AlA's customers from my seat at the front reception desk.

AFFIDA VIT OF STEPHANIE MCFARLAND

3. During the summer of2006, I was provided with a can of pepper spray after an
incident occurred with a vagrant wandering around our building at 111 Main Street,
Lewiston, Idaho. The can of pepper spray was kept to the right of my desk, behind a
partition where it was not able to be seen. When Reed Taylor began his demands and
legal actions against AlA Insurance, Inc., I moved the can of pepper spray directly to the
front of my desk, in plain sight.
4. I advised Building Services on Friday, February 2, 2007, that I was afraid of
Reed Taylor corning to the office for an unscheduled meeting on Monday, February 5,
2007. Gem State Security was hired to sit in the lobby by my desk from 9:00 a.m. to
12:00 p.m. The door to AlA's offices on the second floor were locked and the only access
to our offices was by the elevator, in front of my desk.
5. I am afraid of Reed Taylor corning to AlA Insurance, Inc. I have advised R.
John Taylor that I prefer he not leave town for the next few months, as I fear Reed Taylor
will attempt illegal action against AlA Insurance, Inc. and its employees, should R. John
Taylor be out of town.
6. I am afraid that Reed Taylor would use physical force to make AlA employees
leave the office in an attempt to assume authority over AlA Insurance.
7. I will not work for Reed Taylor.
Dated February

a7, , 2007.

!J4rjTln1tJ
rrrflMcfm/
StepHanie McFarland
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this

d g+t=

day of February, 2007.

~!i 1 Ulll:>mCLpL.

Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho,
Residing at Lewiston, therein.
My Commission Expires: /t)~ S -uq

AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHANIE MCFARLAND

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, J r.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

_ _ _ _ U.S. MAIL
_ _ _ _ HAND DELIVERED
_ _ _ _ OVERNIGHT MAIL
_---'X
TELECOPY (FAX)

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
Michael E. McNichols

AFFIDA VIT OF STEPHANIE MCFARLAND

}/
Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13 th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993
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Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof:
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person:
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 07-00208

AFFIDAVIT OF
AIMEE GORDON

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
: ss.
)

I, Aimee Gordon, being duly sworn, state:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify

as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge.
2.

I am the Accounting Manager for AlA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance.

AFFIDAVIT OF AIMEE GORDON

3.

The financial statements of AlA Insurance, Inc. are reviewed and audited

each year by independent auditors. In my review of the last five years of audit reports,
AlA has always had a positive net income. The net income of AlA during the last five
years has ranged from a low of$239,660 to a high of$I,063,520.
4.

Each year, $196,536 is accrued and recorded in an accrued wages account

on the ledger for John Taylor. Any wages paid to John through payroll or any expenses
the company pays for his benefit are charged against the accrued wages account and
recorded as taxable income on his Form W-2. Any accrued wages not used by John are
carried forward to the next year. In the five years of my employment with AlA the
amount of accrued wages John has used in a year has ranged from $159,000 to $249,000.
5.

In my review of the history of plaintiff's promissory note (1995 thru

2006), I show that he has received approximately $8,000,000 in cash and non-cash
transactions.

The current balance due to plaintiff as of December 31, 2006, is

$8,189,614; this is $6,000,000 in principal and $2,189,614 in accrued interest. In 2002,
the amount of principal was reduced by $307,271 (application of a payable due to John
Taylor) from $6,000,000 to $5,692,729. However, John directed me to reverse this entry
in the fourth quarter of2006, bringing the principal due on the note back to $6,000,000.
6.

In past years, plaintiff has charged AlA for use of his airplane, the last

charge was in 2005 at a rate of$950 per hour.
7.

AlA has provided both of plaintiffs sons with employment. Jud Taylor is

currently employed by CropUSA as an agent. Jay Taylor voluntarily terminated his
employment in July of2005.
CJ~

Dated February

, 2007.

G1 M,

Aimee Gordon

roK

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to this d,,,::>
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day of February, 2007.

(Q
tOO /~L l CltLt:'sYY'c~vL
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho,
Residing at Lewiston, therein.
My Commission Expires: \O,~?,,:>c..q

AFFIDAVIT OF AIMEE GORDON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98 I 04-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

_ _ _ _ U.S. MAIL
_ _ _ _ HAND DELIVERED
_ _ _ _ OVERNIGHT MAIL
_ _X
TELECOPY (FAX)

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:

U&1u«~~
Michael E. McNichols
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FILED

Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13 th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993
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Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN T AYLOR AND
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof:
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person:
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 07-00208

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOLEE K. DUCLOS

)

)
)
)
)
)

)
: ss.
)

I, JoLee K. Duclos, being duly sworn, state:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify

as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge.
2.

I am the Office Manager of the Lewiston, Idaho, offices of AlA Insurance

and CropUSA Insurance.

AFFIDA VII OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS

3.

AlA Insurance and CropUSA both work out the second floor offices in the

Lewis Clark Plaza at 111 Main Street in Lewiston.

The phones are answered

AlAiCropUSA. Approximately15 individuals perform job responsibilities for both of the
companies.

For example, the accounting department takes care of payroll for AlA

Insurance and CropUSA. It is my understanding that the companies allocate salaries and
related expenses, rent, and other shared expenses based on the services provided from
one to the other on a monthly basis.
4.

The employees in the Lewiston office have a great deal of respect for John

Taylor as their boss. In fact, a majority of the employees have worked for John for over
15 years.

The plaintiff is not held in high regard by the employees.

I polled the

employees February 27, 2007. If plaintiff were to take possession of AlA, it would have
a devastating effect on the business because the majority of the current employees would
refuse to work for the plaintiff. In fact, many of the employees in the Lewiston office are
afraid of the plaintiff. His reputation with the employees is so poor that I do not believe a
prosperous business atmosphere would be possible. The plaintiff cannot control and
operate AlA Insurance without the benefit of the current staff. In my opinion, faced with
a near-complete exodus of the current staff, plaintiff would not be able to find personnel
who would be competent in the many processes required to keep AlA functioning on a
day-to-day basis.
5.

I am the recording secretary for the commodity association Trusts who are

the major clients of AlA Insurance and its health insurance program. These Trusts are
the master policyholders for the thousands of insured farmers across the country under
AlA's insurance programs. John Taylor and I attend meetings of these Trusts on at least
an annual basis. The members of the Trust boards respect John Taylor. However, I have
witnessed, on more than one occasion, a director of one of the Trusts being extremely
angry about contact made by the plaintiff. The Director would tell John Taylor that he
needed to make sure that the plaintiff never, ever called or made contact with the director
(or the commodity association he represented). I believe the distrust and dislike that the
directors on the Trust Boards have for the plaintiff could cause dissolution of the Trust
relationships with AlA and would be disastrous to AlA's future.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS

\

6.

Plaintiff states in his affidavit that he will operate AlA Insurance in its

best interests if he is allowed to take control. Having known the plaintiff for many years,
I do not believe this to be possible. I have witnessed many of the business ideas of the
plaintiff over the past several years and have seen them fail.

I have witnessed his

relationships with the agent sales forces of AlA and CropUSA. His intimidation tactics
have not made him a

well~liked

individual. Plaintiff has burned so many bridges in the

past, I do not believe he can overcome the problems created by that conduct and operate
AlA Insurance in its best interests.
7.

In their affidavits in support of the emergency motion, both plaintiff and

his attorney, Roderick C. Bond, state that I have resigned as a director of AlA Insurance
and AlA Services Corporation because of "extensive corporate malfeasance." The claim
of "extensive corporate malfeasance" is absolutely unfounded.

I have tendered my

resignation as a director because I am afraid of the plaintiff.
8.

Plaintiffs attorney states that he has documents which show the

"alteration of documents."

This claim of document alteration is also absolutely

unfounded and I can explain why. I provided my attorney, David Gittins, an abundance
of confidential material in order to educate him about this case. We did not review the
materials together; I simply left them with him to digest and we would discuss at a later
time. On February 14, Mr. Gittins met with plaintiffs attorney to review documents in
the possession of plaintiff. During that meeting, Mr. Gittins provided plaintiff s attorney
with the document identified as Exhibit 2 of Roderick C. Bond's affidavit. Mr. Gittins
did not ask my permission to give this document to plaintiffs attorney, but more
importantly, we had never discussed the origin of the document. My attorney had no idea
what it was. Had he talked to me about the document, I would have advised him that by
looking at the formatting, spelling errors, and abbreviations, I could easily tell this was
not an official corporate record, but rather a spreadsheet prepared by John Taylor for his
personal use during negotiations with plaintiff.
Dated February

,;:kY

,2007.

JoJiee K. Duclos

AFFIDAVIT OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this

agR

day of February, 2007.

ctVY1A/LL QJL'<SIrCl v\...d
Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho,
Residing at Lewiston, therein.
My Commission Expires: \D~3--cq

AFFIDAVIT OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ill 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

_ _ _ _ _ u.S. MAIL
- - - - - HAND DELIVERED
- - - - - OVERNIGHT MAIL
_ _X
TELECOPY (FAX)

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:

~~

Michael E. McNichols

AFFIDAVIT OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS

r-flED

Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
th
321 13 Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993
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Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof:
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person:
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 07-00208

AFFIDAVIT OF
R. JOHN TAYLOR

)
: ss.
)

I, R. John Taylor, being duly sworn, state:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify

as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge.
2.
Bar.

I have degrees in accounting and law, and am a member of the Idaho State

I have extensive experience with business, government, and governance issues

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR

related to charitable organizations. I serve on several Boards of Directors and have been
appointed by Governors Batt and Kempthorne to the Idaho Investment Fund Endowment
Board.
3.

For more than twelve years, I have been the President and Chief Executive

Officer of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., both of which are Idaho
corporations. From the time I joined the companies in 1976, I was the Chief Operating
Officer.
4.

AlA Services Corporation owns all of the issued and outstanding shares of

stock in AlA Insurance, Inc. AlA Services Corporation is indebted to the plaintiff under
the terms of a written agreement that has been amended and modified by written and oral
agreements. One of such modifications is attached as Exhibit A hereto. Plaintiff alleges
that AlA Services Corporation is in default under the terms of the agreements and
defendants allege that AlA Services Corporation is not in default The case will involve
multiple complex legal issues and enormous amounts of money.

It will affect the lives

of not only the litigants, but all employees and agents of AlA, at least two other
companies that are not involved in this litigation, and most importantly thousands of
insured persons.
5.

Plaintiffs allegations of misconduct and/or fraud by John Taylor and

others of the companies are untrue. Plaintiff is well aware of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the transactions described in his emergency motion, but has omitted material
facts. Defendant will correct the misrepresentations ofthe plaintiff.
6.

The plaintiff has the ability to prosecute his claims without running the

business of AlA Insurance. The company will continue to operate during the litigation
for the best interests of the insured farm families and there will be no diminution of the
value of the company during the period nor will there be extraordinary distributions or
transactions outside the ordinary course of business.
7.

AlA Insurance has been the agent and third party administrator for the

health insurance plans of over 30 farm organizations, e.g. the Idaho Grain Producers
Association and the Texas Wheat Producers Association.

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR

8.

AlA Insurance is dependent on the revenues and commissions received

from Trustmark Insurance Company and other life and disability insurers for which AlA
Insurance acts as the agent of record for its client farm associations.
9.

The current management and staff of AlA Insurance have a long and

personal relationship with the clients and insurers of the AlA programs. The plaintiff is
unknown to the current insurance carriers and is disliked and disrespected by the
company's association clients.

His control or management of the business would

irrevocably harm the relationship with the farm association clients of AlA Insurance.
10.

The plaintiff is known to have a disrespectful, notoriously impolite, and

brutish attitude toward the employees of AlA Insurance and many of the current
employees would not work for him.

Some employees. actually fear him and our

receptionist suffers anxiety attacks when I leave town.

Since the pendency of this

litigation, plaintiff has caused to be hand-delivered to employees the letters attached as
Exhibits B, C and D.
11.

Many of the employees of AlA Insurance also perform tasks for CropUSA

Insurance Agency, Inc, which is not a party to this suit. CropUSA reimburses to AlA
Insurance an allocated portion of the employee expenses.
12.

Crop USA and AlA share many services, including the joint utilization of

office space, computers and furniture. The costs are shared between CropUSA and AlA
Insurance. This relationship, would be seriously disrupted if the Plaintiff is allowed to
manage the company.

My ability to properly control and supervise the affairs of

CropUSA, as its CEO, would be disrupted if I was unable to be on the premises. The
separation of the j oint services would be difficult and time-consuming, even if it could be
done in an orderly fashion. CropUSA will suffer irreparable harm if its operations were
disrupted by the imposition of plaintiff s management at AlA Insurance.
13.

AlA Insurance and CropUSA employees in Lewiston jointly provide

accounting, commission payments to agents, billing services, premium remittals to
insurers, and other services vital to the insurance needs of several thousand farm families,
including some area farm families.

Any disruption of services, including failure to

properly process their premium or policy activities could seriously impact the coverages
and insurance protection for both their medical insurance and crop insurance. The

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR

potential liability for their crops alone are estimated to be more than $200,000,000 d?llars
in the next growing season.
14.

The community utilizes the facilities at the Lewis Clark Plaza for several

social events, including the upcoming Lewiston Civic Theatre Fine Arts Ball, the
Lewiston Library Foundation St Patrick's Day Fundraiser, and several weddings to be
held in next few months.

The Plaintiff has stated he will fire the building manager

immediately upon taking control, which would disrupt or cancel these events and
irrevocably damage the reputation of AlA Insurance as a contributing corporate citizen.
The building manager is experienced and knowledgeable about maintenance of the Lewis
Clark Plaza.

The Plaza is an old, fragile building that needs constant care to avoid

deterioration, which the building manager provides.
15.

Plaintiff lacks the management ability, temperament, and skills to

retaionally operate AlA Insurance in the best interests of all its stakeholders. He suffers
from short-term memory loss, excessive uncontrollable anger, and an abusive and abrupt
personality.
16.

AlA Insurance will provide the court with appropriate assurances that it

will continue usual and reasonable operations, not transfer assets or funds or engage in
transactions outside the normal course of business, and will not pay any bonuses or
unusual compensation to its employees.

AlA Insurance will reaffirm its policy to

maintain the integrity of all the files, work papers, and documents in a manner consistent
with good business practices, the rules of the USDA, and the rules of the insurance

Dated February 28, 2007.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this

{~\g

~~\dJL
Cu~ . vLNotary Public in and for the State ofIdaho,
Residing at Lewiston, therein.
My Commission Expires: \0-- 3--01

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day ofF ebruary, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

_ _ _ _ U.S. MAIL
_ _ _ _ HAND DELIVERED
_ _ _ _ OVERNIGHT MAIL
_ _X
TELECOPY (FAX)

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
Michael E. McNichols
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February 27,2001

Donna Taylor
3730 Nicklaus Drive
Clarkston, Wa. 99403
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Dear Ms. Taylor,
AlA is developing a new crop insurance program through a
new company called CropUSA. We will be filing a Form D stock
registration for the agencies who join with CropUSA.
The costs of putting the CropUSA program together in Texas
have been paid. AlA now needs to launch in five new territories next
Month.
AlA requests it be allowed to defer the stock redemption payments
to you for the next five months. Even though redemption is deferred, AlA will
continue to accrue the interest on the interest payments not made.
AlA will agree to work with you to restructure your payments so your
redemption payments are converted to other income so you can set up a SEP or Defined
Benefit plan. When you become a consultant, we can add you to the current
AlA health plan. You will have the option to convert some of your Preferred A
Stock to' CropUSA on the same rate as offered to the C stock

It will take a few months to set this all up. We will work with your
Accountant or will introduce you to CPA's here or in Spokane who can set up
the right tax plan.
Your preferred A stock has the highest priority, above the payments
to Reed, the Preferred C, and the common stock .. Reed and John will
guarantee the deferred payments.

Sincerely,

~~"
ReedJ.T~y

Accepted

L

.

/(JiMI
R. John Taylor

2. d~
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ReedJ. Taylor
7498 Lapwai Road
Lewiston, ID 83501

February 1,2007
VIA HAND DELIVERY
JoLee Duclos
AIA Insurance, Inc.
111 Main Street
Lewiston,ID 83501

Re:

Shareholder Meeting

Dear JoLee:
I am in receipt of your letter dated February 1, 2007.
Attached is a copy of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement ("Pledge Agreement").
Under the Pledge Agreement, AlA Services Corporation pledged all of the shares of AlA
Insurance, Inc. ("AlA") to me as partial security for its indebtedness to me.
Please pay particular attention to Section 6 of the Pledge Agreement, which states in part
Upon the occurrence and continuation of a Default, Pledgor's right to exercise
such voting rights shall immediately cease and terminate and all voting rights with
respect to the Pledged Collateral shall rest solely and exclusively in Secured
Party.
AIA Services Corporation was notified in writing of its various defaults on December 12,
2006. Under the terms of the Pledge Agreement, a default is defined as, among other
ways, failure to pay principal or interest of the $6 Million Note; failure to comply with
Section 4 of the Amended Security Agreement (including the lock box requirement);
breach of any covenant, warranty or representation of the Pledge Agreement (e.g., all of
the requirements under Section 3 and 4); or an event of insolvency. All of the above
defaults have occurred and AlA Services Corporation has failed to cure the defaults.
As you can see, you have no right to prevent me from voting the shares and I will seek a
court order to vote the shares, if necessary.
In the meantime, I demand to be notified of any shareholder or board meeting, and
further demand the right to vote my shares to replace AlA's board and appoint new
officers as is my right.
Sincerely,

/(::;:.~
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Reed J. Taylor
7498 Lapwai Road
Lewiston, ID 83501

February 1,2007
VIA HAND DELIVERY
10Lee Duclos, Co-Trustee
AlA Services Corporation
111 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Re:

,.
?,

,

(

AlA Services Corporation's 401(k) Plan

Dear 10Lee:
I am a participant in AlA Services Corporation's 401(k) Plan (the "Plan").
Pursuant to ERISA § 104(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4), please provide me with the
following documents: (1) a complete copy of the latest updated summary plan
description(s); (2) the latest annual report(s); and (3) the bargaining agreements, trust
agreements, contracts; and (4) other instruments under which this Plan is established or
operated. With respect to the documents in the last category, please include "any
document or instrument which specifies procedures, formulas, methodologies, or
schedules to be applied in determining or calculating a participant's or beneficiary's
benefit entitlement" under the Plan. See PWBA Opinion Letter No. 96-14A. Because
the Plan is a 401(k) plan with various investment options, this category of documents
should include any documents under which those options are established and operated.
(e.g., prospectuses for the various funds, policies and guidelines under which they were
selected and monitored; policies and guidelines for making real estate investments).
To the extent you can do so, please expedite this request and deliver the documents to me
by overnight mail. I will pay your reasonable copying charges and postage charges upon
receipt. If you require payment in advance, please contact me at 208-413-1952 to inform
me of the same, and I will deliver a check to you.
If you are uncertain about the scope of the request, or dispute some part of this request,
please, at a minimum, send to me the documents identified in Nos. (1) - (3) above, and
contact me regarding the documents which are disputed or as to which you believe the
request is unclear.
If you have any questions, comments, or concerns about the request, please do not
hesitate to contact me. Thank you very much for your time and attention to this request.
Sincerely,

37fJ
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Reed J. Taylor
7498 Lapwai Road.
Lewiston, ID 83501
February 2,2007
VIA HAND DELIVERY
Board of Directors
AIA Insurance, Inc.
111 Main Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Dear Board of Directors:
As you know, AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. were in default of
various agreements and for the failure to pay interest or principal due on my $6,000,000
Promissory Note at the time of the last annual shareholder meeting. As a result, my right
to vote all of AlA's outstanding shares was vested in me at the time of the last annual
meeting, while AlA Services Corporation's right to vote the shares was terminated (see
Section 6 of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement). Consequently, AlA's present board
of directors was not properly elected and I do not consent to any action taken by you. I
reiterate my demand for the special shareholder meeting scheduled for Monday, and your
refusal to honor my demand will be actionable. If an annual or special meeting takes
place anytime after this letter (with or without notice to me), I will be voting the shares in
opposition to you as directors and in support of a slate of directors to be named by me.
I have recently become aware of many improper transactions and activities at AlA during
your terms as board members. Because all of the shares of AlA are pledged to me, every
action taken by you will be highly scrutinized between now and when I am able to vote
the shares (whether amicably or by court action). This letter is also notice to you that
when I am able to vote the shares and appoint new directors and officers, you should
anticipate that AlA will be seeking restitution from each of you personally for all the past
improper and wrongful transactions and activities which occurred during your terms as
board members, including acts before and after the date ofthis letter.
I demand that every dollar of AlA's funds be accounted DJL I dema..'1d that all services
and expenses incurred or paid by AlA on behalf of CropUSA or any other party be
itemized and collected. I demand that you comply with all fiduciary duties owed to AlA.
I demand that AlA not make any loans, advances or other inappropriate payments to any
of AlA's officers or directors, or any related entity (including payments to John Taylor).
This letter also serves as demand for you, any officer, any employee or any other party to
not destroy or alter any documents (including email or other electronic files). On behalf
of the participants of the plan, I will also be pursing claims against the Trustees of AlA
Services Corporation's 401(k) Plan, so I expect all of those documents to be preserved.
Sincerely,

/~
Reed J. Taylor
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Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13 th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993
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Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN T AYLOR AND
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof:
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person:
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 07 -00208

AFFIDAVIT OF
R. JOHN TAYLOR

)
: ss.
)

I, R. John Taylor, being duly sworn, state:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify

as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge.
2.
Bar.

I have degrees in accounting and law, and am a member of the Idaho State

I have extensive experience with business, government, and governance issues

related to charitable organizations. I serve on several Boards of Directors and have been
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appointed by Governors Batt and Kempthorne to the Idaho Investment Fund Endowment
Board.
3.

For more than twelve years, I have been the President and Chief Executive

Office of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., both of which are Idaho
corporations. From the time I joined the companies in 1976, I was the Chief Operating
Officer.
4.

Plaintiff was responsible for the sales side of the company from 1976 to

5.

I joined the company, now known as AlA Insurance, in 1976. AlA

1995.

Insurance was an agent and third party administrator for three farm organizations in the
Northwest at that time. Through my efforts, as Chief Operating Officer, the company
expended its farmer health insurance plans to over 30 farm organizations, like the North
Dakota Grain Growers Association, the Arkansas Soybean Growers Association, etc.
No stock in AlA Insurance or AlA Services was ever issued to or ever gifted to me by
plaintiff.
6.

In December, 1983, AlA Services Corporation was formed for the purpose

of assisting in the settlement of Reed Taylor's divorce, which was paid for and financed
by company funds. AlA Services Corporation owns all of the issued and outstanding
shares of stock in AlA Insurance, Inc.
7.

In the 1983 reorganization, I received my initial shares of AlA Services

stock in exchange for my interest in the Life Insurance Company of Idaho, a life
insurance company.
8.

In 1995, AlA Services Corporation entered into various agreements with

the Plaintiff to effectuate his retirement and to buyout the Plaintiffs interest in AlA
Services. The purchase price, including transfer of airplanes, personal debt, and other
assets totaled nearly $10,000,000.

AlA Services issued 295,000 shares of Series C

Preferred stock, in the amount of $2,950,000 to assist in the financing of this leveraged
buyout.

Due to complex accounting rules, the purchase price caused an immediate

reduction to the capital of AlA Services.
9.

AlA Services Corporation is indebted to the plaintiff under the terms of a

written agreement which has been amended and modified by written and oral agreements.
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One of such modifications is attached as Exhibit A hereto. Plaintiff alleges that AlA
Services Corporation is in default under the terms of the agreements and defendants
allege that AlA Services Corporation is not in default.
10.

Throughout the period from the initial leveraged buyout, AlA Services

and AlA Insurance have been managed properly and profitably, to the extent Plaintiff has
received over $8,000,000 in payments since the transaction occurred.
11.

Unfortunately for the business, the Plaintiff did not retire. He maintained

an office at the Company headquarters and had access to all company information, freely
offering advice and direction. At times he served on the Board of Directors or advisory
boards of AlA Insurance and AlA Services. He has had a standing offer to rejoin the
Board, as a member or observer, which was reiterated late last year. No information was
refused to him or his financial advisors.

The financial statements of the operating

companies have been audited by major, independent Certified Public Accountants.
12.

From 1995 to 1997, nearly all of the commissions and revenues of AlA

Insurance came from the Universe Life Insurance Company and Centennial Life
Insurance Company. Like much of the U.S. health insurance industry at that time, they
became impaired as a result of small group reforms, stiffer capital requirements, rapid
medical cost inflation, and other reasons. By 1997, Universe Life began steps toward
liquidation, along with the Centennial Life Insurance Company. With the assistance of
the Idaho Department of Insurance, much of the grower health insurance business was
transferred to Trustmark Insurance Company, where it remains today. However, much of
the business lapsed in the intervening years.
13.

During these times, many of the agents and agencies that traditionally

represented AlA left the company. The plaintiff exacerbated the sales force decline by
forming a competing company, which further caused the decimation of the company's
sales force and independent agency system. Plaintiff actually induced AlA agents to
leave the company and work for plaintiff.
14.

Begimling in 1999, Cro"pUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. was formed to

explore the possibility of marketing crop insurance to the same client base. CropUSA
raised funds independently of AlA Insurance to operate, but agreed to assist AlA
Insurance with overhead and agency costs and to reimburse AlA Insurance for salaries,
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rent, office space, and other costs when appropriate. AlA and CropUSA plan to work
together to build a revitalized sales team.

In addition to assisting AlA Insurance in

rebuilding its agency force and sales staff, AlA would receive an exclusive right to
market health and disability products to CropUSA crop insurance clients.
15.

From 2000 to 2003, the plaintiff and I negotiated and renegotiated the

terms of the redemption agreement and payment of the interest and principal to plaintiff.
Finally, after nearly three years, plaintiff decided to keep his note from AlA Insurance,
forego any equity position in the companies, and have AlA Services accrue any unpaid
interest. In addition, plaintiff agreed to accept partial interest payments of $15,000 per
month, plus other payments on his behalf for his pilot and ranch hand of approximately
$10,000 per month, for a total of nearly $25,000 per month. We agreed that no principal
was to be paid to plaintiff on his retirement note until the redemption of all the Series A
Preferred Stock held by Donna Taylor. (See attached Exhibit A) I further agreed to
guarantee the redemption of Donna Taylor's debt with plaintiff. During this period, I was
not taking a monthly salary in order to assist in conserving cash.
16.

Additionally, the plaintiff agreed to defer his receipt of the unpaid

principal and interest on his note until the companies were financially able to be
restructured and to redeem his note. He was provided written business plans and budgets
outlining the plans and he agreed to the objectives. When the plan achieved breakeven
status, at about $35 million in new business placements, the companies could begin
catching up on accrued interest payments. When the companies achieved $60 million in
new business placements, the companies would then be able to retire his note and redeem
all the outstanding preferred shares of AlA Services.
17.

The companies had hoped to achieve the above goals by this time, but

Plaintiff s interference with various agents and insurers delayed full implementation of
the agreed plan for at least three years.
18.

In March of 2006, I ordered the plaintiff not to interfere with or contact

the agents, employees or sales managers of the companies and not to contact any
commodity association directors. I further isolated all sales managers from the plaintiff s
demands, directives, and sales tactics. Further, it became apparent that plaintiff would
not or could not pass his property and casualty license exams and may have been
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improperly assisting other agents in the solicitation of insurance, so I forbade Plaintiff
from contacting any farmer for the purpose of soliciting insurance, as required by law. I
reiterated that demand to him in a letter in February 2007 which is attached hereto as
Exhibit B.
19.

CropUSA has become very successful. I believe it will meet its goals in

this first year of operation with Clearwater Insurance Company. To date, it has placed
nearly $20 million in crop insurance business and is on target to achieve over $30 million
this crop year. In addition, with a rebuilt sales team, other insurers are now interested in
providing AlA Insurance with new health insurance products.
20.

Plaintiff now wants to benefit from the success of the companies and

wants to again renegotiate his retirement note. Soon after securing adequate lines of
credit to rebuild the agency force, the plaintiff has renewed his determination to
renegotiate so that he can grab an equity interest in addition to the retirement note. The
acts outlined by the plaintiffs allegations are untrue and colored by his extreme jealousy.
21.

Plaintiff now alleges, as an egregious event of default, that the company

failed to provide a lock box that diminished his security. In fact, plaintiff consented to
and was intricately involved in the termination of the lock box agreement by his efforts
and consent to assist in the transfer of the AlA Insurance block of health insurance
business in 1997 from Universe Life and Centennial Life insurance companies to
Trustmark Insurance Company. Trustmark would not allow a lock box requirement. The
need for the lockbox was discussed with plaintiff and his advisors and it was jointly
terminated ten years ago as unnecessary and wasteful, especially since AlA began
collecting all the premiums in Lewiston on behalf of Trustmark. (Prior to the Trustmark
transfer, the premiums had been collected in Kansas City)
22.

Plaintiff mischaracterizes the August 2004 transaction between CropUSA

and AlA Insurance of $1.5 million as a transfer. In fact, as reported to plaintiff at the
time, AlA took advantage of an opportunity to purchase a substantial amount of the
Preferred Series C stock of AlA Services Corporation from CropUSA at a substantial
discount to its par value. The Series C stock had been issued originally to assist with the
payments to the plaintiff under the 1995 agreements.
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23.

Plaintiff has personal knowledge that all payments among the entities

controlled by me are accounted for and fully balanced during the course of business and
detailed in the annual audited statements provided to him. The Plaintiff fails to note any
of the inter-company payables AlA Insurance owes to the other entities.
24.

After 2005, plaintiff ran out of money and demanded additional payments

from the company, which I repeatedly resisted.

Plaintiff has been pressuring the

company since that time to make additional payments to him outside of our modified
agreement in order to support his airplanes and lifestyle.
25.

During 2006, the companies arranged a line of credit from a lender for up

to $15 million dollars. The previous line of credit with Zions bank was not adequate to
enable the company to grow as fast as outlined by the company business plan.

The

amount of the loan able to be drawn is dependent on the commissions receivable by
CropUSA and the amount of certificates of deposits posted by shareholders.

Begilming

this year, the borrowing capacity will enable AlA Insurance to begin carrying its plans to
reintroduce a new medical product to association members. Plaintiff knew of the terms
of this agreement, received drafts of the agreement, and eagerly anticipated the new line
because it so increased his prospects of being paid off.
26.

Since the leveraged buyout and retirement plan for the plaintiff, I have

limited my salary to less than the level agreed to by the 1995 documents, including
payments made on his behalf AlA Insurance. The plaintiff knows that I did not receive a
monthly salary in 2001, and intentionally misleads the court to believe otherwise.
27.

Plaintiff further misinforms the court by characterizing a work sheet

detailing a line item on a CropUSA financial statement as

an inappropriate loan from the

company 401 (k) plan to CropUSA. The plaintiff has been advised and knows that the
transaction was a purchase of short term mortgages on commercial properties located in
Minneapolis and Houston, which is entirely permissible, and for an amount substantially
less than plaintiff alleges.
28.

For over twelve years, as CEO of AlA Insurance and AlA Services, I have

made the decisions for the operations, development, and management of the companies in
their overall best interests for all the stakeholders, consistent with sound business
principles and business judgment. As a Third Party Administrator, agent, and Managing
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General Underwriter, the company maintains the highest standards of integrity in all its
transactions. All activities are intricately reviewed in the CPA audits, by government
auditors, and by financial institution auditors.
Dated February

1 (/{I1.
C7 0
.,

2007.

SUBSCRlVED AND SWORN to this .......:d=-<6
_ _ _ day of February, 2007.

g,U2U

jl
UUJOYYQI\!'Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho,
<

v\

Residing at Lewiston, therein.
My Commission Expires: \0-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Ir.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Ionathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

_ _ _ _ _ U.S. MAIL
_ _ _ _ HAND DELIVERED
________ OVERNIGHTMUUL
_ _X
TELECOPY (FAX)

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
Michael E. McNichols
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February 27,2001

Donna Taylor
3730 Nicklaus Drive
Clarkston, Wa. 99403
Dear Ms. Taylor,

AlA is developing a new crop insurance program through a
new company called CropUSA. We will be filing a Form D stock
registration for the agencies who join with CropUSA.
The costs of putting the CropUSA program together in Texas
have been paid. AlA now needs to launch in five new territories next
Month.
AlA requests it be allowed to defer the stock redemption payments
to you for the next five months. Even though redemption is deferred, AIA.will
continue to accrue the interest on the interest payments not made.
AlA will agree to work with you to restructure your payments so your
redemption payments are converted to other in,come so you can set up a SEP or Defined
Benefit plan. When you become a consultant, we can add you to the current
AlA health plan. You will have the option to convert some of your Preferred A
Stock to CropUSA on the same rate as offered to the C stock

It will take a few months to set this all up. We will work with your
Accountant or will introduce you to CPA's here or in Spokane who can set up
the right tax plan.
Your preferred A stock has the highest priority, above the payments
to Reed, the Preferred C, and the common stock .. Reed and John will
guarantee the deferred payments.

Sincerely,

Reed 1. Tay

Accepted

R. John Taylor

iLl :sf~
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"CropUSA
Insurance

111 Main Street· Po. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501
800-635-1519
208-799-9000
208-746-8159 fax
\·\f\.\fVi.

CropUSAinsurancc. com

February 1, 2007

Mr. Reed Taylor
7498 Lapwai Road
Lewiston,ID 83501

Facsimile transmission: 746-1846
Dear Mr. Taylor:
Recently you requested business cards from Growers National Co-op. I want to remind you
again that you are not authorized to solicit insurance on behalf of Growers National or CropUSA
as you do not have a property & casualty insurance license. You CanJ;1ot accompany other agents
in any meeting in which they may be soliciting new clients. I have let Lynne and Jud know that
as well. Thank you for your cooperation.
CropUSAIGrowers National Co-op

L
Jolm Taylor
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,
v.

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and
the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,
Defendants.

Case No.: CV-07-00208
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF HIS EMERGENCY
MOTION AND MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF
JOHN TAYLOR, AlA INSURANCE,
AND AlA SERVICES FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") submits Memorandum of Law in Support of his
Emergency Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to the Defendants
AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services"), AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance"), and R.

...J
c:(
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John Taylor's Motion for Preliminary Injunction:

I.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND REQUIREMENTS FOR PRELMINARY INJUNCTION
I.R.C.P. 65(e) specifies the grounds for issuance of a Preliminary Injunction. The rule

provides as follows in pertinent part:
(e) Grounds for Preliminary Injunction.

A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases:
(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period
or perpetually.
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commISSIOn or
continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or
irreparable injury to the plaintiff.
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens,
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of
the plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
(4) When it appears, by affidavit, that the defendant during the pendency of the
action, threatens, or is about to remove, or to dispose of the defendant's property
with intent to defraud the plaintiff, an injunction order may be granted to restrain
the removal or disposition.
(5) A preliminary injunction may also be granted on the motion of the defendant
upon filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon any of the grounds
mentioned above in this section, subject to the same rules and provisions provided
for the issuance of injunctions on behalf of the plaintiff.
I.R.C.P.65(e)(1)-(5).
The party who seeks an injunction has the burden of proving the right thereto. Harris v.
Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988 (1984) (citing Lawrence Warehouse Co. v.
Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 (1965)).
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SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND IN
OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION - 2

3f3

Under LR. C.P. 65( e)(1), a party is entitled to a preliminary injunction if he demonstrates
"substantial likelihood of success" at trial. Harris, 106 Idaho at 518. However, the "substantial
likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that [the moving parties] are entitled to the relief
they demanded cannot exist where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from
doubt." ld. In the present case, Reed Taylor has demonstrated substantial likelihood of success
at trial based on the evidence presented below, and for the same reasons, the Defendants have
failed to show any likelihood that they would obtain any relief at trial.
Under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2), the moving party is entitled to a Preliminary Injunction when "it
appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance of some act during the
litigation would produce waste or great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff" I.R.C.P.65(e)(2).
A.

A Preliminary Injunction Cannot Undo That Which Has Already Been Done.

No preliminary injunction may be granted for an action that has already been done.
Cooper v Milam, 256 S.W.2d 196, 201 (1953)(the Bank's vote of shares cannot be enjoined
because the vote already took place).
Here, the Defendants John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance are seeking a
Preliminary Injunction to prevent Reed Taylor from voting the pledged shares. Reed Taylor
provided notices ofms demand to hold a shareholder meeting to replace the board of directors on
December 12,2006, and January 25, 2007. See Plaintiffs Ex. G and AG.! The Defendants had
over 60 days to request a TRO or Preliminary Injunction barring Reed Taylor from voting the
shares, but the Defendants failed to do so.
III

I

Plaintiffs Exhibits A-X are identical to Exhibits A-X attached to the Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor.
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Pursuant to the right granted to him under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge
Agreement, Reed Taylor voted the pledged shares thereby replacing AlA Insurance's board of
directors, replacing AlA Insurance's officers, terminated John Taylor's employment, and took
other appropriate board actions. See Plaintiff's Exs. K_L. 2
B.

John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction Should Be Denied.

John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance are not entitled to a preliminary injunction
enjoining Reed Taylor from enforcing the actions rightfully taken through the Consents dated
February 22,2007, or from voting the pledged shares in the future as he deems appropriate.
C.

Reed Taylor is Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction.

For the reasons set forth herein and provided at the time of the hearing, Reed Taylor is
entitled to a preliminary injunction against AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and John Taylor
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(e)(I), (2), (3), or (4).3
1. No Bond Is Required for Reed Taylor's Preliminary Injunction.

The Court has the discretion of not requiring a party to post security for a Preliminary
Injunction. Hutchins v. Trombley, 95 Idaho 360, 364, 509 P.2d 579 (1973).
Because no net costs, damages or attorneys' fees would result in issuing Reed Taylor's
Preliminary Injunction, the court should not require any security, particularly in light of the $8.1
Million admittedly owed to Reed Taylor.
III
2 AlA Insurance acknowledged Reed Taylor's right to call a meeting to vote the pledged shares.
See
Plaintiff's Ex. AF.
3 Contrary to allegations made by the Defendants, Reed Taylor specifically cited I.R.C.P. 65 as authority
for the Court to grant his requested relief in his Emergency Motion in the form of a TRO.
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Even if the Court believed security was appropriate, no security should be required
because of the $8.1 Million admittedly owed to Reed Taylor. This argument is further supported
by the Affidavit of Connie Taylor, where she alleges the appraised value of Connie Taylor and
John Taylor's majority ownership in AlA Services and Crop USA is a combined $1.5 Million.

4

AlA Services, by and through its Accounting Manager Aimee Gordon, admits that Reed Taylor
is owed $8,189,614. 5 See Affidavit of Aimee Gordon, p. 2, ~ 5.
Therefore, security should not be required because any amounts which could be allegedly
owed by Reed Taylor could simply be credited as an offset to the $8.1 Million owed to him. 6

II.

AlA SERVICES IS IN NUMEROUS MATERIAL DEFAULTS
A.

Default is Defined by Section 7 of the Amended and Restated Stock Purchase
Agreement (Pertinent Portions of Sections 7(a), (b), (c), (d), and (g).

The Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement is clear in that "[a]ny one of the
following events shall constitute a default by [AIA Services) under this Agreement."
Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 7-8, § 7.

See

More recently, Reed Taylor provided written notice of the

Defendants' various defaults on December 12, 2006. See Plaintiffs Ex. F. Significantly, the
Defendants have failed to cure the defaults for over 70 days.7

4 The value of Connie Taylor or John Taylor's shares in AlA Services is irrelevant. Reed Taylor stands as
by far the single largest creditor of AlA Services and would be entitled to full payment of the $8.1 Million owed to
him before shareholders would receive a dime. Furthermore, Connie Taylor has no interest in AlA Insurance and
has no standing to argue against any court action or preliminary injunction granted against AlA Insurance.
5 Aimee Gordon admits that payment was made on Reed Taylor's $6 Million Note from $307,271 for
amounts owed by John Taylor. While this transaction is believed to have occurred in or around 2001-2002, it is
worthy to note that Aimee Gordon did not add additional interest which would have accrued on the $307,271 over
several years.
6 Reed Taylor has not audited the amount owed to him and thus any reference in his pleadings is not an
admission of the amount being correct, but rather an acknowledgment that he believed the amount is over $8
Million, as may be allocated among the various defendants.
7 AlA Services right to vote the shares of AlA Insurance terminated years ago upon AlA Services
insolvency and other material breaches under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
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The various events of default, each of which results in the right to vote the pledged shares
being terminated for AlA Services and irrevocably vested in Reed Taylor, are addressed
separately in the following 5 sections:
1.

Defaults under Section 7(a) of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services is in Default for the failure to pay Reed Taylor "either directly or through
Bank ... within ten (10) days of the date due any principal or interest under the Amended Down
Payment Note or $6M Note. See Plaintiff's Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(a).
Payments of interest must be made monthly and the entire $6,000,000 principal was due
on August 1, 2005. See Plaintiffs Ex. A, p. 1. Reed Taylor is presently owed $7,889,843
according to calculations provided by AlA Services, which have been inappropriately altered
since December 31, 2006. 8 See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, Exs. 1-2.
AlA Services is in default, and has been in default, on the monthly interest payments due
on the $6,000,000 Promissory Note for years. See Plaintiffs Exs. AJ (Exhibit demonstrates that
over $1,000,000 in accrued past-due interest was owed for years). In addition, AlA Services is
in default, and has been in default, for the failure to pay the $6,000,000 principal due on August
1,2005.
III

8 In the Reed Taylor Long Term Note Account statement provided by John Taylor shortly after January 1,
2007, AlA Services' shows that $5,692,729 in principal had been due for over 16 months and accrued interest of
$2,197,114 was also past due. See Plaintiffs Ex. AJ; Affidavit of Roderick Bond, Exs. 1-2. Reed Taylor recently
discovered that John Taylor had inappropriately extinguished a personal debt of $307,271 owed to AlA Services by
crediting Reed Taylor's promissory note with a payment by transferring the $307,271 owed by John Taylor to Reed
Taylor's $6 Million Promissory Note without Reed Taylor's knowledge or consent. After this inappropriate
transaction was pled in the First Amended Complaint, a new document surfaced showing that the balance of the note
was revised back to $6,000,000. See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, Exs. 1-2. This inappropriate action is
acknowledged in the Affidavit of Aimee Gordon, p. 2, ~ 5.
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2.

Defaults under Section 7(b) of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services is also in default for the failure of the Bank to transfer the monthly interest
payments due on the $6,000,000 and the principal balance. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(b).
The defaults under Section 7(b) are essentially identical to the defaults in Section 7(a) with the
difference being that the payments were not made by the Banle
3.

Defaults under Section 7(c) of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services is, and has been, in default for its failure to comply with Section 4 of the
Amended and Restated Security Agreement and the Lockbox Agreement. See Plaintiff sEx. C,
p. 8, § 7(c). Under the terms of the Amended Security Agreement, Reed Taylor was granted the
exclusive security interest in all commissions earned by AlA Insurance and AIA Services and all
such commissions were required to be held in trust for Reed Taylor in a designated Lock Box
Account. See Plaintiffs Ex. 4, p. 2-3, § 4. AlA Insurance and AlA Services have failed to
comply with Section 4 of the Amended Security Agreement and have refused to advise Reed
Taylor of the location of the required lock box. See Plaintiffs Ex. F; Affidavit of Roderick
Bond,

~

4 and Ex. 3.

Because AlA Services and AlA Insurance have failed to comply with the Lock Box
provision, Reed Taylor is unable to seize AlA Insurance's commissions for which he holds a
valid security interest.

4.

Defaults under Section 7(d) of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.

In addition to the specific events of default listed under Section 7, an event of default also
occurs upon the breach of any warranty, representation, covenant, term or condition contained in
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the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement which materially and adversely impairs the
value of the commission collateral or the pledged shares or Reed Taylor's ability to enforce his
rights to the commission collateral or pledged shares. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(d).
An event of default under Section 7(d) has occurred and not been cured under the
following sections, each of which terminates AlA Services' right to vote the shares and vests the
right to vote exclusively with Reed Taylor (See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 7, § 6):

a)

Breaches of Section 3. 7(b) of the Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement.

Under Section 3.7(b), AlA Services is required to fully and punctually perform any duty
required of it in connection with the pledged shares in AlA Insurance and the commission
collateral and will not take any action that will impair, damage or destroy such pledged
collateral. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(d).
AlA Services and AlA Insurance have utilized funds which Reed Taylor held a valid
security interest to invest in companies controlled by John Taylor such as Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., Pacific Empire Communications Corporation, Pacific Empire Holdings
Corporation, Sound Insurance, and Pacific Empire Radio Corporation.

The names of these

companies appear on various check registers, financial statements and reports issued by AlA
Services or AlA Insurance. See Plaintiffs Ex. R, U, V, AL-AV. In addition, AlA Services has
provided free rent, free labor, free costs and other services to other parties to Reed Taylor'S
detriment.
For example, in 2004, AlA Insurance purchased Preferred C Shares of AlA Services for
over $1,500,000. See Plaintiffs Exs. U, AT, AU, and AV. In another example, AlA Insurance
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guaranteed a $15,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance, Inc. and received no
consideration, no equity, no collateral-nothing in return. Such actions have significantly and
materially impaired the value of the shares in AlA Insurance and its commissions-both of
which Reed Taylor has a valid security interest and, in the case of the shares, the right to vote.
See Plaintiff's Ex. R.
The above actions, together with the countless loans and equity infusions into the entities
listed above and all of the breaches of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
constitute an event of default for the impairment of the value of the pledged shares and
commission collateral. Moreover, AlA Insurance's guarantee of Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc.'s $15,000,000 loan is material breach of AlA Insurance's Bylaws. 9
b)

Breaches of Section 4.3 of Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services has materially breached the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge
Agreement by failing to provide Reed Taylor with yearly audited financial statements or
financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. See Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.3.
AlA Services has not obtained audited financial statements for 2000 through 2006. See
Plaintiff's Exs. W, X, and AQ-AT.
III

1//

9 "[AlA Insurance) shall not lend money or to use its credit to assist its directors without authorization in
the particular case by its stockholders." See Plaintiffs Ex. M, p. 22, § 14.1. AlA Services was also in default when
the $15,000,000 loan for Crop USA was executed by John Taylor in October 2006.
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c)

Breaches of Section 4.4 of Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services has materially breached the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge
Agreement by failing to provide Reed Taylor with monthly income statements. See Plaintiffs
Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.4.

d)

Breaches of Section 4.5 of Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services is not providing Reed Taylor with weekly summaries of new insurance
business submitted or with weekly, month-to-date and year-to-date summaries of such new
business. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.5.
Reed Taylor is unable to assess the value of the pledged shares and commission collateral
without the required financial information.
e)

Breaches of Section 4.6 of Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services is in material breach for failing to provide Reed Taylor with pertinent
information regarding the collateral accounts which were required to be maintained to protect
Reed Taylor's security interest. AlA Services has also failed to identify the banks and account
numbers to Reed Taylor to allow him to take control of the commission collateral.

See

Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.6. Without this information, Reed Taylor has lost his express right to
obtain the commission collateral in AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's accounts to make
payments on the millions of dollars owed to him.
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Breaches of Section 4.8 of Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services and AlA Insurance have been providing loans, funds, labor, services and
supplies to affiliated companies who are not owned by AlA Services or AlA Insurance. See
Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.8. As discussed above, there have been significant loans and funds
diverted to entities controlled by John Taylor. Significantly, John Taylor went so far as to loan
money to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. by improperly utilizing funds from the AlA
Services 401 (k) Plan.1O Again, many of these inappropriate loans or conveyances are improper
and in clear breach of Section 4.8. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.8.

g)

Breaches of Section 4.9 of Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services agreed to not subject any of Reed Taylor's commISSIon collateral or
pledged shares to any encumbrance. See Plaintiff sEx. C, p. 6, § 4.9. AlA Services and John
Taylor improperly had AlA Insurance guarantee a $15,000,000 revolving line-of-credit for Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc. This loan is subjecting AlA Insurance to significant exposure to
liabilities of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., an entity in which AlA Insurance has no equity
or ownership interest, and AlA Insurance has nothing to gain for guaranteeing such loan. See
Plaintiffs Ex. Q.
Significantly, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. is presently in default on the
$15,000,000 because of AlA Insurance's inability to service its debts. See Plaintiffs Ex. R, p.
37, § 7.1 (a)-(b ) (among others). Even though AlA Insurance received no consideration for the
10 Loans such as this, together with other inappropriate investments, constitute John Taylor's breach of
fiduciary duties under ERISA, as a Trustee of the Plan.
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loan guarantee and no benefit, Reed Taylor's pledged shares and commission collateral are now
impaired because of the guarantee and the likelihood that AlA Insurance will be forced to seek a
termination of the guarantee under Reed Taylor's direction.

b)

Breaches of Section 4.10 of Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement.

AlA Services was required to allow Reed Taylor or a party designated by him to act as a
member of the board of directors until his $6,000,000 Promissory Note was paid in full, plus
accrued interest. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.10. AlA Services has breached its obligation to
ensure Reed Taylor or his designee is a member of the board since 2001, which was the last year
Reed Taylor was a member of the Board of Directors of AlA Services. See Plaintiff sEx. AKII
Although Reed Taylor demanded to be placed upon the board on December 12, 2006
(See Plaintiffs Ex. F), AlA Services has refused to honor this significant obligation.

AlA

Services failure to ensure that Reed Taylor was a member of the board and the failure to hold
board meetings constitute an event of default and further prevented Reed Taylor from having
knowledge of the transfers, advances, and loans which are now subject to claims set forth in the
First Amended Complaint.

i)

If the Breaches Identified in Subsections (a)-(i) Above Do Not

Constitute Defaults, the Combination of All of Them Are a
Material Event of Default.
If the events of default listed in Sections 4(a)-(h) are not each individually viewed as
default by the Court, the cumulative effect of all of the above defaults also result in an event of
11 Although Reed Taylor was listed as a member of the board of directors of AlA Services for 2001, he was
not invited to or present at any board meetings.
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default.
5.

Section 7(g) Defaults.

If either ALA Services or ALA Insurance becomes insolvent, then such insolvency
constitutes an event of default.

See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(g). ALA Services has been

insolvent for years. See Plaintiffs Exs. AJ, AL-AT.12
III.

REED TAYLOR WAS AND IS ENTITLED TO VOTE THE SHARES OF AlA
INSURANCE WITHOUT ANY INTERFERENCE FROM THE DEFENDANTS
Section 6 of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, entered into as of July

1, 1996, provides in pertinent part:
So long as no Default under this Agreement has occurred and is continuing, [ALA
Services] shall be entitled to exercise any voting rights incident to the Pledged
Collateral [all of the shares of ALA Insurance J. . .. Upon the occurrence and
continuation of a Default, [ALA Insurance's] right to exercise such voting rights
shall immediately cease and terminate and all voting rights with respect to the
Pledged Collateral [all of the shares of ALA Insurance] shall rest solely and
exclusively in [Reed Taylor]. The foregoing sentence shall constitute a grant to
[Reed Taylor] an irrevocable proxy coupled with an interest to vote the Pledged
Collateral [all of the shares of ALA Insurance] upon the occurrence and
continuation of such a Default, and any officer of.. . [ALA Insurance] ... may rely
on written notice from [Reed Taylor] as to the existence of a Default and [Reed
Taylor's] right to vote such Pledged Collateral [all of the shares of ALA
Insurance] .
(Emphasis added.) See Plaintiffs Ex. C.
Based upon the multiple Defaults addressed above, Reed Taylor was at all material times
entitled to vote the shares of ALA Insurance.
At the time the original Share Pledge Agreement was executed and at the time the
12 A "debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets, at a fair
valuation" or a debtor is also insolvent if he "is generally not paying his or her debts as they become due." See I.e.
§ 55-911(1)-(2).
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Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement was executed, 10hn Taylor executed, on behalf
of AlA Services, Assignments Separate From Certificates, Exhibits A-3 to the respective
Agreements, which Assignments assigned and transferred all of the common stock of AlA
Insurance to Reed Taylor. The Assignments provide:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned [AlA Services] hereby assigns and
transfers to REED J. TAYLOR 6,219 shares of the cornmon stock standing in the
name of [AlA Services] on the books of AIA Insurance, Inc. and represented by
Certificate(s) No. 10 and 11 herewith, and hereby irrevocably constitutes and
appoints the Secretary of AlA Insurance, Inc. as attorney to transfer that stock on
the books of such corporate with full power of substitution in the premises. This
Assignment is made pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Agreement
dated as the date hereof and in connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement
dated July 22, 1995, between [AlA Services] and Reed 1. Taylor, and may be used
to transfer the above-described shares of stock after a Default as such is defined
under said Amended and Restated Pledge Agreement.
See Plaintiff's Exs. C-D.
On two occasions, Reed Taylor scheduled meetings of the shareholder of AlA
Insurance, himself. By letter of December 12, 2006, from attorney Patrick Moran, Reed
Taylor advised John Taylor, on behalf of AlA Services, that AlA Services was, and had
been for some time, in Default under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, among
other Agreements. Mr. Moran's letter further detailed the various Defaults, and stated:

Mr. Taylor intends to exercise all voting rights with respect to the Pledged
Collateral, including, without limitation, election of a revised board of
directors ....
Pursuant to this right, Mr. Taylor formally demands as follows:

***
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2. AlAI call a special meeting of the shareholders for the purpose of electing a
new board of directors. Mr. Taylor demands that the special shareholder meeting
occur at the corporate office located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, at 1 pm
on December 26, 2006. Mr. Taylor shall be attending along with counsel.
Attached hereto is the notice as provided in I.e. § 30-1-702. The purpose of the
special meeting of shareholders will be to take action to elect a revised board of
directors. Immediately after the meeting, the newly elected board shall conduct a
meeting to elect revised officers of AlAI.
See Plaintiff's Ex. F.
Accompanying Mr. Moran's letter was a Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders
dated December 12,2006, signed by Reed Taylor. See Plaintiff's Ex. G.
Defendant John Taylor, on behalf of AlA Services, responded to Mr. Moran's letter by
his letter of December 21,2006, See Plaintiff's Ex. AE. In his letter, John Taylor stated:
We acknowledge that Reed Taylor has a security interest in AlA Insurance, Inc.
and may have the right to take the actions outlined in your letter.
John Taylor further clearly acknowledged in his letter that he understood that Reed
Taylor intended to vote all of the shares of AlA Insurance to remove the company's Directors.
In closing, John Taylor stated:
The offices of AlA will be closed on December 26, 2006, for the holidays and no
one is authorized to use the facility without permission.
By letter of January 3, 2007, Plaintiff's Ex. AF, John Taylor further corresponded with
Patrick Moran, attorney for Reed Taylor. In his letter, John Taylor acknowledged that he fully
understood Reed Taylor's intentions with regard to a special shareholder meeting and removal of
the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance when he stated:
I fully recognize that Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate,
including calling a special shareholders meeting.
III
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On February 1,2007, Reed Taylor caused to be delivered to the offices of AlA Insurance
a second Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders, Plaintiffs Ex. AG, this time scheduling the
meeting for 10 a.m. on February 5,2007, at the offices of AlA Insurance. As with the December
12,2006, Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders, this Notice stated:
The purpose of the special meeting of shareholders will be to take action to elect a
revised Board of Directors. Immediately after the meeting, the newly elected
Board shall conduct a meeting to elect new officers of AlA.
At all times, Defendants John Taylor, AlA Services, and AlA Insurance were fully aware
and had been advised in writing of the December 26, 2006, and February 5, 2007, meetings of
shareholders scheduled by Reed Taylor to dismiss the existing Board of Directors, appoint a new
Board, and thereafter elect new officers of AlA Insurance.
As indicated in Mr. Moran's December 12, 2006, letter, See Plaintiffs Ex. F, Reed
Taylor was providing notices of special meetings of shareholders in accordance with I.e. § 30-1702 (1)(b) which provides pertinent part:
(1) A corporation shall hold a special meeting of shareholders:

***

(b) If the holders of at least twenty percent (20%) of all the votes entitled to be
cast on any issue proposed to be considered at the proposed special meeting sign,
date and deliver to the corporation (1) or more written demands for the meeting
describing the purpose or purposes for which it is to be held ....
Despite the fact that Reed Taylor held 100% of the votes entitled to be cast, he was
denied a meeting by Defendants purporting act on behalf of AlA Insurance.
It is noteworthy that in addition to the very clear direction contained in section 6 of the

Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, See Plaintiffs Ex. C, executed on behalf of
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AlA Services by John Taylor, section 11.2(a) of the same Agreement provides:
[AlA Services] will sign such additional documents relating to the Pledged
Collateral [all shares of AlA Insurance] as [Reed Taylor] may reasonably request
in order to provide [Reed Taylor] with the full benefit of this Agreement. [AIA
Services] hereby grants to [Reed Taylor] a power of attorney to execute any such
documents as [AlA Services'] attorney-in-fact. Such power of attorney is coupled
with an interest and shall be irrevocable until the Secured Obligations have been
fully and finally paid.
In response to Reed Taylor's second Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders,
scheduling a meeting at the corporation's offices for February 5, 2007, JoLee Duclos, purporting
to act as Secretary for AlA Insurance, responded by letter of February 1,2007, Plaintiffs Ex. H,
which letter was drafted by Chicago counsel for John Taylor, James Gatziolis, of the firm of
Quarles & Brady LLP. Mr. Gatziolis' authorship of the letter is evidenced by the legend in the
lower lefthand comer.

By this letter, this Ms. Duclos advised Mr. Taylor that the sole

stockholder of AlA Insurance was AlA Services, and that only the Board of Directors or
shareholders holding at least 20% of the stock could call a special meeting of the shareholders.
Ms. Duclos further requested that Reed Taylor provide evidence of his authority. In closing, Ms.
Duclos stated:
Please do not enter the Corporation's premises at the time above stated. You will
not be granted access to the Corporation's offices nor will a meeting of the
Stockholders occur at such time.
Reed Taylor responded to Ms. Duclos' letter the same day by letter dated February 1,
2007, hand delivered to her at AlA Insurance's office. See Plaintiffs Ex. 1. In his letter, Reed
Taylor provided Ms. Duclos with the evidence of his authority she had requested in her letter.
Reed Taylor next wrote to the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance on February 2,2007.
See Plaintiffs Ex. 1. In his letter, Reed Taylor reiterated his demand for a special shareholder
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meeting to be held February 5, 2007. He further advised in his letter of his intention to vote the
shares pledged to him to appoint new directors and officers.
After Defendants had repeatedly thwarted his efforts to schedule a special shareholder
meeting, Reed Taylor elected, as the sole shareholder of AlA Insurance, to execute a Consent In
Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance, by which he removed the existing
Directors and elected himself as the sole Director. See Plaintiff sEx. K.

Thereafter, Reed

Taylor executed a Consent In Lieu of Meeting of the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, and
removed the existing officers of the corporation, and appointed himself as the President,
Secretary and Treasurer.

See Plaintiffs Ex. L. Copies of both Consents were faxed to the

offices of counsel for John Taylor on the morning of February 25,2007. See Plaintiffs Ex. A W.
Reed Taylor'S actions in executing the two Consents were justified not only by the prior
wrongful conduct of John Taylor, but by Reed Taylor'S rights as the sole shareholder of AlA
Insurance, who, pursuant to LC. § 30-1-706 (1), had the right to waive any notice required by
Idaho's Corporations Act.
Although Reed Taylor had hoped that John Taylor would facilitate a peaceful transition
of the management of AlA Insurance, such has not been the case, as John Taylor has continued
to thwart his brother's rights and efforts at every instance.
Reed Taylor's actions in executing the Consents were further authorized by the Articles
of Incorporation of AlA Insurance, formally knows as A.LA., Inc.

Article Ten of the

corporation's Articles ofIncorporation, See Plaintiffs Ex. Y, provides in pertinent part:
(3) Any and all of the Directors of the Corporation may be removed at any time,
with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding
voting stock of the corporation.
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(4) The Board of Directors is especially authorized to remove at any time, with or
without cause, any officers of the corporation.
John Taylor has previously argued in his Declaration In Support of Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order that Reed Taylor cannot vote AlA Insurance's shares because they
have not been transferred into his name. The basis for this argument is Section 3.9 of the Bylaws
of AlA Insurance, Plaintiffs Ex. M, which provides:
A stockholder whose shares are pledged shall be entitled to vote such shares until
the shares have been transferred into the name of the pledgee ....

It is noteworthy that the statute reference stated in the Bylaws for the above noted provision has
been repealed, and is no longer in existence.
All of the shares of AlA Insurance were assigned and transferred into Reed Taylor's
name on July 22, 1995. See Plaintiffs Exs. D and E (Assignments Separate from Certificates).
By each Assignment, John Taylor, on behalf of AlA Services, stated that AlA Services "hereby
assigns and transfers to REED J. TAYLOR 6,279 shares of the common stock standing in the
name of the undersigned on the books of AlA Insurance, Inc and represented by Certificate(s)
No. 10 and 11 herewith .... " The shares are all of the outstanding shares in AlA Insurance and
such shares were assigned and transferred into the name of Reed Taylor on July 22, 1995.
Defendants' argument cannot defeat Reed Taylor's contractually proved voting rights
contained in Section 6 of the Amended and Restated Pledge Agreement, Plaintiff sEx. C, signed
on behalf of AlA Services by John Taylor. Reed Taylor was provided by such section with "an
irrevocable proxy coupled with an interest to vote the Pledged Collateral upon the occurrence
and continuation of such a Default, and any officer of. .. [AlA Insurance] ... may rely on written
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notice from [Reed Taylor] as to the existence of a Default and [Reed Taylor's] right to vote [the
shares of AlA Insurance]." See Plaintiffs Ex. C., p. 7, § 6.
Even if the Defendants contended that the shares had to be transferred on the books of
AlA Insurance into the name of Reed Taylor, which contention they do not make, and which is
not supportable, Defendants cannot thwart Reed Taylor'S entitlement to vote the shares pledged
to him pursuant to section 6 of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement by their own
actions in failing to transfer the stock on the books of the Corporation.
Reed Taylor's position is further supported by case law dealing with similar situations.
DeFelice v. Garon, 380 S.2d. 676 (La. App. 1980) involved a situation where pledgees were
contractually granted the unqualified right to vote the shares of stock pledged to them. The
Court distinguished other cases and stated:
The present case, however, does not involve a mere pledgee, but rather a pledgee
upon whom the owner of the stock has expressly conferred by contract the right to
vote the shares. Since R.S. 12: 75D requires a transfer on the books of the
Corporation to entitle the pledgee to vote the shares, the contract expressly
granting the pledgee the right to vote the shares can only be interpreted
reasonably as implicitly granting the pledgee the right to obtain a transfer of the
shares upon the books of the Corporation.
(Emphasis added.) DeFelice, 380 S.2d at 678.
The Court continued and stated:
The right to vote the shares (a right not necessarily accorded to a mere pledgee)
could hardly have been more clearly conferred, and with this right the pledgee
necessarily is given the right to take the formal steps necessary to accomplish
utilization of that right.
DeFelice, 380 S.2d at 678.

III
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Also on point is Valley International Properties, Inc. v. Los Campeones, Inc., 568 SW.2d
680 (Tex. App. 1978). In this case, the court held that a shareholder had a protectable property
interest in the corporation even though its stock was not registered or transferred on the books of
the corporation, and such shareholders should have been able to protect such interest by
demanding shareholders' meetings. In rendering its decision, the court stated:
The requirement that shares be registered is intended for the protection of the
corporation so that it may know who is entitled to vote, receive dividends, and
otherwise participate in other managerial functions.
Valley International Properties, 568 S.W.2d at 687.
No such difficulty is present here. There is no question that Reed Taylor is the only
person entitled to vote the shares of AlA Insurance. This is made clear not only by section 6 of
the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, but also by the Assignments Separate from
Certificates. Similarly, there is absolutely no question that AlA Services' rights to vote the shares
terminated long before Reed Taylor exercised his right to vote the shares. See Plaintiffs Ex. C.,
p. 7, § 6 ("Upon the occurrence and continuation of a Default, [AlA Services'] right to exercise
voting rights shall immediately cease and terminate ... ).
Finally, any contention that AlA Insurance's shares pledged to Reed Taylor must first be
transferred on the books of the Corporation before Reed Taylor is entitled to vote them has been
waived by both John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance by the documents executed at the
time these shares were pledged to Reed Taylor, including the Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement. In addition, Defendants are further estopped by their conduct to make such
contention. John Taylor acknowledged in his letter of December 21, 2006, to Patrick Moran,
Plaintiffs Ex. AE, that Reed Taylor had the right to vote the shares of AlA Insurance to oust the
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Directors. John Taylor acknowledged the same when he stated in his letter of January 3, 2007, to
Patrick Moran "I fully recognize that Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate,
including calling a special shareholders meeting." See Plaintiff's Ex. AF.

A.

AlA Services Has Waived and is Estopped from Contending Shares Must First
be Transferred on the Books of Corporation and From Asserting Any Other
Defense Under the Bylaws.

AlA Insurance's Bylaws may be altered or amended. See Plaintiff's Ex. M, p. 22, § 13.1.
AlA Insurance's Board of Directors consented to the rights granted to Reed Taylor in the
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.

See Plaintiff's Ex. AC and Schedule III

thereto. Moreover, a corporation's bylaws may be amended or waived by an informal action of
the board of directors. Hernandez v. Banco De Leas Americas, 116 Ariz. 552, 555, 570 P.2d 494
(1977)( approval of a contract by the directors constituted an informal waiver of the Bylaws).
Because the directors approved the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, any
inconsistencies between the rights granted to Reed Taylor and the Bylaws constitute a waiver of
the Bylaws.

IV.

THE TERMS OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
WERE NOT ORALLY MODIFIED BY THE PARTIES
A.

Terms of Promissory Note
1.

Oral Modification of the Terms of a Promissory Note is Barred by the
Statute of Frauds, I.e. § 9-505(5)

Each of the relevant Agreements, including the Promissory Note and the Stock Pledge
Agreements, contain clauses which bar subsequent oral modifications of the Agreements. All
modifications or amendments of the Agreements must be in writing to be enforceable.
III
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Below are the relevant clauses which reqUIre that all future modifications to the
Agreements be in writing:
ORAL AGREEMENTS OR ORAL COMMITMENTS TO LOAN MONEY,
EXTEND CREDIT, OR TO FORBEAR FROM ENFORCING
REPAYMENT OF A DEBT ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER IDAHO
LAW.
See Plaintiff s Ex. A (promissory Note, dated August 1, 1995).
The provisions of this Agreement may be amended only by the written agreement
of Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder and Creditor. Except as otherwise
provided herein, any waiver, permit, consent or approval of any kind or character
on the part of either Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder or Creditor of any
provision or condition of this Agreement must be made in writing and shall be
effective only to the extent specifically set forth in such writing. ... The waiver
by either Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder or Creditor of a breach of this
provision of this Agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any
subsequent breach.
See Plaintiffs Ex. B (Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, dated July 1, 1996).
No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the parties to this Agreement. No
waiver of Secured Party of any default shall be a waiver of any other default.
See Plaintiffs Ex. C (Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, dated July 1,
1996).
No prOVISIOn of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived or
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the party sought to be charged with
the amendment, modification, waiver or supplementation.
See Plaintiffs Ex. E (Amended and Restated Security Agreement, dated July 1, 1996).
Amendments and Waivers. The provisions of this agreement may be amended
only by the written agreement of the parties hereto. Except as otherwise provided
herein, any waiver, permit, consent or approval of any kind or character on the
part of either party of any provision or condition of this Agreement must be made
in writing and shall be effective only to the extent specifically set forth in such
writing. No action take pursuant to this Agreement, including any investigation
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by or on behalf either party, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver by the party
taking such action of compliance with any representation, warranty, covenant or
agreement contained herein. The waiver by any party hereto of a breach of any
provision of this Agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any
subsequent breach.
See Plaintiffs Ex. Z (Stock Redemption Agreement, dated July 22, 1995).
No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the parties to this Agreement. No
waiver by Secured Party of any default shall be a waiver of any other default.
See Plaintiffs Ex. AA (Stock Pledge Agreement, dated July 22,1995).
This Agreement and the other written documents, instruments and agreements
entered into in connection with the Secured Obligations contain the complete and
final expression of the entire agreement of the parties. No provision of this
Agreement may be amended, modified, waived or supplemented, except by a
writing signed by the party sought to be charged with the amendment,
modification, waiver or supplementation. No waiver by Secured Party of any
Default shall be a waiver of any other Default.
See Plaintiffs Ex. AB (Security Agreement, dated July 22, 1995).
B.

Oral Modification of the Terms of a Promissory Note is Barred by the
Statute of Frauds, I.e. § 9-505(5).

Pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, agreements to lend money must be in writing to be
enforceable. I.e. § 9-505(5) provides as follows in pertinent part:
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the \vriting or
secondary evidence of its contents:

* * *
5. A promise or commitment to lend money or to grant or extend credit in an
original principal amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, made by a
person or entity engaged in the business of lending money or extending credit.

I.e. § 9-505(5).
The subject Promissory Note falls within the statute of frauds as a commitment to lend
money of $50,000 or more. Therefore, the terms of the $6 Million Promissory Note must be in
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writing to be enforceable pursuant to I.C. § 9-505(5).
The $6 Million Promissory Note (See Plaintiff's Ex. A) falls within the Statute of Frauds
as a commitment to lend money of $50,000 or more. Therefore, any modifications to the terms
of the $6 Million Promissory Note must be in writing to be enforceable pursuant to I.C. § 9505(5).
Idaho Courts have recognized that any subsequent oral modifications of commitments to
lend money are barred by the Statute of Frauds. In USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First National
Bank, 120 Idaho 271, 815 P.2d 469 (1991), the plaintiff, USA Fertilizer, attempted to argue that
the lender, Idaho First, had orally modified the length of the terms of a written commitment to
lend money. The Idaho Court of Appeals summarily dismissed USA Fertilizer's argument of an
oral modification of the written document. The Court held that "to the extent that USA Fertilizer
seeks to argue the evidence as altering the original terms of the guarantee, we hold that such an
oral modification would be barred under the statute of frauds." USA Fertilizer, 120 Idaho at 275.
The holding of the Court in USA Fertilizer, 120 Idaho 271 is directly analogous to the
present case. It is anticipated that the Defendants will argue that the terms of the Promissory
Note have been modified by subsequent oral agreements between the parties. To the extent that
Defendants assert this argument, their argument fails under the Statute of Frauds and the holding
in USA Fertilizer.
C.

Even if the Court finds the Statute of Frauds Inapplicable, Defendants
Cannot Meet Their Burden of Proving Oral Modification by Clear and
Convincing Evidence

In the event Defendants argue that USA Fertilizer and the Statute of Frauds for
Promissory Notes is inapplicable, they are nonetheless unable to prove an oral modification to
the $6 Million Promissory Note or any other written documents entered into between the parties.
III
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While it is true that some courts have recognized that a party may orally modify a written
contract, in limited circumstances, the party asserting the oral modification has a difficult burden.
See e.g., Scott v. Castle, 105 Idaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163 (1983). "The party asserting an oral
modification of a written contract has the burden of proving the modification by clear and
convincing evidence." Scott, 105 Idaho at 724 (citing Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116,645 P.2d
350 (1982). In Scott, the appellant, Scott, entered into a purchase and sale agreement and note
with Castle to purchase real property. The purchase and sale agreement and note contained
provisions requiring that Scott make five annual payments of equal amount. Scott attempted to
argue that the parties had orally agreed to defer payments under the purchase and sale agreement
and note by contending the parties had a separate oral agreement and that Castle had acquiesced
in demanding payments. The court rejected Scott's argument holding that Castle had not met its
difficult burden of proving an oral modification by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 724.
In the present case, even if the Court finds that the Statute of Frauds does not preclude an
oral modification to the Promissory Note or other documents between the parties, Defendants
have not produced sufficient evidence of an oral modification.

V.

MICHAEL McNICHOLS AND HIS FIRM ARE BARRED BY RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FROM REPRESENTING AlA INSURANCE,
AlA SERVICES, AND JOHN TAYLOR DUE TO THE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST BETWEEN SUCH PERSONS AND ENTITIES 13
A.

RPC 1.7 Requires Mr. McNichols and His Firm From Representing AlA
Insurance, AlA Services and R. John Taylor.

Michael McNichols and the firm of Clements Brown & McNichols have formally
appeared as counsel of record in this matter for Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA
Insurance, Inc. and John Taylor. John Taylor is an officer and director of AlA Services and AlA
13 Mr. McNichols and his firm have also been terminated as counsel for AlA Insurance by Reed Taylor's
letter dated February 25, 2007, Plaintiffs Ex. N, which letter followed Reed Taylor assuming control of AlA
Insurance pursuant to the Consent in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance, Plaintiffs Ex. K.
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Insurance, and is also the majority shareholder of AlA Services.

Mr. McNichols' triple

representation of AlA Services, AlA Insurance and John Taylor in this lawsuit is conflict of
interest and not permitted under RPC 1.7.
Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct provide as follows, with respect to conflicts
between current clients:
RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including
family and domestic relationships.
RPC 1.7.
The conflict that exists in Mr. McNichols representation of AlA Insurance, AlA Services,
and John Taylor arises from the complaint filed by Reed Taylor. The complaint filed by Reed
Taylor alleges fraud and self-dealing committed by John Taylor against the corporations. See
First Amended Complaint, p. 13.

In addition, AlA Services has numerous shareholders who

may have claims against John Taylor and/or AlA Services may have claims against John Taylor.
See Plaintiff's Ex. AX (list of shareholders of AlA Services). Moreover, Reed Taylor is the
single largest creditor of AlA Services. See Plaintiff's Exs. AJ, AL-AT. Because the interests of
the corporations are in direct conflict with the interests each other and those of John Taylor, Mr.
McNichol's representation of AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and John Taylor is a conflict of
interest under RPC 1.7.
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Courts and commentators have consistently stated that an attorney cannot represent an
officer or director and the corporation when allegations of fraud are made against the officer or
director. Law of Corp. Officers & Dir.: Indemn. & Ins. § 4:5 (2006) ("An attorney may not
represent both the board of directors and the corporation where the directors are alleged to have
committed fraud."); Forrest v. Baeza, 58 Cal. App. 4th 65, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 (1st Dist. 1997)
(An attorney may not represent both corporation and directors in a shareholder suit where the
directors are alleged to have committed fraud.); Musheno v. Gensemer, 897 F. Supp. 833 (M.D.
Pa. 1995) (An attorney representing a corporation and its board of directors in a shareholder suit
would be disqualified from representing a corporation, where the complaint alleged fraud and
self-dealing by directors, revealing a clear divergence of interests between a corporation and its
directors). Similarly, Reed Taylor has alleged fraud and self-dealing committed by John Taylor
against the corporations and, thus, Mr. McNichols cannot represent the corporations and John
Taylor due to their conflicting interests.
Although Idaho courts have not addressed the issue of conflicts of interest during the dual
representation of an officer or director and a corporation, Idaho courts have held that the a
motion to disqualify is proper if there is a conflict of interest that bars representation. "The
decision to grant or to deny a motion to disqualify counsel is within the discretion of the trial
court." Crown v. Hawkins Co., 128 Idaho 114,910 P.2d 786 (1996) (citing Weaver v. Millard,
120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1991)). In Crown, the court denied the party's
motion to disqualify opposing counsel when it was made three weeks before the trial date. Id. at
122, 910 P.2d at 794. The court in Crown held that "a motion to disqualify opposing counsel
should be filed at the onset of the litigation, or 'with promptness and reasonable diligence' once
the facts upon which the motion is based have become known." Id. at 123,910 at 795 (quoting
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Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698,819 P.2d at 116).
In contrast to Crown and Weaver, Reed Taylor has brought this motion to disqualify at
the onset of litigation.

The trial date has not been scheduled and all Defendants have not

answered the First Amended Complaint. Given the lack of prejudice to Defendants John Taylor,
AlA Insurance, and AlA Services and the conflict that exists between John Taylor and the
corporations, the Court should disqualify Mr. McNichols from representing the conflicted
parties.14 15

VI.

REED TAYLOR IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES DUE TO
WRONGFUL ISSUANCE OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
If a party is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained, the wrongfully

restrained party is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. I.R.C.P.65(c).
Here, John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance have wrongfully restrained Reed
Taylor from exercising his right to vote the shares in AlA Insurance to replace the Board of
Directors, replace the officers and take such other actions he deems appropriate, as were the
rights irrevocably provided to him under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
Reed Taylor is entitled to an award of his attorneys' fees and costs to be paid in whole or in part
from the $10,000 cash bond posted by John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance.

II/
14 Jonathan Hally of the firm Clark and Feeney has appeared and filed an Answer on behalf of Connie
Taylor in this action. Connie Taylor and Clark and Feeney are presently representing Reed Taylor in a pending
action. Clark and Feeney and its lawyers are also precluded from representing Connie Taylor under the Rules of
Professional Conduct and time does not permit this issue to be briefed and heard at the scheduled hearing. Reed
Taylor will move to disqualify Clark and Feeney and its attorneys as soon as practical.
15 Reed Taylor recognizes that until he determines how he will proceed with his security interest in the
pledged shares he will retain independent counsel for AIA Insurance. Obviously, this issue will be moot should
Reed Taylor elected to sell the shares at a public or private sell or purchase the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance
himself through a public or private sale by crediting his purchase price against the over $8 Million owed to him.

MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN
SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND IN
OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION - 29

VII.

CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion, without bond or security, deny the

Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and award Reed Taylor attorneys' fees and costs.
DATED: This 28 th day of February, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

By:- - - Roderic
Paul
sman, Jr.
Ned A. Cannon
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of the Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Support of Emergency Motion and
Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to Defendants R. John Taylor, AlA Insurance, Inc., and
AlA Services Corporation's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiffs Exhibits Volume I,
and Plaintiffs Exhibits Volume II on the following person(s) via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and R. John
Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Signed this 28 th day of February, 2007, at Lewiston, Id,..,..._ _?--_
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Cited Cases

COOPER v. MILAMTex.Civ.App. 1953
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Waco.
COOPER
v.
MILAM et al.
No. 3080.

Appeal and Error 30

March 5, 1953.
Suit to enJoIn a bank, which held stock in a
corporation as independent executor of estate of a
deceased, from voting such shares in favor of a
partial capital liquidating dividend, and for other
relief. The District Court, McLennan County, D. Y.
McDaniel, J., entered an interlocutory order
refusing to grant temporary injunction and plaintiff
appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Hale, A. J.,
held that cause of action was moot.
Order in accordance with opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Injunction 212 ~135
212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to
Procure
212IV(A)1 In General
212kI35 k. Discretion of Court. Most
Cited Cases
Generally trial judge, in exercise of his equitable
powers to grant or refuse application for temporary
injunction pendente lite, is vested with wide latitude
of sound judicial discretion.

[2] Appeal and Error 30

~954(2)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k950 Provisional Remedies
30k954 Injunction
30k954(2) k. Refusing Injunction.
Most Cited Cases
Generally on appeal from action of trial judge in
exercising his equitable powers to grant or refuse
application for temporary injunction pendente lite,
reviewing court should not disturb action of trial
court unless record on appeal shows that such
action constituted an abuse of discretion.

[3} Action 13

~6

13 Action
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent
13k6 k. Moot, Hypothetical or Abstract
Questions. Most Cited Cases
Where bank, which held stock in corporation as
independent executor of estate of a decedent, had
voted such stock in favor of a partial capital
liquidating dividend, and corporation and its
president had counted such vote, cause of action for
temporary injunction to prohibit bank from voting
the stock in favor of partial liquidating dividends
and to prohibit corporation and its president from
counting such vote or from paying dividends, was
moot, even though trustee had not accepted
liquidating dividends and vote was cast without
representation that bank had right to cast vote.

~954(1)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k950 Provisional Remedies
30k954 Injunction
30k954(l) k. In General.

Most

*197 Naman, Howell & Boswell, Waco, for
appellant.
Witt, Terrell, Jones & Riley, Waco, for appellees.
HALE, Justice.
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the
trial court refusing to grant appellant a temporary
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injunction. As plaintiff in the court below,
appellant sought to enjoin the Citizens National
Bank of Waco from voting 1,600 shares of stock in
the Cooper Company in favor of a partial capital
liquidating dividend in the amount of $366,000.
The Bank held the stock as independent executor of
the estate of E. C. Barrett, deceased. Appellant also
sought to enjoin the Cooper Company and its
president, J. R. Milam, Jr., from counting any vote
cast by the Bank as executor of the estate of E. C.
Barrett in favor of such liquidating dividend, and to
enjoin the Cooper Company and its president from
paying such dividend. In addition to his prayer for
a temporary injunction, appellant also prayed that
upon final hearing the temporary injunction sought
by him be made permanent, that certain action
theretofore taken by the board of directors of the
Cooper Company in declaring a prior dividend be
cancelled, set aside and held for naught and that
judgment be rendered in favor of the corporation
against the said J. R. Milam, Jr., in the sum of
$338,832 and interest, and for damages and costs of
court and for such other and further relief as he
might show himself entitled to.
Appellant's application for a temporary injunction
came on for hearing in the court below on
December 3, 1952 and after the evidence thereon
had been adduced the court refused the same,
appellant duly excepted, gave notice of appeal, filed
appeal bond and caused a record of the proceedings
to be filed in this Court on December 17, 1952.
Appellant's brief was filed here on January 2, 1953,
his appeal being predicated upon the following
point of error:
'The trial court erred ill refusing to grant the
temporary injunction in this case because the
Citizens National Bank of Waco has no right as
independent pendent executor of the estate of E. C.
Barrett, deceased, to vote the 1,600 shares of the
Barrett stock in The Cooper Company in the
proposed stockholders' meeting to vote on a partial
capital liquidating dividend.'

On January 6, 1953, J. R. Milam, Jr., and the
Cooper Company filed their motion herein to
dismiss the cases on appeal on the ground that the
acts which appellant sought to enjoin had been

accomplished since the hearing in the court below
and hence his application for injunctive relief had
become moot. From the recitals in the verified
motion of appellees to dismiss, it appears that on
December 3, 1952, after the trial court had denied
appellant's application for a temporary injunction, a
meeting of the stockholders of the Cooper Company
was had at which the Citizens National Bank of
Waco, as executor of the estate of E. C. Barrett,
voted the 1,600 shares of stock held by it in favor of
the partial capital liquidating dividend in the
amount of $366,000. It also appears that the
Cooper Company and its president, J. R. Milam, Jr.,
counted the votes cast by the Bank at the meeting of
the stockholders, the proper officers and directors
of the corporation certified to the Secretary of State
that the partial capital liquidating dividend had been
passed by vote of more than two-thirds of the
stockholders of the corporation and the proposed
charter amendment reducing the corporation's
capital stock in accordance with the action so taken
by its stockholders, was approved by the Secretary
of State. The motion to dismiss has been carried
along with the appealed cause which is now under
submission on written briefs and oral arguments of
the parties.
*198 Appellant filed his original verfied petition in
the court below on December 1, 1952. He alleged
therein, among other things, that he was the owner
of 570 shares of stock in the Cooper Company; that
E. C. Barrett was the owner of 1,600 shares of stock
in the corporation at the time of his death on May
30, 1952, and by the terms of his will the stock was
bequeathed to appellant as trustee for the benefit of
certain other persons as set forth in the will; that on
July 19,1952, a judgment was rendered in the court
below in favor of the Cooper Company against J. R.
Milam, Jr., in the amount of $297,897.93 and in
order to pay said judgment the said J. R. Milam, Jr.,
borrowed such sum from some third party and
under the terms of his loan obligated himself to vote
his stock in the Cooper Company and to obtain the
votes of other directors in favor of an irrevocable
dividend, either ordinary or by way of partial
liquidation of the corporation, and to pledge such
dividend to secure his personal loan; that the said J.
R. Milam, Jr. in order the fulfill his agreement and
contrary to the best interests of the Cooper
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Company, had the directors of the corporation to
adopt a resolution declaring a dividend in the
amount of $338,832 and withdrew such amount
from the corporation, such action constituting a
misappropriation and a conversion of the assets of
the corporation; that J. R. Milam, Jr., as president of
the Cooper Company had called a meeting of the
stockholders of the corporation which would be
held on December 2, 1952, for the purpose of
voting a partial capital liquidating dividend and that
the Citizens National Bank of Waco, as executor of
the extate of E. C. Barrett, was threatening to vote
the 1,600 shares of stock which it held as executor
in favor of such partial liquidation and that, unless
restrained, it would do so, notwithstanding the fact
that the Bank as executor had no right to vote the
stock so held by it in favor of the proposed
liquidating
dividend.
Upon
presentation
of
appellant's application for a temporary injunction,
the court ordered that appellees be cited to appear
on December 2, 1952, at 9:00 o'clock a. m. and
show cause, if any they had, why the injunction as
prayed for should not be granted.
Appellees filed an extensive answer to the
application for injunctive relief in which they
alleged, among other things, that the Bank, as
executor of the will and estate of E. C. Barrett, was
lawfully in possession of the 1,600 shares of stock
which was of the reasonable value of $233,600 and
as such executor it was charged with the duty of
paying all the debts of the decedent, including State
inheritance taxes and Federal estate taxes.
Appellees further alleged in their verified answer as
follows:

'8.
'Defendants allege that Madison A. Cooper,
plaintiff herein, is acting unreasonable and
arbitrary, and against the best interest of his cestui
que trust, for the reason that the defendants have
gone to considerable time and expense to obtain a
ruling from the Internal Revenue Department of the
U. S. Government to the effect that in view of the
liquidation of the grocery department of said
corporation, said corporation and stockholders
thereof have a right to declare a partial capital

liquidation, provided that two-thirds of the
stockholders of the said corporation vote in favor of
said partial capital liquidating dividend, and to
obtain said two-thirds majority for said liquidating
dividend requires a vote therefor of all of the said
1600 shares of stock now standing on the books of
said corporation in the name of E. C. Barrett. That
if said dividend is declared to be a partial capital
liquidating dividend, the estate of E. C. Barrett and
the owners of the stock in question will make a
considerable saving in taxes. In fact, said estate and
the beneficiaries ultimately receiving said stock will
save approximately $40,000.00. That Pauline
Barrett Brassell and Mary Barrett Denton, in person
or through their duly authorized agents, have
instructed Madison A. Cooper to vote said 1600
shares of stock which they will receive as
beneficiaries under the will of E. C. Barrett in favor
of said partial capital liquidation, and has written
him a letter to this effect, but he has declined *199
and refused to do so, to their injury and detriment.
They have also advised the Citizens National Bank,
independent executor of the estate of E. C. Barrett,
to vote in favor of said capital liquidation plan or
paying a dividend which will receive the treatment
of capital gain or loss tax benefits under the Federal
Estate Tex. That if this procedure is not followed,
an ordinary dividend will be paid, amounting to
approximately $366,000.00, which will cost the
Barrett estate and the said Pauline Barrett Brassell
and Mary Barrett Denton approximately $40,000.00
and the partial capital dividend will save said estate
and the said beneficiaries said $40,000.00 in taxes.
That the action of the said plaintiff, Madison A.
Cooper, in refusing to vote in accordance with the
wishes of the beneficiaries named in said will, as
the ultimate owners of said stock, is arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable, and will result in
serious financial injury to said beneficiaries, whose
best interests he is supposed to represent, and in this
connection, these defendants would show that the
Bank, as the independent executor, stands ready to
vote for said partial capital liquidation dividend in
accordance with the instructions from the said
Pauline Barrett Brassell and Mary Barrett Denton
conveyed to said Bank through their duly
authorized agents.
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'That the Directors of said corporation have
heretofore declared a dividend of $366,000.00 to be
padi one-half thereof on the 27th day of December,
1952, and the remaining one-hale on the 5th day of
January, 1953, conditioned only upon the fact if
they were able to obtain the consent of the Internal
Revenue Department of the U. S. Government to
pay a partial capital liquidation dividend; this form
of dividend would be substituted for an ordinary
dividend, and, as stated above, if an ordinary
dividend is paid, the Barrett estate and the
beneficiaries under his will receiving said stock of
The
Cooper
Company,
Inc.,
will
save
approximately
$40,000.00
which
they
will
otherwise have to pay in the form of taxes if an
ordinary dividend is ultimately paid for said amount.

'10.
'Defendants would show that they now have
secured from the Internal Revenue Department of
the U. S. Government a ruling to the effect that if
said partial capital liquidating dividend is paid, a
tax thereon under the Capital Gain and Loss
Provisions of said Federal Tax Law would be
applied, which will result in the savings to said
estate and beneficiaries as set out above.

'11.

'That the payment of said capital liquidating
dividend of $366,000.00 will not result in any
injury or damage to the plaintiff or to the defendants
herein because after the payment thereof, said
corporation will still have remaining approximately
$650,000.00 net worth, which is more than ample to
properly conduct the wholesale dry goods business,
which is the only business that said corporation is
now conducting, as said wholesale dry goods
business does not amount, in volume, to more than
one million dollars per annum.'
The contention of appellant to the effect that the
Citizens National Bank as executor of the estate of
E. C. Barrett had no right to vote the Barrett stock is

based upon the following provision in the will of
the testator:
'I give and bequeath to Madison A. Cooper, Jr., in
trust, all of my shares of stock in the Cooper Co.,
Inc., of Waco, Texas, and in Behrens Drug Co., of
Waco, Texas, to be held by my said trustee during
his lifetime for the benefit of my two nieces, Pauline
Barrett Brassell and Mary Barrett Denton, share and
share alike. Said stock shall be turned over to said
trustee as promptly as practicable after my death
and all income thereon shall be paid by said trustee
annually or as dividends are paid on said stock to
said beneficiaries, share and share alike. Said *200
trustee . shall receive no compensation for his
services as trustee of said stock and shall not be
required to give bond as such trustee, and shall have
full voting rights as the holder of the legal title to
said stock during the life of said trustee, or so long
as he may continue to serve as trustee under this
provision of my will. It is my will that said trustee
shall not be required to comply with the Texas Trust
Act while acting as trustee herein, and that no
beneficiary shall ever have any claim against said
trustee for any act or omission on his part in the
performance of said trust.'

Appellant says the Bank had no right to vote the
1,600 shares of stock in the Cooper Company for a
partial capital liquidating dividend because, among
other reasons, 'Under Texas law, upon the death of
E. C. Barrett the legal title to the 1600 shares of
Cooper Company stock vested in Madison A.
Cooper, Jr., legatee in the Barrett will, and Mr.
Cooper had the sole right to vote said stock as an
incident to his legal title.' On the other hand,
subject to their motion to dismiss the cause on
appeal, appellees say the Bank, as executor of the
will and estate of E. C. Barrett, had the legal right
and duty, under the circumstances alleged in their
verified answer to appellant's application for a
temporary injunction, to vote the Barrett stock on
December 3, 1952, for a partial capital liquidating
dividend and that appellant, as trustee under the will
of E. C. Barrett, had no legal or equitable right to
vote the Barrett stock against such dividend to the
injury and detriment of the cestui que trustent for
whose benefit he was purporting to act.
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{l )(2) As a general rule a trial judge, in the exercise
of his equitable powers to grant or refuse an
application for a temporary injunction pendente lite,
is vested with a wide latitude of sound judicial
discretion. Houston Electric Co. v. City of
Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W. 198; Ward
County Water Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. Ward
County Irr. Dist. No.1, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W.
490; Beirne v. North Texas Gas Co., Tex.Civ.App.,
221 S.W. 301; Sutherland v. City of Winnsboro,
Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W. 63; Fort v. Moore,
Tex.Civ.App., 33 S.W.2d 807 (er. Dis.); Wizig v.
Jefferson, Tex.Civ.App., 74 S.W.2d 428; First Trust
Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago v. Hayes,
Tex.Civ.App., 90 S.W.2d 331; Pancake v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 776.
It is also generally held that upon appeal from an
exercise of such power, a reviewing court should
not disturb the action of the trial judge unless the
record on appeal shows that such action constituted
an abuse of discretion. Davidson v. Wells,
Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W. 518; Pavey v. McFarland,
Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W. 591; Basham v. Holcombe,
Tex.Civ.App., 240 S.W. 691; Gordon v. Hoencke,
Tex.Civ.App., 253 S.W. 629; Massa v. Guardian
Trust Co., Tex.Civ.App., 258 S.W. 598; Railroad
Commission of Texas v. San Antonio Compress
Co., Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W. 214; Southwestern
Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Comm. of Tex., 128
Tex. 560,99 S.W.2d 263,109 A.L.R. 1235.

(3) Although we are inclined to the view that the
record before us fails to disclose an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to
grant appellant's application for a temporary
injunction, we do not think it is necessary or proper
for this court to pass upon that question or to
determine at this time whether appellant or the Bank
had the right or duty to vote the Barrett stock on
December 3, 1952, or to decide whether the trial
court did or did not err in refusing to grant the
application because it now appears that the acts
which appellant sought to enjoin have been
performed and hence we have concluded that
appellant's application for a temporary injunction
has
become
moot.
Brown
v.
Fleming,
Tex.Com.App., 212 S.W. 483, pts. 1 and 2;
Anderson v. City of San Antonio, Tex.Civ.App., 26
S.W.2d 353; International Ass'n of Machinists

Union Local No. 1488 v. Federated Ass'n of
Accessory Workers, 133 Tex. 624, 130 S.W.2d 282;
Service Finance Corp. v. Grote, 133 Tex. 606, 131
S.W.2d 93; Continental Pipe Line Co. v. Gandy,
Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 631; Panos v. Foley
Bros. Dry Goods Co., Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d
494.
In his verified answer to the motion of appellees to
dismiss the cause, appellant says his asserted cause
of action for a temporary *201 injunction has not
become moot because (1) the Bank, in voting the
Barrett stock for the proposed inquidating dividend
on December 3, 1952, did not act unconditionally
and (2) the Cooper Company and its president have
not completed the payment of such liquidating
dividend. Attached to such answer is a copy of a
letter from the Bank's trust officer dated December
3, 1952, addressed to Jesse Milam as president of
the Cooper Company which reads in part as
follows: 'In voting the stock this afternoon,
(meaning the Barrett stock) we do so without
asserting or representing to you that we have any
right to do so. If we have the right to vote it, our
vote is cast in favor of the liquidating dividend.' It
also appears from such answer that appellant has
not accepted the sum of $25,696 under the
proposed liquidating dividend. However, we do not
think these facts are material to a determination as
to whether or not appellant's application for a
temporary injunction is now moot. The material
question now before us is not what the Bank or the
Cooper Company or its officers should have done
under the circumstances; in the light of what was
actually been done, the vital question is whether any
of the threatened acts which appellant sought to
enJOIn can now be effectively prevented.
Regardless of whether the Bank did or did not have
the right to vote the Barrett stock, conditionally or
unconditionally, it has done so and no preliminary
injunction can now effectively that which has been
done. Furthermore, the fact that appellant has not
accepted the liquidating dividend which has been
declared is a matter beyond the control of the Bank,
the Cooper Company or its officers.
It is quite clear to us that the subject matter of this
suit, viz.: appellant's cause of action for a temporary
injunction to prohibit the Citizens National Bank
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from voting the Barrett stock in favor of a partial
capital liquidating dividend and to prohibit the
Cooper Company and its president, J. R. Milam, Jr.,
from counting such vote or from paying the
dividend so voted, no longer exists as a live subject
of controversy because such acts have been
completely performed in so far as the Bank, the
Cooper Company and its president are concemed.
Preventive injunctions necessarily operate only
upon unperformed and unexecuted acts. It is
axiomatic that a prohibitory injunction against the
performance of an act or a deed which has already
been accomplished is futile and useless.
In the case of Isbell v. Rednick, Tex.Civ.App., 193
S.W.2d 736, 737, this court said: 'It is a
fundamental principle that courts are created, not
for the purpose of deciding abstract questions of
law or rendering advisory opinions, but for the
judicial determination of presently existing disputes
between parties in relation to facts out of which
controverted questions arise. Where a controversy
becomes moot while a cause is pending in an
appellate court, so that no effective relief can be
given to either party to the appeal, it is the duty of
the appellate court to vacate the proceedings out of
which the controversy arose, reverse the judgment
of the trial court and dismiss the asserted cause of
action. State v. Society for Friendless Children,
130 Tex. 533, III S.W.2d 1075; Benavides v.
Atkins, 132 Tex. 1, 120 S.W.2d 415; City of West
University Place v. Martin, 132 Tex. 354, 123
S. W.2d 638; Ansley v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 175
S.W. 470; Shinn v. Barrow, Tex.Civ.App., 121
S.W.2d 450 (er. dis.); Changos v. Ford,
Tex.Civ.App., 131 S.W.2d 1025; Renfro v. Burrell,
Tex.Civ.App., 138 S.W.2d 1110; Callison v. Vance
Independent School District, Tex.Civ.App., 152
S.W.2d 395; Dowlen v. Amarillo Independent
School District, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S. W.2d 288 (er.
reO·'

must be disposed of, if such an adjudication is
desired, at a trial of the main case on its merits.
Hence, our disposition of this appeal should be and
is without prejudice to any right of any party *202
to this proceeding in so far as such issues may be
involved on a trial ofthe main case on its merits.
Since we have concluded that appellant's asserted
cause of action for a temporary injunction is now
moot, appellees' motion to dismiss the cause will be
granted, the order of the trial court refusing to grant
appellant's application for a temporary injunction
will be vacated, the case to the extent of such
application will be dismissed, and all costs of court
incident to such application will be assessed against
appellant, and it is so ordered.
Tex.Civ.App.1953
Cooper v. Milam
256 S.W.2d 196
END OF DOCUMENT

We do not wish to express any opinion whatsoever
at this time on the issues as to whether the action of
the Bank in voting the Barrett stock, or the action of
the Cooper Company or of its president in counting
such stock or in paying all or any part of the
dividends so declared, was or was not wrongful.
These issues have not been adjudicated and they
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pDeFelice v. GaronLa.App., 1980.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Frances Radosta, wife of and Stephen 1. DEFELICE

v.
Herbert J. GARON and Rufus M. Carimi.
No. 10344.

Most Cited Cases
Contract giving pledgee unqualified right to vote
shares of stock pledged to them was not invalid as a
contract which separated voting rights from
ownership interest and pledgees could enforce the
contract by having the shares of stock transferred on
the books of the corporation during the existence of
the pledge. LSA-R.S. 12:75, subd. D.

Feb. 4, 1980.
[3J Corporations 101 €;:::;>197
Appeal was taken from a partial summary judgment
entered in the Civil District Court, Parish of
Orleans, S. Sanford Levy, J., invalidating a contract
giving pledgees the unqualified right to vote shares
of stock pledged to them. The Court of Appeal,
Lemmon, J., held that: (1) contract giving pledgees
unqualified right to vote shares of stock pledged to
them was not invalid as a contract which separated
voting rights from ownership interest and pledgees
could enforce such contract by having the shares of
stock transferred on the books of the corporation
during the existence of the pledge, and (2) contract
was not invalid as one containing a potestative
condition, since pledgees under the contract were
clearly obligees.
Partial summary judgment set aside; case remanded.
West Headnotes
[IJ Corporations 101 €;::::::>197
101 Corporations
10 lIX Members and Stockholders
101 IX(B) Meetings
101 k 197 k. Right to Vote in General.
Most Cited Cases
Normally, only registered owner of shares listed on
books of corporation has the right to vote the stock.
[2J Corporations 101 €;::::::>197
101 Corporations
101 IX Members and Stockholders
101 IX(B) Meetings
101 k 197 k. Right to Vote in General.

101 Corporations
10 lIX Members and Stockholders
10 IIX(B) Meetings
10 1k 197 k. Right to Vote In General.
Most Cited Cases
Contract giving pledgees unqualified right to vote
shares of stock pledged to them was not invalid as
one containing a potestative condition, since
pledgees under the contract were clearly obligees.
LSA-C.C. arts. 2034-2036.

*676 Victoria L. Bartels and William F. Wessel,
New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Garon, Brener & McNeely, Milton E. Brener, New
Orleans, for defendants-appellants.
Before SAMUEL, LEMMON and GARRISON, n.
LEMMON, Judge.
Defendants have appealed from a partial summary
judgment which declared invalid a contract they had
executed with plaintiff and prohibited them from
acting as trustees under the contract.[FNIJ The
issue on appeal is the validity of the contract.

FNl. The judgment, couched in terms of a
preliminary injunction, was not appealed
within 15 days as required by C.c.P. art.
3612 for judgments relating to preliminary
injunctions. However, the only matter
before the court at the time of the
judgment was a motion for partial

© 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND
IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION
http://web2.westlaw.com/printiprintstream.aspx?prfi=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split...

39 FU
2/28/2007

Page 2 of 4

Page 2

380 So.2d 676
380 So.2d 676
(Cite as: 380 So.2d 676)
summary judgment declaring the contract
invalid, the rule for preliminary injunction
having previously been denied, and the
parties had stipulated that an injunction
should issue if the contract was invalid.
Moreover,
the
Supreme
Court, on
application for supervisory writs, ordered
the granting of a suspensive appeal at a
time more than 15 days after the judgment.
We therefore treat this appeal as one from
a partial summary judgment.

Prior to the execution of the contract at issue,
plaintiff was the owner of 50% of the shares of
stock in Pascal-Manale, Inc., and defendants Garon
and Carimi were the attorney and accountant
respectively for the corporation. Plaintiff had
contracted to purchase the other 50% of the stock
from her sister for the price of $450,000.00, but had
difficulty obtaining financing. *677 Through
defendants' efforts a bank agreed to lend plaintiff
$600,000.00 (which included the pay-out of an
existing $150,000.00 loan), but required the pledge
of the corporate stock and mortgages of other
property owned by plaintiff, as well as personal
guaranties by defendants and three other persons
(intervenors in this suit) and additional security
valued in excess of $200,000.00 to be furnished by
defendants and intervenors.
As part of the agreement to guarantee the loan and
furnish the necessary security defendants and
intervenors required plaintiff to execute two
contracts. In the first contract, entitled Joint
Venture Agreement, the parties stated that it was in
their best interest for the corporation to be managed
and directed under a definite and fixed policy in
order to properly develop the corporation's business
opportunities and to repay the loan, and they agreed
that defendants and intervenors would guarantee the
loan and provide the additional security and that
plaintiff would pay them $2,000.00 per month
during the term of the loan (or a minimum of
$120,000.00). Plaintiff further agreed that, in the
event of her default on the note, she would assign
all of her interest in the corporation to defendants
and intervenors upon their demand, subject to

plaintiffs right to reacquire the stock within 60 days
by paying all sums expended to remedy the default.
In the second contract, entitled Voting Trust
Agreement, plaintiff, as sole shareholder, and
defendants, as trustees, reasserted that it was in
plaintiffs best interest for the corporation to be
managed and directed during the next ten years
under a definite and fixed policy, and for this
purpose plaintiff "requested" defendants to hold
legal title to the stock in trust for ten years under the
contract terms. Defendants were further given the
unqualified right to vote the stock as shareholders,
free from any interference by plaintiff, but without
liability as shareholders, and were also given the
following powers:
a) The right to vote for election of directors and in
favor of or in opposition to any resolution or
proposed action of any character whatsoever which
may be presented in any meeting requiring the
consent of shareholders of the corporation;
b) The right to set salaries, bonuses, and other
compensation for all employees, agents, officers,
and directors of the corporation;
c) The right to declare all dividends;
d) The right to hire and fire all personnel employed
by the corporation;
e) The right to approve of any and all remodeling,
alterations and repairs of any property owned or
leased by the corporation;
f) The right to authorize and approve all capital
expenditures for any purpose whatsoever; and
g) The right to dispose of the collateral securing the
debt of shareholder in any manner deemed
appropriate by the trustees and to pledge the stock
to secure any corporate loan.
The contract specified a term of ten years, but
reserved to the trustees the right to terminate the
agreement sooner by unanimous vote.

II

Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment
attacked the second contract (Voting Trust
Agreement) on two grounds: (1) the contract is
invalid as a voting trust agreement, because R.S.
12:78 only authorizes such an agreement when
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contracted by two or more shareholders, and (2) the
contract is invalid as an ordinary contract, because
it contains a potestative condition in that the
trustees are free to terminate at will. The trial court
invalidated the contract on the second ground.
Taken in the context of the overall circumstances,
the contract at issue is not a voting trust
contemplated by R.S. 12:78. Rather, the contract is
a security device, designed to protect the guarantors
of plaintiffs promissory note by giving them the
right to control the management of the *678
corporation during the term of the loan.[FN2} The
intent of the contract therefore was to constitute
defendants as pledgees, rather than trustees.
FN2. The substance, not the title,
determines the nature of the contract.
Indeed, in their petition plaintiffs asserted
that the contract was a "guise for a security
device coupled with a managerial mandate"

[1] Normally, only the registered owner of shares
listed on the books of the corporation have the right
to vote the stock. Chapp ius v. Spencer, 167 La.
527, 119 So. 697 (La.1928); D'Amico v. Canizaro,
256 La. 801, 239 So.2d 339 (La.l970). In Emile
Babst Co. v. Commercial Enterprises, Inc., 274
So.2d 742 (La.App. 4th Cif. 1973), cert. den. 277
So.2d 673, noted 68 A.L.R.3d 674 (1976), this
court held that, despite the revision and reenactment
of the Business Corporation Law, a mere pledgee
cannot vote the pledged stock unless the shares
have been transferred on the books of the
corporation to the pledgee.[FN3]

FN3. The Babst case turned on an
interpretation of R.S. 12:75 D, which
provides:
"A person whose shares are pledged shall
be entitled to vote thereon unless and until
such shares have been transferred on the
books of the corporation to the pledgee;
and thereafter the pledgee shall be entitled
to vote thereon."

[2} In the Babst case the owner had not expressly
authorized the pledgee to vote the shares, and the
pledgee sought to do so simply on the basis of his
status as pledgee. The present case, however, does
not involve a mere pledgee, but rather a pledgee
upon whom the owner of the stock has expressly
conferred by contract the right to vote the shares.
Since R.S. 12:75 D requires a transfer on the books
of the corporation to entitle the pledgee to vote the
shares, the contract expressly granting the pledgee
the right to vote the share can only be interpreted
reasonably as implicitly granting the pledgee the
right to obtain a transfer of the shares upon the
books of the corporation.
Under our interpretation of R.S. 12:75 D the type of
security device executed by the parties in the
present case is statutorily authorized. Under the
contract plaintiff turned over the shares of stock to
defendants and granted them "the unqualified right,
without any restrictions or limitations, to vote the
stock deposited with them in accordance with their
own best judgment and free from any interference
or control" by plaintiff. The right to vote the shares
(a right not necessarily accorded to a mere pledgee)
could hardly have been more clearly conferred, and
with this right the pledgee necessarily was given the
right to take the formal steps necessary to
accomplish utilization of that right.
We therefore conclude that a contract gIvmg the
pledgee the unqualified right to vote shares of stock
pledged to him is not invalid as a contract which
separates voting rights from ownership interest, but
is valid as a contract authorized by R.S. 12:75 D,
and that the pledgee may enforce the contract by
having the shares of stock transferred on the books
of the corporation during the existence of the pledge.

III

[3] Finally, the contract was not invalid as one
containing a potestative condition. Nullity on
account of a potestative condition is limited to those
potestative conditions which make the obligation
dependent solely on the exercise of the obligor's
will. C.C. arts. 2034, 2035. Under the contract at
issue defendants were clearly the obligees (the
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parties in whose favor the obligation was
contracted), since they had performed their
obligation concurrently with the execution of the
contract by guaranteeing the loan and furnishing the
additional security. [FN4] c.c. art. 3556(20). An
obligation may validly be made to depend on the
will of the obligee for its duration. c.c. art. 2036.
The contract was therefore not null on account of an
invalidating potestative condition.
FN4. Defendants and intervenors stated
they would not have done so without the
protection afforded by the two contracts.
Accordingly, the partial summary judgment
rendered by the trial court is set *679 aside, and the
matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs
are to be assessed upon final disposition.
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SET ASIDE,
CASE REMANDED.
La.App., 1980.
DeFelice v. Garon
380 So.2d 676
END OF DOCUMENT
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H
Valley Intern. Properties, Inc. v. Los Campeones,
Inc.Tex.Civ.App.,1978.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.
V ALLEY INTERNATIONAL PROPERTIES,
INC., Appellant,

v.
LOS CAMPEONES, INC., Appellee.
No.l300.
June 15, 1978.
Rehearing Denied June 26,1978.
Shareholder of corporation petitioned for order to
compel holding of annual shareholders meeting.
The 197th District Court, Cameron County,
Filemon B. Vela, J., ordered holding of meeting,
and corporation appealed. The Court of Civil
Appeals, Young, J., held that: (1) state court had
jurisdiction of suit to compel shareholders' meeting,
notwithstanding that corporation was subject of
arrangement proceeding under Bankruptcy Act; (2)
shareholder had protectible property interest in
corporation even though shareholder's stock was not
registered with corporation, and thus shareholder
should have been able to protect such interest by
demanding annual shareholders' meeting regardless
of shareholder's ability or desire to vote; (3) claim
that shareholder had defective title to shares was not
considered where no pleadings were presented to
trial court concerning such defense nor was matter
brought to court's attention; (4) evidence was
sufficient to support implied finding that there was
no breach of contract by savings and loan
association which sold stock to shareholder at
foreclosure sale to release shares, in that president
did not meet all conditions required for association
to release shares, and (5) correspondence between
savings and loan association and shareholder which
was association member was privileged and
corporation did not have right to view such
correspondence.
Affirmed.

West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €;::::;>846(5)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k844 Review Dependent on Mode of
Trial in Lower Court
30k846 Trial by Court in General
30k846(5) k. Necessity of Finding
Facts. Most Cited Ca'!Ies
Where no findings of fact and conclusions of law
were filed by trial court in proceeding to compel
annual shareholders' meeting of corporation nor
were any requested by parties, and corporation
brought forward statement of facts on appeal, the
Court of Civil Appeals was required to presume that
the trial judge found every fact necessary to sustain
the judgment compelling the shareholders' meeting,
provided such facts were raised by the pleadings
and were supported by the evidence.
[2] Bankruptcy 51 €;::::;>2060.1
51 Bankruptcy
51 I In General
51I(C) Jurisdiction
51k2060 Exclusive, Conflicting, or
Concurrent Jurisdiction
51k2060.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 51k2060, 51k964)
Generally, under Chapter XI governing corporate
arrangements, the bankruptcy court has exclusive
jurisdiction of a debtor and his property, wherever
located; however, the bankruptcy court does not
have jurisdiction over all suits brought against the
Chapter XI debtor. Bankr.Act, § 301 et seq., 11
U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.
[3] Bankruptcy 51 €;::::;>3661.100
51 Bankruptcy
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SI XV Arrangements
SIXV(A) In General
Slk3661.100 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly Slk9S1)
Under the Bankruptcy Act, a Chapter X
reorganization provides for extensive jurisdictional
and judicial control over the proceedings and
administration of a corporation, while a Chapter XI
arrangement is intended to provide a quick efficient
method of implementing a composition among the
debtor's general creditors with minimal court
involvement. Bankr.Act, §§ 101 et seq., 301 et
seq., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ SOl et seq., 701 et seq.
[4] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2062
SI Bankruptcy
SI I In General
SII(C) Jurisdiction
Slk2060 Exclusive, Conflicting, or
Concurrent Jurisdiction
SI k2062 k. Bankruptcy Courts and
State Courts. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly Slk96S)
The mere pendency of a Chapter XI arrangement
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act does not
divest a state court of jurisdiction. Bankr.Act, §
301 et seq., 11 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.
[5] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2062
SI Bankruptcy
SI I In General
SII(C) Jurisdiction
S1k2060 Exclusive, Conflicting, or
Concurrent Jurisdiction
SIk2062 k. Bankruptcy Courts and
State Courts. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly SI k96S)
A state claim must interfere with the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court in order to preclude a state
court's jurisdiction.
[6] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2361
SI Bankruptcy
SIIV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction
and Stay

SIIV(A) In General
S1k2361 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly Slk9S4)
Bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction over meetings
of shareholders of corporate debtor; however, the
court does have power to enjoin a shareholders'
meeting which will interfere with the administration
of the debtor'S estate.
[7] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2361
SI Bankruptcy
SIIV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction
and Stay
SIIV(A) In General
S1k2361 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly Slk9S4)
Fact that an election and possible installation of
new directors of corporation could ultimately have
had some indirect effect on Chapter XI arrangement
of corporation under Bankruptcy Act did not confer
jurisdiction over shareholders meeting on the
bankruptcy court. Bank.Act, § 30 I et seq., II
U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.
[8] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2395
SI Bankruptcy
SI IV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction
and Stay
SIIV(B) Automatic Stay
S1k2394 Proceedings, Acts, or Persons
Affected
S1k239S k. Judicial Proceedings in
General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly Slk9S4)
Where bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction
over suit to compel shareholders' meeting of
corporation which was subject of Chapter XI
arrangement proceeding, the automatic stay of state
court actions under the Bankruptcy Rules did not
preclude trial court's order compelling holding of
shareholders' meeting. Bankruptcy Rules, rule
11-44, 11 U.S.c.A.; Bankr.Act, § 301 et seq., II
U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.; V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act,
art. 2.24, subd. B.

[9J Corporations 101 <8:=191
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101 Corporations
IOIIX Members and Stockholders
101 IX(B) Meetings
IOIkI9I k. Necessity. Most Cited Cases
Statute governing rights of issuer of securities with
respect to registered owners deals only with
relationship between the issuer and the shareholder;
such statute makes no provision for a court to treat
the unregistered shareholder in the same manner
that the issuer of the stock might treat him.
V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 8.207(a).
[10J Corporations 101 €;::;;>191
101 Corporations
1OIIX Members and Stockholders
10 I IX(B) Meetings
IOIkl9I k. Necessity. Most Cited Cases
Shareholder had a protectable property interest in
corporation, even though its ownership of the shares
was not registered with the corporation; thus,
shareholder should have been able to protect that
property interest by demanding an annual
shareholders' meeting regardless of shareholder's
ability or desire to vote. V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act,
art. 2.24, subd. B; V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 8.207(a).
[11] Corporations 101 €;::;;>170
101 Corporations
IOIIX Members and Stockholders
10 IIX(A) Rights and Liabilities as to
Corporation
101 k 170 k. Who Are Members or
Stockholders. Most Cited Cases
The plain meaning of the term "shareholder" is one
who owns a share of corporate stock. V.A.T.S.
Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B.
[12] Statutes 361 €;::;;>205
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36Ik204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
36Ik205 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
A statute should be construed as a whole, and all of

its parts be harmonized if possible.
[13] Statutes 361 €;::;;>212.6
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36Ik2I2 Presumptions to Aid Construction
36Ik2I2.6 k. Words Used. Most Cited
Cases
Every word or phrase in a statute is presumed to
have been used intentionally, with a meaning and
purpose.
[14J Corporations 101 €;::;;>191
101 Corporations
10 IIX Members and Stockholders
101 IX(B) Meetings
IOIkI9I k. Necessity. Most Cited Cases
Requirement that shares be registered with issuer is
intended for the protection of the corporation so
that it may know who is entitled to vote, receive
dividends, and otherwise participate in other
managerial functions; however, under statute
governing court order for shareholders' meeting, the
court intervenes to determine the status of a
purported shareholder, and the protections provided
by a registration requirement are not necessary.
V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B;
V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 8.207(a).
[15] Appeal and Error 30 €;::;;>173(2)
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower
Court of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30kI73 Grounds of Defense or Opposition
30kI73(2) k. Nature or Subject-Matter
in General. Most Cited Cases
Court of Civil Appeals was not required to consider
corporation's defense that shareholder had defective
title to shares in action brought by shareholder to
compel shareholders' meeting where no pleading
was presented to trial court concerning such defense
and matter was not brought to court's attention when
setting out issues before court for decision.
V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B.
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[16] Corporations 101 <8=113

[19J Building and Loan Associations 66 <8=6(2)

101 Corporations
101 VIII Capital and Stock
101 VIII (D) Transfer of Shares
101 k 113 k. Restriction of Right to
Transfer. Most Cited Cases
Evidence in action by shareholder, which purchased
shares at foreclosure sale by savings and loan
association, to compel annual shareholders' meeting
of corporation was sufficient to support implied
finding that there was no breach of contract by
savings association to release shares in that
president of corporation could not meet conditions
required for savings association to release shares
which had been pledged.

66 Building and Loan Associations
66k6 Membership
66k6(2) k. Members' Rights and Liabilities in
General. Most Cited Cases
to
eliminate
Legislature
did
not
intend
correspondence from phrase "books and records" in
statute governing right of member of savings and
loan association to inspect books and records of
association, and thereby prevent members from
inspecting their own correspondence. Vernon's
Ann.Civ.St. art. 852a, § 3.07.
[20] Witnesses 410 <8=196.3

302 Pleading
302III Responses or Responsive Pleadings in
General
302III(A) Defenses in General
302k78 k. Necessity for Defense. Most
Cited Cases
Where corporation asserted that shareholder which
brought action to compel shareholders' meeting had
obtained shares in fraudulent manner, defense of
fraud was used as an affirmative defense, and thus
defense was waived by failure of corporation to
plead it or have it acted upon by the trial court.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 94; V.A.T.S.
Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B.

410 Witnesses
41 orr Competency
41 OIl(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
41 Ok 196 Fiduciary or Contract Relations
in General
410k196.3 k. Bank and Customer.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 41 Okl96)
Correspondence
between
savings and
loan
association and shareholder which was member of
association was privileged, and thus corporation did
not have right to view such correspondence in
action by shareholder to compel shareholders'
meeting of corporation. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art.
852a, § 3.07; V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24,
subd. B.

[18] Fraud 184 <8=58(1)

[21] Witnesses 410 <8=196.3

184 Fraud
184Il Actions
184II(D) Evidence
184k58 Weight and Sufficiency
184k58(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Evidence in action by shareholder, which had
purchased shares at foreclosure sale by savings and
loan association, to compel shareholders' meeting of
corporation was sufficient to support implied
conclusion that corporation did not meet its burden
of proving that savings association had defrauded
corporation.

410 Witnesses
410n Competency
410Il(D)
Confidential
Relations
and
Privileged Communications
410k196 Fiduciary or Contract Relations
in General
410k196.3 k. Bank and Customer.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 410k196)
Statute providing for confidentiality of books and
records of savings and loan association confers
privilege upon which trial court may exclude
evidence. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 852a, § 3.07.

[17] Pleading 302 <8=78
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[22] Appeal and Error 30 <8=846(5)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, In
General
30k844 Review Dependent on Mode of
Trial in Lower Court
30k846 Trial by Court in General
30k846(5) k. Necessity of Finding
Facts. Most Cited Cases
Where no findings of fact and conclusions of law
were filed in action by shareholder to compel
shareholders' meeting of corporation, Court of Civil
Appeals presumed that trial judge disregarded
evidence which might have been improperly
received. V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B.
[23] Appeal and Error 30 <8=77(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30m Decisions Reviewable
30III(D) Finality of Determination
30k75 Final Judgments or Decrees
30k77 Nature or Form of Action or
Proceeding
30k77(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Judgment rendered by trial court compelling
holding of annual shareholders' meeting of
corporation was a final judgment in that it disposed
of all matters involved in suit and determined rights
of all parties in suit, and thus Court of Civil Appeals
had jurisdiction to hear appeal from such judgment.
V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B;
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 1819.

*683 Joel W. Ellis, Carter & Ellis, Harlingen, Rhett
G. Campbell, Houston, for appellant.
Joel W. Cook, Schlanger, Cook, Cohn & Mills,
Richard L. Fuqua, Haines, Cowgill, Andell &
Fuqua, Houston, for appellee.
OPINION
YOUNG, Justice.
Los Campeones, Inc. filed a petition on July 25,
1977, in the district court of Cameron County
seeking relief under Tex.Bus.Corp.Act Ann. art.

2.24 B (Supp.1978) which provides for a court of
competent jurisdiction to summarily compel an
annual shareholders' meeting upon application of
any shareholder where no annual meeting has been
held within the prior thirteen months. Valley
International Properties, Inc., was named in the
petition as defendant. Los Campeones is the
majority shareholder ofV.I.P.
On that same day (July 25) the trial court granted an
ex parte order ordering, among other things, the
requested shareholders' meeting to be held on
September 2. Then, on August 11 V.I.P. filed its
answer which sought a hearing to set aside the July
25th order. The trial court set and conducted a
hearing without a jury and thereafter, on September
7, rendered judgment, among other things,
upholding its prior order and resetting the
shareholders' meeting for September 26. V.I.P.
appeals from the September 26th order.
Appellant brings forward four points of error. In
those points appellant contends: 1) that the trial
court was without jurisdiction of this matter because
V.I.P. was engaged in a Chapter XI, 11 U.S.C.A. s
701 et seq. (1970), Bankruptcy Proceeding at the
time Los Campeones filed suit; 2) that Los
Campeones could not compel a meeting because it
was not a shareholder of record, because Los
Campeones had a defective title to its V.I.P. shares
in that it received its stock in a sale which violated
the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.CA. ss 77a et seq.
(197 I), because Brownsville Savings & Loan
Association, the prior owner of the V.I.P. shares
now held by Los Campeones, breached an
agreement with V.I.P., and because Brownsville
defrauded V.I.P. in certain loan agreements. V.I.P.
also contends (3 and 4) that the trial court erred in
excluding and admitting certain evidence.
Los Campeones asserts by cross-point and by
motions to dismiss the appeal that this court has no
jurisdiction of an appeal from a Tex.Bus.Corp.Act
Ann. art. 2.24 B (Supp.1978) proceeding. We
overrule all of the contentions of the parties and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The background of this case involves an embittered
struggle between the management and stockholders
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of V.I.P. to gain managerial control. V.I.P. is a
corporation owning various country club and golf
course facilities in Cameron County, Texas. In
order to finance the purchase and construction of its
facilities and property, V.I.P. borrowed substantial
amounts from Brownsville Savings at some time
prior to *684 1973. Subsequently, on September 24,
1973, Brownsville Savings in conjunction with
Mutual Savings Association of Fort Worth and
Abilene Savings Association issued a 3.9 million
dollar permanent loan commitment to V.I.P.
provided it performed certain conditions. The
commitment was to be funded September 24, 1976.
In December of 1974 V.I.P. shareholders pledged a
majority of V.I.P.'s outstanding shares to
Brownsville Savings in order to secure the
previously mentioned loans.
Sometime in early 1976, it became apparent to
V.I.P. and Brownsville Savings that V.I.P. would be
unable to payoff its debts as they became due. As a
result, the loans were renegotiated and extended. As
a further means of insuring the continuing viability
of V.I.P., Bill Bass, president of V.I.P., began
organIzmg
a
limited
partnership,
Los
Conquistadores, which would be used to inject 1.6
million dollars of additionally needed capital into
the V.I.P. operations. By June of 1976, Los
Conquistadores allegedly had raised $800,000 and
still needed to raise an additional $800,000. Bass
then purportedly presented the limited partnership
idea to Brownsville Savings' president, Thomas
Pope, and other officers at a meeting on June 25,
1976. During this meeting, the Brownsville officers
stated that they wanted no part of the limited
partnership but that they would consider other
alternatives for helping Bass inject additional
capital into the V.I.P. operations. These alternatives
were presented to Brownsville Savings in a written
memorandum on June 28, 1976. On July 1, 1976,
Pope, on behalf of Brownsville Savings, responded
to the memo by agreeing to release the V.I.P. stock
in its possession in return for Bass' agreeing to
assign a $98,661.00 promissory note to Brownsville
Savings. V.I.P. contends Brownsville Savings knew
in July that without payment of the 3.9 million
dollar commitment due on September 24, 1976, the
limited partnership would be unable to secure the
additional $800,000 required and thus would fail.

But Robert Knowles an officer of Brownsville
Savings in 1976, and later president, denied these
allegations.
On September 24, 1976, Brownsville Savings
refused to fund the 3.9 million dollar commitment
because of the failure of V.I.P. to meet certain
conditions in the loan commitment; i. e., failure to
have the property free of liens and failure to issue a
plat as required. The principals of Los
Conquistadores then refused to further fund the
$800,000, and Bass was unable to secure the
$98,661.00 promissory note which he was going to
assign to Brownsville Savings in order to secure a
release of the pledged V.I.P. stock.
In November of 1976, Bass informed Brownsville
Savings that he could not make his payments on the
prior debt, whereupon Brownsville Savings
accelerated maturities of its outstanding loans to
V.I.P. In addition, on November 9, 1976,
Brownsville Savings formed Los Cam peones, Inc.,
appellee herein, for the purpose of taking over
operations of V.I.P. Pat Stanford was hired as agent
for Brownsville Savings to operate Los Cam peones
and the V.I.P. operations it was assuming. Los
Cam peones operated the golf course and country
club facilities during parts of November and
December of 1976.
On December 7, 1976, V.I.P. filed for Chapter XI
Bankruptcy. The Federal Bankruptcy Judge then
appointed a receiver for V.I.P. In March of 1977,
V .I.P.' s unsecured creditors voted on and approved
the arrangement plan submitted by V.I.P., and on
May 10, 1977, the Bankruptcy Judge entered an
order confirming the plan. Subsequently, on May
18, 1977, the Bankruptcy Judge entered an order
allowing Brownsville Savings to foreclose on the
V.I.P. 's shares in its possession. On June 6, 1977,
Pat Stanford's employment with Brownsville
Savings terminated. On June 7, 1977, Stanford,
representing Los Cam peones, purchased all of the
V.I.P. shares possessed by Brownsville Savings at a
public foreclosure sale.
[1] All of which brings us to a consideration of the
merits of this appeal. No findings of fact and
conclusions of law were filed nor were any
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requested. Appellant *685 has brought forward a
statement of facts and therefore we must presume
that the trial judge found every fact necessary to
sustain the judgment, provided such facts are raised
by the pleadings and are supported by the evidence.
Bishop v. Bishop, 359 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Sup.l962);
Texas Construction Associates, Inc. v. Balli, 558
S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1977, no
writ).
Appellant's first point of error asserts that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
enter an order compelling an annual shareholders'
meeting under Tex.Bus.Corp.Act Ann. art. 2.24 B
(Supp.1978) in that the article is unconstitutional as
applied to appellant because the Federal
Bankruptcy Court had exclusive and paramount
jurisdiction over the appellant's cooperative affairs
and because Rule 11-44 (U.S.C.A. Bankruptcy
Rules, 1975, pamphlet edition) stayed state court
proceedings against appellant.
[2] An overview of the jurisdictional provisions of
Chapter XI is set forth in In re Breinig, 40 F.Supp.
29 (E.D.Penn.194I). Generally speaking under
Chapter XI, the Bankruptcy Court has exclusive
jurisdiction of the debtor and his property, wherever
located. Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C.A. s 5 11 (1970) contains substantially the
same provision. In re Bettinger Corporation, 197
F.Supp. 273 (D.Mass.1961). The Bankruptcy Court
does not have jurisdiction, though, over all suits
brought against the Chapter XI debtor. 8 Collier on
Bankruptcy P 3.01(2) (14th ed. 1974), Evarts v.
Eloy Gin Corp., 204 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 876, 74 S.Ct. 129, 98 L.Ed.
384 (1953), See In re Prudence Bonds Corporation,
75 F.2d 262 (2nd Cir. 1935).
Much of the precedent which we find relevant to the
scope of the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction over
suits to compel shareholder meetings is found not
only in cases dealing with the jurisdiction of
Chapter XI proceedings but also in Chapter X, 11
U.S.C.A. ss 501 et seq. (1970), reorganization
cases. Chapter X and Chapter XI represent the two
corporate
rehabilitation
provisions
of the
Bankruptcy
Act.
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379

U.S. 594, 85 S.Ct. 513, 13 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); In
re Texas Consumer Finance Corp., 480 F.2d 1261
(5th Cir. 1973). A more detailed explanation of the
background and interrelationship of Chapters X and
XI can be found in American Trailer, supra, and
Texas Consumer Finance, supra.
[3] In that regard, a Chapter X reorganization
provides for extensive jurisdictional and judicial
control over the proceedings and administration of a
corporation, while a Chapter XI arrangement is
intended to provide a quick efficient method of
implementing a composition among the debtor's
general creditors with minimal court involvement.
American Trailer, supra, T-Anchor Corp. v.
Travarillo
Associates,
529
S. W.2d
622
(Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1975, no writ). Moreover,
Breinieg, supra, points out that certain provisions of
Chapters I-VII, 11 U.S.C.A. ss 1 et seq. (1966) are
also applicable to the jurisdiction of a Chapter XI
case. 8 Collier on Bankruptcy P 3.10, 3.11 (14th ed.
1974). The jurisdiction of a Chapter XI Bankruptcy
Court is somewhat broader, however, than that
under Chapters I-VII. Pocono Racing Management
Association, Inc. v. Banks, 434 F.Supp. 507, 509
(M.D.Pa.1977); 1 Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v.
Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 400 F.Supp. 280
(N.D.Ga.I975); 8 Collier on Bankruptcy P 3.01
(14th ed. 1974).
Appellant contends in its brief that pendency of an
arrangement proceeding precludes a state court
from adjudicating any matter which might touch
upon affairs of the corporate debtor without first
obtaining the approval of the Bankruptcy Court. In
sum, appellant argues that the instant suit to compel
a shareholder's meeting is tantamount to a suit to
oust current management, and that the potential
result would indeed interfere with the arrangement
debtors' affairs and the Bankruptcy Court's
jurisdiction. We do not agree with this conclusion.
*686 [4J[5] The mere pendency of a Chapter XI
proceeding does not divest a state court of
jurisdiction. Fitch v. Jones, 441 S.W.2d 187, 188
(Tex.Sup.l969). A state claim must interfere with
the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court in order to
preclude a state court's jurisdiction. In re Wisconsin
Cent. Ry. Co., 94 F.Supp. 165, 167 (D.Minn.l950)
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. See International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S.
261,49 S.Ct. 108,73 L.Ed. 318 (1929); In re Bush
Terminal Co., 78 F.2d 662, 665 (2nd Cir. 1935),
Cert. denied 299 U.S. 596, 57 S.Ct. 189, 81 L.Ed.
440 (1936); Northeastern Real Estate Securities
Corporation v. Goldstein, 276 N.Y. 64, 11 N.E.2d
354 (1937), (cited with approval in Fitch, supra); 8
C.J.S. Bankruptcy s 143 (1962). Compare 6 Collier
on Bankruptcy P 3.09 n. 18 (14th ed. 1977).

(N.D.Ga. 1975). Appellant's first point is overruled .

[6][7] The Bankruptcy Court has no jurisdiction
over the meetings of stockholders of the debtor. In
re J. P. Linahan, Inc., III F.2d 590 (2nd Cir. 1940);
In re Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., supra; see also
Taylor v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 7 F. 381
(C.C.E.D.Pa.1881). A Bankruptcy Court though,
does have the power to enjoin a shareholders'
meeting which will interfere with the administration
of the debtors' estate. In re Public Service Holding
Corp., 141 F.2d 425 (2nd Cir. 1944); Fitch, supra;
6 Collier on Bankruptcy P 8.15 (14th ed. 1977). In
the instant case, there is no evidence that the
court-appointed receiver, or any other party, sought
an injunction or order staying the holding of an
annual
shareholders'
meeting.
Indeed,
the
Bankruptcy Judge signed an order approving the
holding of a shareholders' meeting. Furthermore, the
mere fact that an election and possible installation
of new directors might ultimately have had some
indirect effect on the arrangement does not confer
jurisdiction on the Bankruptcy Court. In re Bush
Terminal Co., supra; In re New York and Worcester
Express, Inc., 294 F.Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y.1968).
Accordingly, we find the state court had jurisdiction
of this matter.

The current provisions of Article 2.24 B provide in
pertinent part:
" ... If the annual meeting is not held within any
13-month period, any court of competent
jurisdiction in the county in which the principal
office of the corporation is located may, on the
application of any shareholder, summarily order a
meeting to be held .... "

[8] Because we have concluded that the Bankruptcy
Court did not have jurisdiction over this suit to
compel a shareholders' meeting, and because we
construe the scope of Rule 11-44 to be in accord
with the substantive provisions of Chapter XI, we
find that the automatic rule 11-44 stay of the
Chapter XI proceeding did not preclude the district
court's order. Mid-Jersey National Bank v.
Fidelity-Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640 (3rd Cir.
1975). See also Matter of Cuba Electric and
Furniture Corporation, 430 F.Supp. 689 (D.Puerto
Rico 1977); Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Gwinnett
Bank & Trust Co., 400 F.Supp. 280, 284

Appellant's second point first contends that the trial
court erred in compelling an annual shareholder'S
meeting under Article 2.24 B because Los
Campeones failed to register its stock with V .J.P. in
accordance with the requirements of Tex.Bus. &
Comm.Code Ann. s 8.207(a) (1968) and in
accordance with the corporate bylaws ofV.I.P.

V.J.P. then directs us to Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code
Ann. s 8.207(a) (1968), which provides in pertinent
part:
"Prior to due present for registration of transfer of a
security in registered form the issuer ... may treat
the registered owner as the person exclusively
entitled to vote, to receive notifications and
otherwise to exercise all the rights and powers of an
owner."
Article III Section 1 of the V.J.P. bylaws contains a
similar provision. Appellant, further asserts that the
evidence is undisputed that Los Cam peones failed
to present its stock for registration to V.J.P. In
effect, V.I.P. argues that if an issuer may treat an
unregistered shareholder as having no power to
exercise the rights and powers *687 of an owner,
then the court under Article 2.24 B must treat an
unregistered shareholder as having no rights to seek
an annual shareholders' meeting. V.J.P. further
argues that the accepted meaning of the term "
&
shareholder"
comports
with
Tex.Bus.
Comm.Code Ann. s 8.207(a) (1968) and actually
means "shareholder of record," citing Mead
Corporation v. Commissioner of International
Revenue, 116 F.2d 187, 191 (3rd Cir. 1940). We do
not agree with these assertions for several reasons.
[9][I0J[IIJ[12][13J First, Section 8.207(a) deals
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only with the relationship between the issuer and
the shareholder. It makes no provision for a court's
treating the unregistered shareholder in the same
manner. Compare Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90,
94 (3rd Cir. 1941). Second, in an analogous
situation, unregistered shareholders are said to have
a protectable property interest which entitles them
to sue on behalf of the corporation regardless of
their lack of record status. In re Pittsburg & L. E. R.
Co., Etc., 543 F.2d 1058 (3rd Cir. 1976); 13
Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private
Corporations ss 5976, 5979 (1970), 12 Id. s 5507
(1971). Similarly, Los Campeones has a protectable
property interest. Cooper v. Citizens Nat. Bank of
Waco, 267 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1954,
writ refd n. r. e.); Greenspun v. Greenspun, 194
S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth), affd 145
Tex. 374, 198 S.W.2d 82 (1946). And it should be
able to protect that interest by demanding an annual
shareholders' meeting regardless of its ability or
desire to vote. Third, in Mead Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 116 F.2d 187
(3rd Cir. 1940), cited by appellant for the
proposition that "shareholder" means shareholder of
record, the term " shareholder" there defined was
derived from a specific tax law provision rather
than from common usage. The plain meaning of the
term "shareholder" is one who owns a share of
corporate stock. Applications of Friedman, 184
Misc. 639, 54 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1945). Fourth, it is
fundamental that a statute should be construed as a
whole, and that all of its parts be harmonized if
possible. Trawalter v. Schaefer, 142 Tex. 521, 179
S.W.2d 765 (1944); Turullols v. San Felipe Country
Club, 458 S.W.2d 206 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio
1970, writ refd n. r. e.). Every word or phrase is
presumed to have been used intentionally, with a
meaning and purpose. Robertson v. State, 406
S.W.2d 90 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1966, writ
refd n. r. e.).
[14J In looking at the entire Business Corporation
Act we find that if the Legislature had intended the
word "shareholder" in Article 2.24 B to mean "
shareholder of record," it would have provided that
the shareholder be one "of record" as it did in
Article 2.25. 53 Tex.Jur.2d, Statutes ss 160, 181
(1964). See HFG Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 162 F.2d
536, 540 (7th Cir. 1947). Finally, this Court's

interpretation of the word "shareholder" comports
with the purpose of the registration requirement.
The requirement that shares be registered is
intended for the protection of the corporation so
that it may know who is entitled to vote, receive
dividends, and otherwise participate in other
managerial functions. 12 Fletcher Cyclopedia of
Law of Private Corporations s 5489 (1971). See
also Kerr v. Tyler Guaranty State Bank, 283 S.W.
601 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1926, no writ). Under
Article 2.24 B, however, the court intervenes to
determine the status of a purported shareholder, and
the protections provided by a registration
requirement are not necessary.
Further in its second point V.J.P. asserts that the
trial court erred in ordering the meeting under
Article 2.24 B because Los Campeones possessed a
defective title to the shares; i. e., that it was not a
legitimate shareholder because: 1) the foreclosure
sale violated s 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C.A. s 77e (1971); 2) the evidence shows
Brownsville Savings breached its agreement to
release the pledged shares to their rightful owners;
and 3) Brownsville Savings and Los Cam peones
engaged in a scheme and artifice whereby they
fraudulently obtained the V.J.P. shares.
[15J About the general contention that Los
Campeones possessed a defective title to its shares,
we need not consider the merits*688 of this point
of error because no pleadings were presented to the
trial court concerning this defense nor was the
matter brought to the court's attention when setting
out the issues before the court for decision. See
State of California Department of Mental Hygiene
v. Bank of the Southwest National Association, 163
Tex. 314, 354 S.W.2d 576 (1962); Smith v. Davis,
453 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1970,
writ refd n. r. e.); Blackmon v. Stanley, 265 S.W.2d
695 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1954, no writ); 3
Tex.Jur.2d Rev. Appeal & Error s 98 (1974).
There are additional reasons why we must overrule
this phase of the second point. V.J.P. 's contention
that the foreclosure sale violated the 1933 Securities
Act was never pled nor presented to the trial court;
indeed, at trial defense counsel denied that the
legality of the foreclosure was in issue.
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[16][17][18] As to V.I.P.'s assertion that
Brownsville Savings breached its agreement to
release the V.I.P. shares, even considering this
contention on its merits, we find there is sufficient
evidence to support the trial judge's implied finding
that there was no breach of contract in that Bass did
not meet all the conditions required for Brownsville
Savings to release the pledged shares. Relative to
the assertion by V.J.P. of fraud, that defense as used
in this case is an affirmative defense. Tex.R.Civ.P.
94. Here the defense was waived by V.J.P. 's failure
to plead it or have it acted on by the trial court.
Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. v. Tyra, 419
S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Sup.l967); Parliament Insurance
Company v. L.B. Foster Co., 533 S.W.2d 43, 50
(Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1975, writ refd n. r.
e.). Furthermore, even if V.I.P. had properly plead
and preserved this contention, we find there was
sufficient evidence to support the court's implied
conclusion that V.I.P. did not meet its burden in
proving that Brownsville Savings defrauded V.I.P.
Appellant's second point is overruled.

only to books and records of a more formal nature.
We disagree. Sections 3.07 also provides:"Every
member shall have the right to inspect such books
and records of an association as pertain to his loan,
Permanent Reserves Funds Stock or savings
Account."

[19J In V.I.P.'s third point it alleges that the trial
court erred in refusing to permit V.J.P.'s counsel to
review court exhibits 1 through 4, 6 and 7, and in
refusing to admit exhibits 1 and 4 into evidence.
Pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum Robert
Knowles was ordered to deliver to the court
Brownsville Savings' correspondence file relevant
to Los Campeones. The Court reviewed seven
documents and admitted court exhibit number 5 into
evidence. The rest were considered privileged
information and V.I.P. 's counsel was not permitted
to review them. The privilege was claimed under
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 852a s 3.07 (1964),
which provides in pertinent part:
"The books and records pertaining to the accounts
and loans of members shall be kept confidential by
the
Commissioner,
his
examiners
and
representatives, except when disclosure thereof
shall be compelled by a court of competent
jurisdiction, and no member or other person shall
have access to the books and records . . . except
upon express action and authority of the board of
directors."

*689 [20] V.I.P. further maintains that Section 3.07
provides that a court of competent jurisdiction may
order disclosure of the correspondence herein, and
that the subpoena duces tecum was tantamount to
such an order. Rule 167, T.R.C.P., pertaining to the
production of documents, provides a party shall
only produce such documents as are "not privileged"
. We hold that these documents were privileged and
V.I.P. 's counsel did not have a right to view them.

V.I.P. submits that the language of Section 3.07
quoted above does not apply to correspondence, but

In construing statutes every word or phrase is
presumed to have been used intentionally, with a
meaning and purpose. Robertson, supra. We do not
think the Legislature intended to eliminate
correspondence from the phrase "books and records
", and thereby prevent members from inspecting
their own correspondence.
V.I.P. also asserts that Section 3.07 does not apply
to litigants of a formal lawsuit but is meant to apply
to the "Commissioner, his examiners and
representatives". The clear language of the statute
refutes this contention in stating "no member or
other person shall have access to the books and
records ... "

[21 J V.I.P. also appears to complain that Section
3.07 does not preclude the admission into evidence
of such undisclosed communications where they are
material to the suit. A provision similar to Article
852a s 3.07; i. e., Article 1136a-9 (parts of which
are now in Article 852a s 11.18), was interpreted to
preclude the discoverability of certain reports in
Falkner v. Gibraltar Savings Association, 348
S.W.2d 472 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1961, writ refd
n. r. e.). See also Benson v. San Antonio Savings
Association, 374 S.W.2d 423 (Tex.Sup.l963). We
agree with these decisions and find Section 3.07
confers a privilege upon which a trial court may
exclude certain evidence. V.I.P.'s third point is
overruled.
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[22] V.J.P. complains in its fourth point that the trial
court erred in permitting the witness Knowles to
testify, over objection, concerning Bill Bass'
statement about an audit report because such
testimony was hearsay as to the report. We need not
consider the merits of this contention in that without
findings of fact and conclusions of law we presume
the trial judge disregarded evidence which might
have been improperly received. Gray v. Bird, 380
S.W.2d 908 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1964, writ refd n.
r. e.). See also Yzaguirre v. State, 427 S.W.2d 687
(Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1968, no writ); 4
Tex.Jur.2d Rev. Appeal & Error s 720 n. 17 (I 974).
V.I.P.'s fourth point is overruled.
[23] Los Cam peones by cross-point argues that the"
summary" nature of an Article 2.24 B order makes
it unappealable and final in the trial court and that
consequently this Court is without jurisdiction to
hear this appeal. We do not agree. The judgment
rendered by the trial court on September 7, 1977,
was a final judgment in that it disposed of all
matters involved in the suit and determined the
rights of all parties in the suit. North East
Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400
S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Sup.1966); McHenry v. Shelton,
456 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1970,
no writ). Consequently, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art.
1819 (I 964) confers jurisdiction on this Court for
purposes of this appeal. The cross-point and
motions to dismiss the appeal contentions of Los
Campeones are overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Tex.Civ.App., 1978.
Valley Intern. Properties, Inc. v. Los Campeones,
Inc.
568 S.W.2d 680
END OF DOCUMENT
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attorney from the outset of the third shareholder's
representation by independent counsel. In addition,
the court held that the attorney's continuing
representation of his individual shareholder clients
was permissible. Because the functioning of these
closely held corporations had been so intertwined
with the individual defendants that any distinction
between them was entirely fictional, application of a
strict rule of disqualification would be meaningless.
(Opinion by Kline, P. J., with Haerle and Lambden,
JJ., concurring.)

HEADNOTES
SUMMARY
Classified to California Digest of Official Reports
An attorney was simultaneously representing two
closely held family-run corporations and two of the
three shareholders (and directors) of those
corporations in a shareholder's derivative action.
Those two
shareholders were accused of
embezzling from the corporations and subjecting
them to penalties for tax fraud. The trial court
granted the motion brought by the third shareholder
to disqualifY the attorney from representing the
corporations, but allowed the attorney to continue
with representation of the other two shareholders in
the litigation. (Superior Court of San Mateo County,
Nos. 386666 and 390289, Harlan K. Veal, Judge.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting in
part and denying in part the motion for
disqualification. The court held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it disqualified the
attorney from representing the corporations, since it
was clear that the interests of the corporations and
the shareholders were diverse. In addition, under
Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-600, the two
shareholders could not as directors consent to the
dual representation. The court further held that the
motion for disqualification was timely filed, since
any delays were occasioned by settlement
negotiations, and the two shareholders had notice of
the third shareholder's wish to disqualifY their

(1) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client
Relationship--Conflict of Interest and Remedies of
Former
Clients--Motion
to
DisqualifY--*66
Appellate Review of Ruling.
An order granting or denying a motion to disqualifY
counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The
trial court's exercise of discretion is limited by
applicable legal principles and is subject to reversal
when there is no reasonable basis for the action
taken.
[See 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996)
Attorneys, § 134.]
(2) Attorneys at Law § 10--Attorney-client
Relationship--Motion to DisqualifY.
The issue of disqualification of an attorney
ultimately involves a conflict between the clients'
right to counsel of their choice and the need to
maintain
ethical
standards
of
professional
responsibility. The paramount concern, though,
must be the preservation of public trust in the
scrupulous administration of justice and the
integrity of the bar. The recognized and important
right to counsel of one's choosing must yield to
considerations of ethics that run to the very integrity
ofthe judicial process.
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(3) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client
Relationship--Conflict of Interest and Remedies of
Former Clients--Successive Representation
of
Adverse Clients.
When an attorney's conflict of interest arises from
successive representation of clients with potentially
adverse interests, the chief fiduciary value
jeopardized is that of client confidentiality. The
initial question in such cases is whether there is a
substantial relationship between the subjects of the
former and current representations. If a substantial
relationship exists, the court will presume that
confidences were disclosed during the former
representation which may have value in the current
relationship.
(4) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client
Relationship--Conflict of Interest and Remedies of
Former Clients--Simultaneous Representation of
Adverse Clients.
When an attorney's conflict of interest arises from
simultaneous representations of clients with
potentially adverse interests, the primary value is
the attorney's duty-and the client's legitimate
expectation-of loyalty, rather than confidentiality.
Representation adverse to a present client must be
measured not so much against the similarities in
litigation as against the duty of undivided loyalty
which an attorney owes to each of his or her clients.
In all but a few instances, the rule of
disqualification in simultaneous representation
cases is an automatic one. The strict proscription
against dual representation of clients with adverse
interests derives from a concern with protecting the
integrity of the attorney-client relationship rather
than from concerns with the risk of specific acts of
disloyalty or diminution of the quality of the
attorney's representation. *67
(5) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client
Relationship--Conflict of Interest--Simultaneous
Representation of Corporation and Directors in
Shareholders' Derivative Action.
In a shareholder's derivative action in which the
same attorney simultaneously represented two
closely held family-run corporations and two of the
three shareholders (and directors) of those
corporations, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it disqualified the attorney from

representing
the
corporations,
since
the
shareholders were accused of embezzling from the
corporations and subjecting them to penalties for
tax fraud. It was clear that the interests of the
corporations and the shareholders were diverse. In
addition, under Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-600, the
two shareholders could not as directors consent to
the dual representation.
[See 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996)
Attorneys, § 139.J
(6) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client
Relationship--Conflict of Interest and Remedies of
Former Clients--Motion to Disqualify--Timeliness.
In a shareholder's derivative action, a motion for
disqualification of an attorney who simultaneously
represented
two
closely
held
family-run
corporations and two of the corporation's three
shareholders (and directors) was timely filed.
Although inexcusable delay may occasion denial of
a motion to disqualify counsel, the delay must be
extreme in terms of time and consequence. The two
shareholders had notice of the third shareholder's
wish to disqualify their attorney from the outset of
the
third
shareholder's
representation
by
independent counsel. Any delays in bringing the
motion were occasioned by settlement negotiations.
Once that settlement was repudiated, the third
shareholder obtained the deposition transcript
containing damning admissions of embezzlement
and tax fraud against the corporation by one of the
shareholders under representation, and filed the
motion to disqualify. Given this history, the attorney
and his individual clients could not have been
misled into thinking that the third shareholder had
consented to the adverse representation.
(7) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client
Relationship--Conflict of Interest--Shareholders'
Derivative Action--Continuing Representation of
Individual Directors.
In a shareholder's derivative action in which the
same attorney simultaneously represented two
closely held family-run corporations and two of the
three shareholders (and directors) of those
corporations, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it disqualified the attorney from
representing the corporations, yet allowed the
attorney
to
continue
with
his
individual
representation of the shareholders. The shareholders
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were accused of embezzling from *68 the
corporations and sUbjecting them to penalties for
tax fraud. While dual representation of a
corporation and its directors in shareholder
derivative litigation is impermissible (at least if the
directors are charged with fraud), the attorney who
formerly represented both clients may continue to
represent the individual ones. This rule recognizes
that while the corporation's attorney is nominally
the corporation's representative, his or her personal
loyalties will inevitably be to the insider executives
who hired him or her. Because the functioning of
these closely held corporations had been so
intertwined with the individual defendants that any
distinction between them was entirely fictional,
application of a strict rule of disqualification would
have been meaningless.

COUNSEL
Corey, Luzaich, Gemello, Manos & Pliska and
Dario de Ghetaldi for Defendants and Appellants.
David M. McKim for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
KLINE, P. J.
This case raises issues pertaining to a motion to
disqualifY the attorney simultaneously representing
two closely held, family-run corporations, and two
of the corporations' three shareholders. The trial
court granted the motion to disqualifY the attorney
from representation of the corporate parties, but
allowed him to continue his representation of the
individuals. The minority director/shareholder
appeals, contending the court erred in failing to
grant the disqualification motion In full. The
corporations, on cross-appeal, urge the trial court
erred in granting the motion at all.

Statement of the Case and Facts
This case involves a dispute between the three
shareholders of Ba-Cel, Inc. (a corporation
primarily engaged in the business of automobile
towing and now known as Michael W. Forrest,
Inc.), and Elgin Auto Body, Inc. (a corporation
primarily engaged in the business of automobile
body repair and now known as Forrest Auto Body,
Inc.). The corporations are each owned in equal
measure by Michael W. Forrest, his wife, Sandra

Forrest, and Sandra Forrest's brother, Ritch Ricetti.
The three shareholders were each officers and
directors of the corporations until September 22,
1994, when the Forrests purportedly removed
Ricetti from office. *69
On January 26, 1994, Michael W. Forrest and
Ba-Cel, Inc., filed a complaint (No. 386666) for
damages and declaratory relief against John M.
Baeza, a former officer and 50 percent shareholder
of Ba-Cel, Inc., and various insurance companies
and brokers. The complaint alleged Baeza had
procured inadequate liability insurance for the
corporation before selling his interest. The plaintiffs
were represented by David M. McKim.
On June 14, 1994, Baeza filed a cross-complaint for
indemnity against Michael Forrest, Sandra Forrest,
Ritch Ricetti and the insurance defendants. McKim
filed an answer to the cross-complaint on behalf of
Michael and Sandra Forrest (the Forrests) and
Ricetti.
On November 23, 1994, a new attorney was
substituted as counsel for Ricetti.
On November 28, 1994, McKim filed on behalf of
the Forrests and Elgin Auto Body, Inc., a complaint
(No. 390289) for damages, contribution and
equitable subrogation against Ricetti and Baeza. FNI
The complaint
alleged malfeasance against
Elgin by Ricetti, and a conspiracy between Ricetti
and Baeza to drive the Forrests out of the business
and enable Baeza to repurchase stock at a
discounted price. The plaintiffs sought contribution
for amounts owed by Ricetti on the promissory
notes by which the corporation's stock had been
purchased, alleging Ricetti had failed to pay these
amounts and the Forrests had done so in order to
avoid foreclosure upon their home, which secured
the notes. They further sought equitable subrogation
to the secured obligations held by Baeza and
Celestre.

FNI The complaint also named as a
defendant Julio Ricetti, father of Ritch
Ricetti and Sandra Forrest. According to
the allegations of subsequent pleadings,
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Baeza and Carmelo Celestre had sold their
Elgin and Ba-Cel stock to the Forrests and
Julio Ricetti; the latter then transferred his
shares to Ritch Ricetti.
On December 9, 1994, Ricetti filed notice of a
motion for appointment of a receiver to manage the
affairs of Elgin and Ba-Cel. He also filed the first of
his motions to disqualifY McKim as counsel for the
Forrests and the corporations in the two pending
cases, alleging a conflict of interest due to McKim's
prior representation of the Forrests, the corporations
and Ricetti in the litigation.
On January 23, 1995, the trial court denied Ricetti's
motions to disqualifY McKim and to appoint a
receiver, and granted his motions for leave to file a
cross-complaint and to consolidate the two cases.
Ricetti filed a crosscomplaint against the Forrests,
the corporations, and the insurance parties. Ricetti
alleged the corporations were alter egos of the
Forrests; the Forrests *70 made personal use of
assets and funds of the corporations, transferred
assets and funds of the corporations to themselves
without adequate consideration, and operated the
corporations to Ricetti's detriment. He further
alleged that the Forrests improperly removed Ricetti
as a director and officer of the corporations at a
meeting on September 22, 1994. Among other
things, Ricetti sought damages, removal of the
Forrests as directors, and winding up and
dissolution of the corporations (for the protection of
Ricetti as the minority shareholder).
In April 1995, Sandra Forrest's deposition was
taken. As evidenced by the excerpts included in the
record, she testified that cash brought into Ba-Cel
was recorded on deposit slips, except that before
Ricetti left, the Forrests and Ricetti each received
$500 a week that was not recorded. After Ricetti's
departure, everything was recorded except cash
overtime payments to four employees. Forrest also
stated that prior to Ricetti's departure she would "
skim" from lien sales, with Ricetti receiving
one-third of the money. Forrest kept a record of the
income not recorded on the deposit slips, so that the
corporation's total income could be ascertained by
consulting this record plus the deposit slips. The
income reflected in this separate record, however,

was not reported on the corporation's income tax
returns or on the Forrests' or Ricetti's returns. The
cash payments Forrest made to employees were not
reported to federal or state authorities or to the
corporation's accountant. Forrest denied using
undeposited cash for personal purposes. Forrest
testified that a check from Julio Ricetti, for the
purchase of an engine through Elgin, was at Ritch
Ricetti's direction cashed and split three ways
between Ricetti and the Forrests.
On January 19, 1996, Ricetti filed a second motion
to disqualifY McKim. In his accompanying
declaration, Ricetti alleged that his inspection of the
corporate records revealed embezzlement by the
Forrests from the corporations. Ricetti· submitted
excerpts from Sandra Forrest's deposition and took
the position that Sandra Forrest had admitted
embezzlement, tax fraud and other crimes, creating
an actual conflict of interest between the Forrests
and the corporations that could not be waived.
On February 22, 1996, the parties stipulated to have
the disqualification motion determined by retired
Justice Robert Kane, a referee.
In opposition to the motion to disqualifY, the
Forrests submitted a joint declaration affirming
their wish, as individuals and as shareholders of the
corporations, to have McKim continue his
representation. The Forrests stated they had taken
no cash distribution from either corporation for
which Ricetti did not get a corresponding
proportionate share; no creditor of either *71
corporation ever went unpaid because of cash
distributions to the shareholders; and two
accountants had been retained and had begun to
redo the corporate tax returns to account for the
cash withdrawals. They further stated that
throughout
McKim's
representation,
the
corporations had had separate general counsel. The
Forrests felt Ricetti's disqualification motion had
been brought, on the eve of trial, for purposes of
harassment.
In
their
brief opposing
the
disqualification motion, the Forrests noted that if
Ricetti was permitted to amend his cross-complaint
to allege a derivative action against the Forrests and
the
corporations
regarding
the
purported
embezzlement and tax related liabilities, McKim "
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arguably" would be prohibited
representation as to those issues.

from

joint

The Forrests also submitted the declaration of Ron
Ferretti, a retired San Mateo County Sheriff, who
stated that he had on several occasions observed
Sandra Forrest hand Ricetti "a thick wad of currency
" saying "here's your money" or "here's your share,"
creating the impression Forrest was giving Ricetti
his share of the businesses' profits. Ferretti also
declared he had been present at the Forrests' home
when Ricetti asked Sandra Forrest to keep his
$6,000 share of cash in the wall safe until he could
obtain his own safe. The declaration of Hattie
Ferretti related the same incident.
McKim's declaration in opposition to the motion to
disqualify stated that a subpoena of Ricetti's bank
records showed his use of his checking account
dropped dramatically after he became a shareholder
and rose again after the Forrests stopped making
cash distributions in the summer of 1994, and that
Ricetti wrote checks to "cash" before becoming a
shareholder and after being terminated as an officer,
but not in between.
Ricetti in turn, submitted deposition testimony, in
which he denied ever receiving cash distributions
from the corporations or the Forrests, or knowing
the Forrests or corporation employees were
receiving cash distributions or payments. With
respect to his bank records, Ricetti did not
remember why the number of checks written
dropped, but explained it rose again after he was
terminated from the corporations because he was at
home all the time and took responsibility for paying
more bills. Ricetti denied ever asking Sandra
Forrest to keep cash for him in her safe. Ricetti also
submitted the declaration of his father stating he had
overheard Michael Forrest and Ron Ferretti
agreeing to falsely represent that Ferretti was an
employee of Ba-Cel on Ferretti's application for a
mortgage. Ricetti's own declaration made further
accusations against the Forrests, the Ferrettis and
McKim. FN2

FN2 Ricetti accused the Forrests, the
Ferrettis and McKim of making false

statements in their declarations regarding
Ricetti's conduct and intentions and
accused Ron Ferretti and the Forrests of
improper conduct. Ricetti additionally
charged that the Forrests had succeeded in
defeating the first motion to disqualify
McKim in part by submitting perjurous
declarations from themselves, McKim and
Frank Blum (former corporate counsel)
stating that at the time of the Forrests' and
Ricetti's initial meeting with McKim about
filing the original lawsuit, Ricetti was
neither an officer nor a director of either of
the corporations. Ricetti also stated his
belief that the Forrests were continuing to
steal money from the corporations.
At the hearing before Justice Kane on March 11,
1996, McKim argued there was no actual conflict
between the Forrests and the corporations due to *72
the cash distributions and improper tax reporting
because the Forrests had hired two accountants who
were straightening out the situation. McKim urged
that Ricetti's claims that the Forrests took money for
their own use were personal, not derivative claims
of the corporations, because if as the Forrests
maintained Ricetti participated equally in the
distributions, they were lawful distributions agreed
to by the only three shareholders of the
corporations. McKim also claimed any conflict was
waived by the Forrests as shareholders of the
corporations.
On March 15, 1996, Ricetti filed his first amended
cross-complaint adding derivative causes of action
for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting, and
deleting the cause of action for involuntary
dissolution of the corporations.
On April 1, 1996, the referee signed an order
denying the motion to disqualify McKim. The
referee found no actual conflict, based on the record
existing at the time of the motion, and held damage
to the corporations would have to be alleged by
means of a derivative action. The referee further
found any conflict had been effectively waived by a
majority of the corporations' shareholders.
Ricetti filed objections to the referee's decision and
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a new motion for disqualification based on his
derivative action against the Forrests. On June 3,
1996, the court found no abuse of discretion in the
referee's decision and appointed Justice Kane to
hear the new motion for disqualification. The
parties agreed to argue the matter without further
briefing.
On June 20, 1996, after a hearing which was not
reported, the referee granted the motion to
disqualifY as to McKim's representation of the
corporations but denied it as to his representation of
the Forrests. The superior court's order adopting the
referee's decision was filed on June 27, 1996.
On July 10, 1996, Ricetti filed a petition for writ of
mandate (Ricetti v. Superior Court, No. A074866).
The petition was denied on July 25, 1996, on the
ground that an order denying a motion to disqualifY
counsel is appealable.
Ricetti filed a timely notice of appeal on July 29,
1996, appealing the decision to allow McKim to
continue to represent the Forrests. The corporations
filed a notice of cross-appeal seeking review of the
decision to disqualifY McKim from representation
of the corporations. *73

preservation of public trust in the scrupulous
administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.
The recognized and important right to counsel of
one's choosing must yield to considerations of
ethics that run to the very integrity of our judicial
process.'
(Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc.
v.
Tracinda Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1838,
quoting In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991)
232 Cal.App.3d 572, 585 [283 Cal.Rptr. 732].)
(3) Rule 3-310 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
of the State Bar of California FN3 provides in
pertinent part: "(C) A member shall not, without the
informed written consent of each client: [1] (2)
Accept or continue representation of more than one
client in a matter in which the interests of the clients
actually conflict ... [~] (E) A member shall not,
without the informed written consent of the client or
former client, accept employment adverse to the
client or former client where, by reason of the
representation of the client or former client, the
member has obtained confidential information
material to the employment."

FN3 All further references to rules will be
to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
State Bar of California unless otherwise
specified.

Discussion
(1) An order granting or denying a motion to
disqualifY counsel is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Truck Ins. Exchange V. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055 [8
Cal.Rptr.2d 228]; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v.
Tracinda Corp. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1838 [
43 Cal.Rptr.2d 327].) "The trial court's exercise of
discretion is limited by applicable legal principles
and is subject to reversal when there is no
reasonable basis for the action taken." (
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. supra, 36 Cal.App.4th
atp.1838.)
(2) "The issue of disqualification 'ultimately
involves a conflict between the clients' right to
counsel of their choice and the need to maintain
ethical standards of professional responsibility. The
paramount concern, though, must be the

Where an attorney's conflict arises from successive
representation of clients with potentially adverse
interests, "the chief fiduciary value jeopardized is
that of client confidentiality." (Flatt v. Superior
Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 283 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d
537, 885 P.2d 950], italics in original.) The initial
question in such cases is whether there is a "
substantial relationship" between the subjects of the
former
and
current
representations.
(Ibid.;
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp.,
supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1839; Truck Ins.
Exchange v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., supra, 6
Cal.App.4th at p. 1056.) "If a substantial
relationship exists, courts will presume that
confidences were disclosed during the former
representation which may have *74 value in the
current relationship." (Truck Ins. Exchange, supra,
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056; Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p.283.)
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(4) A different test is utilized where the attorney's
conflict arises from simultaneous representations. "
The primary value at stake in cases of simultaneous
or dual representation is the attorney's duty-and the
client's legitimate expectation-of loyalty, rather than
confidentiality." (Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9
Cal. 4th
at
p.
284,
italics
in
original;
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. V. Tracinda Corp.,
supra,
36
Cal.AppAth
at
p.
1839.)
"
'[R]epresentation adverse to a present client must be
measured not so much against the similarities in
litigation, as against the duty of undivided loyalty
which an attorney owes to each of his clients.' " (
Truck Ins. Exchange V. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
supra, 6 Cal.AppAth at p. 1056, italics in original.)
"[I]n all but a few instances, the rule of
disqualification in simultaneous representation
cases is a per se or 'automatic' one. [Citations.] [~]
The reason for such a rule is evident, even (or
perhaps especially) to the nonattorney. A client who
learns that his or her lawyer is also representing a
litigation adversary, even with respect to a matter
wholly unrelated to the one for which counsel was
retained, cannot long be expected to sustain the
level of confidence and trust in counsel that is one
of the foundations of the professional relationship."
(Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 285.)
The strict proscription against dual representation
of clients with adverse interests thus derives from a
concern with protecting the integrity of the
attorney-client relationship rather than from
concerns with the risk of specific acts of disloyalty
or diminution of the quality of the attorney's
representation. (Developments in the Law-Coriflicts
of Interest in the Legal Profession (1981) 94 Harv.
L.Rev. 1244, 1295-1302.)
(5) In the present case, McKim is in the position of
simultaneously representing the Forrests and the
corporations they are accused of embezzling from
and subjecting to penalties for tax fraud. In the
context of the third disqualification motion-the only
one before us for review-the corporations are
nominal defendants in a shareholder's derivative
suit. In such a suit, the corporation, while nominally
a defendant, is actually a plaintiff; if the allegations
of Ricetti's cross-complaint are proved, the
corporations stand to benefit from recovery for the

Forrests' wrongful actions. (Cannon V. u.s.
Acoustics Corporation (N.D.Ill. 1975) 398 F.Supp.
209,213-214.) Current case law clearly forbids dual
representation of a corporation and directors in a
shareholder derivative suit, at least w.here, as here,
the directors are alleged to have committed fraud. (
Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Bolger (3d Cir. 1993) 2 FJd
1304, 1317; Musheno V. Gensemer (M.D.Pa. 1995)
897 F.Supp. 833, 838; In re Orade Securities
Litigation (N.D.Cal. 1993) *75829 F.Supp. 1176,
1188; Messing V. FDI, Inc. (D.N.J. 1977) 439
F.Supp. 776; Lewis V. Shaffer Stores Company
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) 218 F.Supp. 238, 239.)
We are aware of one California case holding that,
prior to an adjudication that the corporation is
entitled to relief against its officers or directors, the
same attorney may represent both. (Jacuzzi V.
Jacuzzi Brothers, Inc. (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 1,
35-36 [52 Cal.Rptr. 147].) Jacuzzi has been
criticized as illogical and against the weight of
authority. (In re Oracle Securities Litigation, supra,
829 F.Supp. at p. 1188, fn. 8; Patton,
Disqualification
of Corporate
Counsel
in
Derivative Actions: Jacuzzi and the Inadequacy oj
Dual Representation (1979) 31 Hastings L.J. 347.)
As stated in Lewis V. Shaffer Stores Company, supra
, 218 F.Supp. at page 239, the merits of the action
(which will determine whether there is in fact
adversity between the corporation and directors in a
derivative suit) should not be determined in the
context of a motion to disqualify counsel. Here,
under the allegations of the cross-complaint, it is
clear that the interests of the corporations and the
Forrests are adverse.
Respondents/cross-appellants (the Forrests and
corporations) FN4 urge there is no conflict between
the Forrests' interests and the corporations' with
respect to either the embezzlement claims or the tax
fraud issues. On the first point, they take the
position all the distributions they received from the
corporations were shared in equal measure by
Ricetti, having been agreed to by the three
directors/shareholders of the corporations. While
this is the picture painted by Sandra Forrest's
deposition testimony and the Forrests' declaration,
inferentially supported by their other evidence of
Ricetti being seen in possession of significant sums

© 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND
IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION
http://web2.westlaw.com/printiprintstrearn.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split...

39 0 f P
d

2/28/2007

Page 8 of13

58 Cal.App.4th 65

Page 8

58 Cal.App.4th 65, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 7806, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,541
(Cite as: 58 Cal.AppAth 65)
of cash, Ricetti denied ever receIving cash
distributions from the corporations or knowing the
Forrests were receiving cash distributions. Which
side of this story is to be believed has yet to be
determined in this action. As for the tax fraud
issues, the Forrests concede the corporations could
be liable for taxes, interest and penalties, yet argue
there is no conflict because the officers would be
personally liable to the same extent as the
corporation, and the Forrests hired accountants to
correct the payroll reporting. The latter point does
not resolve the question whether the corporation
will be liable for penalties, nor whether accountants
hired by the Forrests will be sufficiently
independent to properly resolve the financial issues.
The former point assumes Ricetti's knowledge of
the Forrests' conduct, a matter as yet undetermined.
The court did not abuse its *76 discretion in finding
an actual conflict between the interests of the
Forrests and the corporations.

FN4
The
"Respondents'
and
Cross-Appellants' Brief' was filed by
McKim on behalf of the Forrests, who did
not file a notice of appeal from the trial
court's order. Some of the arguments made
are clearly on behalf of the corporations,
which did file a notice of appeal, and the
brief makes no attempt to distinguish
which arguments are made on behalf of
which party. The "Cross-Appellants' Reply
Brief' was filed by McKim on behalf of
the corporations.
Respondents urge any conflict was legally waived
by the Forrests' consent, as shareholders of the
corporations, to the dual representation. Rule
3-600(E), provides: "A member representing an
organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders, or
other constituents, subject to the provisions of rule
3-310. If the organization's consent to the dual
representation is required by rule 3-310, the consent
shall be given by an appropriate constituent of the
organization other than the individual or constituent
who is to be represented, or by the shareholder(s) or
organization members." According to respondents,
the Forrests, as holders of two-thirds of the

corporations' stock, could and did validly consent to
McKim's representation on behalf of the
corporations.
The referee'S view on this issue was succinctly
stated in its order: "[IJn the face of a derivative
cause of action, to permit the Forrests to waive the
conflict on behalf of the corporations would be the
equivalent of denying Mr. Ricetti's derivative claim
out of hand-a legally impermissible action."
Clearly, under rule 3-600, the Forrests could not
consent to the representation on behalf of the
corporations in their capacity as directors of the
corporations. In the circumstances here, where the
only shareholders of the corporations are also the
directors involved in the controversy, to allow the
shareholders to consent on behalf of the corporation
would render rule 3-600 meaningless.
Indeed, commentators and case law alike have
concluded that reliance on consent is ill founded in
the context of derivative litigation. Thus, in Cannon
V. u.s. Acoustics Corporation, supra, 398 F.Supp.
at page 216, footnote 10, the court stated: "[Ethical
Consideration] 5-16 [of the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility]
provides that in some circumstances multiple
representation may be permissible if both clients are
fully informed of potential conflict and the parties
consent to the representation. This consent rationale
seems peculiarly inapplicable to a derivative suit,
because the corporation must consent through the
directors, who, as in the present case, are the
individual
defendants.
See
Opinion
842,
Association of the City of New York Committee on
Professional Ethics (Jan. 4, 1960), 15 Record
N.Y.C.B.A. 80 (1960)." Messing v. FDI, Inc., supra
, 439 F.Supp. at page 784, in discussing an alleged
conflict between representation of corporate
directors charged with fraud and directors charged
with negligence, noted: "However, in contrast to the
question of the joint representation of the directors
and the corporation, here there are individuals who
are capable of informed consent and who can act
independently of each other." In *77 In re Oracle
Securities Litigation, supra, 829 F.Supp. at page
1189, the court stated: "It is also clear that an
inanimate corporate entity, which is run by directors
who are themselves defendants in the derivative
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litigation, cannot effectively waive a conflict of
interest as might. an individual under applicable
professional rules such as [rules] 3-600(E) and
3-310." One commentator noted: "But it would be
meaningless in derivative litigation to allow the
consent of the parties defendant to exculpate the
practice of dual representation, for most often it
would be the defendant directors and officers who
would force the corporation's consent." (Comment,
Independent
Representation
for
Corporate
Defendants in Derivative Suits (1965) 74 Yale L.J.
524,528.)
(6) Respondents also assert the disqualification
motion should have been denied because it was not
timely filed. They base this contention on the
assertion that Ricetti "was aware of the cash
withdrawals nearly a year before making the motion.
" No citation to the record is provided to clarifY this
assertion. We presume it is based on the fact that
Sandra Forrest discussed the cash distributions and
payments upon which Ricetti's allegations of
embezzlement and tax fraud are based in her
deposition in April 1995, but the motion to
disqualifY McKim based on Forrests' admissions
was not filed until January 1996.
The record reflects that Ricetti filed his first motion
to disqualifY McKim in December 1994, within
weeks of substituting in his new attorney. This
motion, based on different grounds from the one
before us for review, was denied. In April 1995,
Sandra Forrest's deposition was taken. At this time,
the parties entered into a settlement agreement,
which was subsequently repudiated in July 1995.
According to Ricetti's attorney, preparation of the
deposition transcript was delayed as part of the
settlement agreement. Ricetti then attempted
unsuccessfully to have the court enter judgment on
the settlement agreement. In November 1995, the
court denied the motion for judgment on the
settlement agreement and Ricetti made a written
demand
for
McKim's
withdrawal
from
representation. McKim refused, Ricetti's attorney
ordered transcription of Sandra Forrest's deposition,
and the transcript was finalized on December 15,
1995. Ricetti's motion to disqualifY based on the
conflict between the Forrests and corporations due
to the alleged embezzlement and tax fraud was filed

on January 19, 1996. The motion was denied on
April 1, 1996; Ricetti filed the third motion for
disqualification along with his objections to the
referee's decision later that month.
Although inexcusable delay may occasion denial of
a motion to disqualifY counsel, the "delay must be
extreme in terms of time and consequence." (River
West, Inc. V. Nickel (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1297,
1311 [*78234 Cal.Rptr. 33].) In River West, a
defendant moved to disqualifY plaintiffs' attorney
because the attorney had represented the defendant
in a "substantially related" matter some 27 to 30
years before. The motion was filed more than three
years after the defendant had knowledge of the
conflict, after the attorney had worked more than
3,000 hours on the case, at a cost of some $387,000.
The defendant attempted to excuse the delay by
claiming there had been no court available to hear
the motion due to pending motions for change of
venue and judicial disqualification. The reviewing
court found the excuse insufficient, as there had
been times within the period when a judge would
have been available and, in any case, the inability of
a court to determine the motion did not excuse the
defendant from filing the motion to give notice to
the plaintiffs and their attorney of the claimed
conflict. (188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1314.)
In Trust Corp. of Montana V. Piper Aircraft Corp.
(9th Cir. 1983) 701 F.2d 85, 87-88, upon which
respondents rely, an objection to adverse
representation was deemed waived where the
objecting party had known of the conflict for two
and a half years before seeking disqualification.
Health Maintenance Network V. Blue Cross of So.
California (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1064 [249
Cal.Rptr. 220], the other case relied upon by
respondents, is inapposite as it found a former client
had waived objection by impliedly consenting to the
adverse representation. The only discussion of the
issue of delay as a waiver of a disqualification
motion was the following statement: "Although a
waiver of an objection to an opposing attorney by
reason of a disqualifYing conflict of interest will
normally not be presumed merely because of delay
in raising such objection, a client or former client
may consent to an attorney's acceptance of adverse
employment and such consent may be implied by
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conduct." (202 Cal.App.3d at p.
added.)

1064, italics

In the present case, the evidence supports the trial
court's implied finding that any delay was
insufficiently extreme to warrant denial of the
disqualification motion. Respondents had notice
from the outset of Ricetti's representation by
independent counsel that Ricetti wished to
disqualifY McKim. Ricetti's second motion to
disqualifY was based upon Sandra Forrest's
statements in her April 1995 deposition, after which
the parties entered into a settlement agreement. As
explained in Ricetti's attorney's November 1995
letter to McKim, Ricetti was willing to accept
McKim's representation of the Forrests and
corporations during the time the parties tried to
effectuate a settlement. Once the settlement was
repudiated, Ricetti's attempt to have the court
enforce it failed, and McKim rejected Ricetti's
demand that he withdraw as counsel for the Forrests
and corporations. Ricetti then obtained the
deposition transcript and filed the motion to
disqualifY. The third motion to disqualifY was filed
within weeks of the denial of the second one. Given
the history of this case, respondents and their
attorney could not have been *79 misled into
thinking Ricetti consented to the adverse
representation. Respondents have suggested no
extreme time delay or extreme prejudice such as
motivated the courts in River West and Health
Maintenance Network.
(7) Finally, Ricetti argues the trial court erred in
failing to disqualifY McKim from representing the
Forrests as well as the corporations. Relying
primarily on Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9
Cal.4th 275 and Truck Ins. Exchange V. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, Ricetti
claims the actual conflict between the interests of
the Forrests and the corporations required that
McKim take no further part in the litigation.
In Truck Ins. Exchange, Crosby, Heafey, Roach &
May (Crosby), the law firm contacted to represent
Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck) in litigation
against Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
(Fireman's Fund) and others discovered it had been
defending an entity related to Fireman's Fund in two

wrongful termination suits. Crosby asked Fireman's
Fund if it objected to the law firm representing
Truck in the insurance coverage case and, in the
alternative, offered to withdraw from the wrongful
termination cases. Fireman's Fund objected to the
concurrent representation and stated it wished to
have the law firm continue its role in the wrongful
termination cases. Crosby, however, accepted
representation of Truck and moved to withdraw
from the wrongful termination cases. Fireman's
Fund filed a motion to disqualifY Crosby from
representing Truck in the insurance case, viewing
the issue as a breach of the duty of loyalty in
concurrent representation that required automatic
disqualification. Truck maintained that because
Crosby had withdrawn from the wrongful
termination cases, Fireman's Fund was only the law
firm's former client and disqualification was not
required because Crosby possessed no confidential
information that could be misused to Fireman's
prejudice. Truck Ins. Exchange rejected Truck's
analysis, concluding that "a law firm that knowingly
undertakes adverse concurrent representation may
not avoid disqualification by withdrawing from the
representation of the less favored client before
hearing." (6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057.)
In Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th page
275, the court held that an attorney's duty of loyalty
to an existing client negated any duty to give advice
to a new or prospective client, representation of
whom would irreconcilably conflict with the duty of
loyalty to the existing client. Discussing the duty of
loyalty, the court stated: "So inviolate is the duty of
loyalty to an existing client that not even by
withdrawing from the relationship can an attorney
evade it. Thus, in Truck Ins. Exchange V. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, the
Court of Appeal discussed the aptly named 'hot
potato rule,' that is, the bar on curing dual
representation conflicts by *80 the expedient of
severing the relationship with the preexisting
client.... ' "[T]he principle precluding representing
an interest adverse to those of a current client is
based not on any concern with the confidential
relations between attorney and client but rather on
the need to assure the attorney's undivided loyalty
and commitment to the client. [Citations]." , (Id at
p. 1056.) The court went on to hold that the
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'automatic disqualification rule applicable to
concurrent representation [cannot] be avoided by
unilaterally converting a present client into a former
client prior to hearing on the motion for
disqualification[.]' (Id. at p. 1057 .... )" (Id. at p.
288.)
Neither Flatt nor Truck Jns. Exchange considered
the issue of dual representation in the context of a
shareholder's derivative action. These cases clearly
stand for the proposition that dual representation of
clients with adverse interests is impermissible (in
the absence of informed consent) and requires
automatic disqualification. They hold that an
attorney may not violate his or her duty of loyalty to
an existing client by undertaking representation
adverse to that client's interests; they do not,
however, hold that the attorney is required to cease
representation of either client. While that may have
been the practical effect of Truck Ins. Exchange, as
Crosby had withdrawn from representation of the
first client before being disqualified from
representing the second, this effect is a function of
the particular facts of the case. The opinion does
not suggest that if Crosby had not so withdrawn it
would have been precluded from continuing to
represent Fireman's Fund in the wrongful
termination cases.
In the present case, McKim did not unilaterally (or
otherwise) decide to drop one client in preference
for a more favored one. Rather, the court
determined McKim could not represent both the
Forrests
and
the
corporations-a
correct
determination as discussed above-and required the
corporations to secure independent counsel. This
order is consistent with federal authority in the
precise circumstance of attorney disqualification in
shareholder derivative litigation, which holds that
while dual representation of a corporation and its
directors is impermissible (at least if the directors
are charged with fraud), the attorney who formerly
represented both clients may continue to represent
the individual ones. (Musheno v. Gensemer, supra,
897 F.Supp. at p. 838; Lewis v. Shaffer Stores
Company, supra, 218 F.Supp. at p. 239.) These
cases are short on reasoning, perhaps because the
parties
were
not
contending
complete
disqualification was required. In Lewis, the court

stated: "The affidavit submitted by [the law firm
representing corporation and directors] states in
substance that the firm feels an obligation to defend
the officers and directors whom it has advised. This
is understandable, and I see no impropriety in their
doing so under the circumstances of this case.
[Citation.] [,J Plaintiff indeed does not contend
otherwise." (*81218 F.Supp. at p. 239.) In Musheno
, the court stated: "It is unclear whether Plaintiffs
seek to disqualify [the attorney) from representing
any Defendant in this litigation, or whether they
merely seek to prevent the firm from representing
[the corporation). In any event, there is nothing to
prevent [the attorney) from continuing to represent
the Directors." (897 F.Supp. at p. 838, fn. 5.) In
Messing v. FDJ, Inc., supra, 439 F.Supp. at pages
781-783, although the issue was not explicitly
addressed, the court held the corporation would be
required to obtain independent counsel without
suggesting new counsel would also be necessary for
the directors.
The reasoning reflected in these decisions is
somewhat
more
extensively
addressed
in
commentary discussing whether the problem of dual
representation in the shareholder derivative suit
context is better solved by requiring independent
counsel for the corporation or for the individual
defendants. One author stated: "An alternative
solution [to requiring independent counsel for the
corporation) might be to require the insiders to
secure new counsel, thus permitting the corporation
to retain its original counsel. But while this
procedure removes the outward appearances of dual
representation, the substance of the wrong remains.
A residual bias in favor of the individual defendants
might continue to undermine counsel's judgment.
This potential bias would stem from the fact that
counsel's first loyalty might remain with the
directors and officers of the corporation, who have
been his principal contact with the inanimate
corporate client in the past. In addition, counsel
might fear that rendering advice antagonistic to the
insiders' interests would impair future relations with
his corporate client. For these reasons, the Lewis
decision to have the corporation secure new counsel
seems the sounder alternative." (Comment,
Independent
Representation
for
Corporate
Defendants in Derivative Suits, supra, 74 Yale LJ.
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at pp. 533-534, fn. omitted.) To similar effect: "It
has been suggested that the outside lawyer ...
represent the individual defendants, perhaps as
[another] means of ensuring that their legal fees are
not borne by the corporation. The better rule is to
require that outside counsel represent the
corporation, while the corporate attorney represents
the insider defendant; the question of expenses
would be decided separately. This rule recognizes
that while the in house attorney is nominally the
representative of the corporation, his personal
loyalties will inevitably be to the [insider]
executives who hired him." (Developments in the
Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession,
supra, 94 Harv. L.Rev. at p. 1341, fns. omitted.)
Interestingly, neither of these authors so much as
entertains the possibility of requiring complete
disqualification of the attorney who initially
represented both the corporation and its directors.
Ricetti argues that the court's order allowing
McKim to continue to represent the Forrests while
converting the corporations to former clients, *82
requires violation of rule 3-310(E): "A member
shall not, without the informed written consent of
the client or former client, accept employment
adverse to the client or former client where, by
reason of the representation of the client or former
client, the member has obtained confidential
information
material
to
the
employment."
Technically, this rule may not even apply as McKim
is not accepting employment but continuing his
of the
Forrests.
preexisting
representation
Moreover, in the factual circumstances of this case,
where McKim has been representing a corporation
comprised of three shareholders solely by virtue of
his relationship with the Forrests, acting as the
majority directors/shareholders, it is impossible to
conceive of confidential information McKim could
have received from the "corporation" that is
different from information he received from the
Forrests. We recognize the rule that "[w]here the
requisite substantial relationship between the
subjects of the prior and the current representations
can be demonstrated, access to confidential
information by the attorney in the course of the first
representation (relevant, by definition, to the second
representation) is presumed and disqualification of
the attorney's representation of the second client is

mandatory." (Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9
Cal.4th at p. 283.) The rule, however, is based on
the need to protect scrupulously against the
improper use of confidential information " 'This is
the rule by necessity, for it is not within the power
of the former client to prove what is in the mind of
the attorney. Nor should the attorney have to "
engage in a subtle evaluation of the extent to which
he acquired relevant information in the first
representation and of the actual use of that
knowledge and information in the subsequent
representation." .. .' " (River West, Inc. V. Nickel,
supra, 188 Cal.AppJd at p. 1304, quoting Global
Van Lines, Inc. V. Superior Court (1983) 144
Cal.AppJd 483, 489 [192 Cal.Rptr. 609].) Where,
as here, the functioning of the corporation has been
so intertwined with the individual defendants that
any distinction between them is entirely fictional,
and the sole repositories of corporate information to
which the attorney has had access are the individual
clients, application of the "former clienf' rule
would be meaningless.
The order granting in part and denying in part the
motion for disqualification is affirmed.
Haerle, J., and Lambden, J., concurred. *83
CaI.App.l.Dist.
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C
Briefs and Other Related Documents
Musheno v. GensemerM.D.Pa.,1995.
United States District Court,M.D. Pennsylvania.
J. Randolph MUSHENO, John R. Musheno,
individually and on behalf of all shareholders of
Keystone Heritage Group, Inc., Plaintiffs,

v.
Harry Z. GENSEMER, Albert B. Murry, Ernest D.
Williams, Jr., Raymond M. Dorsch, Jr., Donald W.
Lesher, Jr., Mark Randolph Tice, Lance M.
Frehafer, Charles V. Henry, III, Harlan R. Wengert,
The Estate of John H. Gerdes, Elvin H. Spitler,
Norman J. Rothermel, Kurt A. Phillips, The Estate
of Harry T. Richwine, Bruce A. Johnson, Lebanon
Valley "National Bank, Keystone Heritage Group,
Inc., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. I:CV-95-570.
July 10,1995.
Derivative action initiated in state court was
removed to federal district court where plaintiff
shareholders moved to disqualifY law firm from
continuing its dual representation of corporation
and its board of directors. The District Court,
Caldwell, J., held that: (1) disqualification was
appropriate, and (2) motion for disqualification was
not premature.
Motion granted.
West Headnotes
[IJ Federal Courts 170B €=433
170B Federal Courts
170BVI State Laws as Rules of Decision
170BVI(C) Application to Particular Matters
170Bk433 k. Other Particular Matters.
Most Cited Cases
Ethical standards imposed upon attorneys in federal
court are a matter of federal law.
[2J Attorney and Client 45 €=21.5(3)

45 Attorney and Client
451 The Office of Attorney
45I(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities
45k20 Representing Adverse Interests
45k21.5 Particular Cases and Problems
45k21.5(3)
k.
Corporations,
Employment by or Representation Of. Most Cited
Cases
Attorney representing corporation and its board of
directors in derivative action would be disqualified
from representing corporation, where complaint
alleged fraud and self-dealing by directors,
revealing clear divergence of interests between
corporation and
its directors. Pa.Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rule 1.13,42 Pa.C.S.A.
[3] Attorney and Client 45 €=21.20
45 Attorney and Client
451 The Office of Attorney
45I(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities
45k21.20 k. Disqualification Proceedings;
Standing. Most Cited Cases
Motion
to
disqualifY
attorney
representing
corporation and its board of directors in derivative
action was not premature, despite contention that
business judgment rule would likely result in
dismissal; permitting attorney to represent to
clients with conflicting interests, even if only until
motion to dismiss was decided, could result in
substantial difficulty for all parties and court, and
there was a chance that confidences obtained from
one client could be used to the detriment of the
other, particularly if motion to dismiss were denied.
Pa.Rules ofProf.Conduct, Rule 1.13,42 Pa.C.S.A.
[4J Attorney and Client 45 €=21.5(3)
45 Attorney and Client
451 The Office of Attorney
45I(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities
45k20 Representing Adverse Interests
45k21.5 Particular Cases and Problems
45k21.5(3)
k.
Corporations,
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Employment by or Representation Of. Most Cited
Cases
Upon disqualification of attorney representing both
corporation and its board of directors in derivative
action, court would decline to appoint counsel for
corporation itself. Pa.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule
1.13,42 Pa.C.S.A.

*834 Richard E. Freeburn, Wilt, Magdule, Freeburn,
Harrisburg, P A, for J. Randolph Musheno, John R.
Musheno.
Mark M. Wilcox, Michael F. Brown, Drinker,
Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, PA, for Harry Z.
Gensemer, Albert B. Murry, Ernest D. Williams,
Jr., Raymond M. Dorsch, Jr., Donald W. Lesher,
Jr., Mark Randolph Tice, Lance M. Frehafer,
Harlan R. Wengert, Estate of John H. Gerdes, Elvin
H. Spitler, Norman 1. Rothermal, Kurt A. Phillips,
Estate of Harry T. Richwine, Bruce A. Johnson.
Jeffrey B. Rettig, Thomas, Thomas & Hafer,
Harrisburg, PA, Mark M. Wilcox, Michael F. Brown
, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, PA, for
Charles V. Henry, III.
Wilbur L. Kipnes, Philadelphia, PA, Mark M.
Wilcox, Michael F. Brown, Drinker, Biddle &
Reath, Philadelphia, P A, for Lebanon Valley
National Bank, Keystone Heritage Group, Inc.

MEMORANDUM
CALDWELL, District Judge.
We are considering the Plaintiffs'
disqualifY Defendants' counsel.

motion

to

single customer.

FNI. Keystone, a bank holding company,
engages in banking through L VNB, its
wholly owned subsidiary. Thus, we will
refer to Keystone and LVNB collectively
as "Keystone". The board of directors of
the two corporations are nearly identical.
The Directors named as Defendants here
are: Harry Z. Gensemer, Albert B. Murry,
Ernest D. Williams, Jr., Raymond M.
Dorsch, Jr., Donald W. Lesher, Jr., Mark
Randolph Tice, Lance M. Frehafer,
Charles V. Henry, III, Harlan R. Wengert,
the Estate of John H. Gerdes, Elvin H.
Spitler, Norman 1. Rothermel, Kurt A.
Phillips, the Estate of Harry T. Richwine,
and Bruce A. Johnson. Defendant Henry
also served as legal counsel to Keystone.
On January 21, 1994, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter
of demand to Defendant Lesher requesting that
Keystone take action against the individuals
responsible for losses sustained as a result of illegal
loans to GLA. On February 22, 1994, the
Directors
appointed *835
an
independent
committee to investigate Plaintiffs' demands. This
group was composed of two non-defendant
Directors, Thomas 1. Siegal and Brett H. Tennis,
and independent counsel, John P. Lampi. The
committee
conducted
an
investigation
and
concluded that it would not be in Keystone's best
interest to pursue legal action against the Directors
named in Plaintiffs' writ of summons.

1. INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiffs are shareholders of Keystone
Heritage Group, Inc. ("Keystone"). They instituted
this action by filing a writ of summons on January
6, 1994, in the Dauphin County Court of Common
Pleas, against Keystone, Lebanon Valley National
Bank ("LVNB"), and the board of directors of
Keystone and L VNB ("Directors") FNI. The
claims arise from two loans made by L VNB to
Gelder, Luttrell & Associates ("GLA"). Plaintiffs
contend that the loans were made in violation of the
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.c. § 21 et seq., which
limits the amount of money a bank can lend to a

After the committee's recommendation was
accepted by Keystone, the parties moved forward in
the state court action, engaging in pre-complaint
discovery. On April 12, 1995, before a complaint
was filed, the Directors removed the case to this
court, and on May 5, 1995, Plaintiffs filed their
complaint against Keystone, LVNB, and the
Directors. The complaint contains seven claims,
all arising from losses sustained in connection with
the allegedly improper loans to GLA.
In Count I, Plaintiffs maintain that the Directors
violated 12 U.S.C. § 84, which limits the amount a
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bank is permitted to lend to one customer. A
negligence claim is made in Count II and Count III
is a claim for self-dealing, willful misconduct,
and/or recklessness. In Count IV, Plaintiffs
contend that the Directors breached their fiduciary
duty and in Count V assert that they engaged in
fraud. Count VI alleges a conspiracy and Count
VII is a claim for negligence against Defendant
Charles V. Henry, as counsel for Keystone.

officers/directors in a derivative action. This issue
has, to some extent, produced a split in authority.
Early decisions adopted the position that, at least in
the absence of a breach of trust, joint representation
was permissible. See, e.g., Otis & Co. v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 57 F.Supp. 680, 684
(E.D.Pa.1944), affd per curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d
Cir.1946); Hornsby v. Lohmeyer, 364 Pa. 271, 279,
72 A.2d 294, 299 (1950).

The law firm of Drinker, Biddle & Reath ("Drinker"
) entered an appearance in state court on behalf of
Keystone and the Directors. Plaintiffs seek to
disqualify Drinker from continuing its dual
representation. They claim there is a conflict of
interest in the representation of both Keystone and
its Directors, and that such representation violates
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Directors contend that, at this stage of the litigation,
there is no conflict of interest, and that it is
premature to disqualify counsel from representing
Keystone because Keystone's interests are aligned
with those of its Directors, i.e., to have this action
dismissed.

However, more recent decisions, beginning with
Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F.Supp. 238
(S.D.N.Y.1963),
have
identified
numerous
problems with dual representation. In Lewis, the
shareholders of a corporation brought a derivative
action against the corporation and its board of
directors. After counsel entered an appearance on
behalf of the corporation and its Directors, the
shareholders sought to disqualify the law firm from
representing the corporation. The court stated that
[t]he interests of the officer, director and majority
stockholder defendants in this action are clearly
adverse, on the face of the complaint, to the
interests of the stockholders of [the corporation]
other than defendants. I have no doubt that [the
attorneys] believe in good faith that there is no
merit to this action. Plaintiff, of course, *836
vigorously contends to the contrary. The court
cannot and should not attempt to pass upon the
merits at this stage. Under all the circumstances,
including the nature of the charges, and the vigor
with which they are apparently being pressed and
defended, I believe that it would be wise for the
corporation to retain independent counsel, who
have had no previous connection with the
corporation, to advise it as to the position it should
take in this controversy.

II. LAW AND DISCUSSION
A. Disqualification

The Plaintiffs' suit appears to be a shareholder
derivative action. In a derivative action, suit is
brought on behalf of a corporation, by its
shareholders.
The
defendants are
generally
corporate officers and directors, as well as the
corporation itself. However, the corporation is
merely a "nominal" defendant, and in fact stands to
receive
a
substantial
benefit
if
the
plaintiffs/shareholders are successful. See, e.g.,
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1315
(3d Cir.1993). Thus, the corporation is in the
anomalous position of being both a plaintiff and a
defendant.
We are faced with the question of whether, within
the confines of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, an attorney or law firm can engage in the
joint representation of both a corporation and its

ld. at 239-40 (citations omitted).

u.s.

In Cannon v.
Acoustics Corp., 398 F.Supp.
209 (N.D.IlU975), affd in relevant part per
curiam, 532 F .2d 1118, 1119 (7th Cir.1976), the
court disqualified a law firm from representing a
corporation and its board of directors in a derivative
action,
where
the
complaint
alleged
a
misappropriation of corporate funds by the
Directors. Id. at 218-19. The court reached its
decision based upon both the conflict of interest
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between the corporation and its directors, and the
possibility that confidences obtained from one
client during the course of representation might be
used to the detriment of the other. Id. The court in
Messing v. FDI, Inc., 439 F.Supp. 776 (D.NJ.1977)
, faced with a similar situation, held that the
corporation was required to obtain independent
counsel, "unshackled by any ties to the directors",
to advise it of its most favorable course of action.
[d. at 782; see also In re Oracle Securities
Litigation,
829
F.Supp.
1176,
1188-89
(N.D.CaU993).
Finally, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d
1304 (3d Cir.1993), the Third Circuit was faced
with a factual scenario similar to the present action.
After the settlement of consumer fraud claims
brought by the Pennsylvania Attorney General
against Bell Atlantic, a group of shareholders made
a demand on Bell Atlantic's board to seek recovery
from those responsible for causing the losses. The
board formed a special committee, which included
independent counsel, to investigate the allegations.
The committee recommended that the board reject
the demand as not in the corporation's best interest.
The committee's recommendation was adopted, and
the shareholders instituted a derivative action
against Bell Atlantic and its directors. After the
shareholders and the directors reached a proposed
settlement, a second group of shareholders filed suit
and objected to the settlement terms. The district
court denied their objections and approved the
settlement.
[1] On appeal the court addressed the issue of
whether the settlement was invalid based on the fact
that counsel represented both the corporation and its
directors in the derivative action. The court first
conducted an historical overview of the law in this
area, citing what it identified as a "representative
observation" of one commentator:
There is some conflict as to the propriety of an
attorney or law firm simultaneously representing a
corporation and its officers and directors in a
stockholders' derivative action. But the modern
view is that it is generally improper due to conflict
of interests for counsel to attempt to represent the
corporation, on whose behalf the action has been
instituted, while also representing the individuals

charged with harming the corporation for their
wrongful conduct.

[d. at 1316 (citing 13 William M. Fletcher, Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §
6025 at 442 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1991)}. However,
the court noted that" 'independent counsel may not
be required if the derivative claim is obviously or
patently frivolous.' " Id. (citing Fletcher, Fletcher
Cyclopedia § 6025, at 443). The court then turned
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
whether
dual
representation
was
determine
appropriate. FN2

FN2. "The ethical standards imposed upon
attorneys in federal court are a matter of
federal law", and therefore, "[w]e look to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
to furnish the appropriate ethical standard."
Id. (citing County of Suffolk v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 710 F.Supp. 1407,
1413 (E.D.N.Y.l989), afj'd, 907 F.2d
1295 (2d Cir.1990)}.
[2] Pursuant to MRPC 1.13, "[a] lawyer employed
or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents",
and
when
"representing
an
organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, *837 subject to the provisions of Rule
1.7." American Bar Ass'n, Annotated Model Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.13(a), (e).FN3 In Bell
Atlantic, the court relied upon the commentary to
Rule 1.13, which provides, in relevant part, that:

FN3. Rule 1.7 provides that
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client will be
directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a cI ient if
the representation of that client may be
materially
limited
by
the
lawyer's
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responsibilities to another client or to a
third . person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless:
(l) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
American Bar Ass'n, Annotated Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a).
The question can arise whether counsel for the
organization may defend [a derivative] action. The
proposition that the organization is the lawyer's
client does not alone resolve the issue. Most
derivative actions are a normal incident of an
organization's affairs, to be defended by the
organization's lawyer like any other suit. However,
if the claim involved serious charges of wrongdoing
by those in control of the organization, a conflict
may arise between the lawyer's duty to the
organization and the lawyer's relationship with the
board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs
who should represent the directors and the
organization.
Id. at 1316 (citing American Bar Ass'n, Annotated
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ) (emphasis
added). Applying this standard to the facts before
it, the court determined that "serious charges of
wrongdoing have not been levelled against the
individual defendants", and that Plaintiffs alleged
only a breach of the fiduciary duty of care, not a
breach of the directors' duty of loyalty. ld. Thus,
the court held that independent counsel was not
required, and affirmed the district court's approval
of the settlement. The underlying rationale for the
court's decision in Bell Atlantic conclusively
establishes that Keystone must retain independent
counsel in the present case.
Like the shareholders in Bell Atlantic, the Plaintiffs'
demand to the bank, to pursue an action against the
Directors, was investigated by an independent
committee and determined not to be in the best
interest of the corporation. In Bell Atlantic, the
court relied on this fact in reaching its decision,
stating that
[t]his suggests a relative (though not complete)
convergence of the individual and corporate
interests in defending and settling the litigation.

Although not dispositive, it is important that early
in the litigation, independent counsel, after
undertaking an exhaustive investigation, determined
the corporation's interests were more in line with
those of the defendants than plaintiffs.

ld. In the present case, the Directors focus on this
language in arguing that the interests of Keystone
and its directors are not in conflict at this point in
the litigation because the independent committee
determined that Keystone should not pursue legal
action. However, the Directors ignore the
remainder of the quote from Bell Atlantic, which
provides that[ o]f greater significance, however, is
the absence of allegations of fraud, intentional
misconduct, or self-dealing. We have no hesitation
in holding that-except in patently frivolous
cases-allegations of directors' fraud, intentional
misconduct, or self-dealing require separate
counsel.
ld. (emphasis added). In this case, unlike Bell
Atlantic, the Plaintiffs claim that the Directors
committed fraud (Count V) by concealing the fact
that they exceeded the legal lending limit, and
self-dealing (Count III) by engaging in willful
misconduct that was contrary to Keystone's interests
and favorable to their own. Additionally, there is
no evidence that the Plaintiffs' claims are "patently
frivolous". Thus, under the standard set forth in
Bell Atlantic, Keystone must retain independent
counsel.
[3] The Directors' sole argument in opposition to
Plaintiffs' motion is that disqualification is
premature because the business judgment*838 rule
will likely result in dismissal of Plaintiffs' action.
They contend that the disqualification issue should
be postponed until a motion to dismiss, based on the
business judgment rule, is decided. FN4 Although
the Directors did not cite authority to support this
contention, our research has uncovered a case that
supports their argument. In Clark v. Lomas &
Nettleton Fin. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 658 (N.D.Tex.1978)
, the court held that

FN4. We do agree that the business
judgment rule presents an enormous hurdle
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for the Plaintiffs, particularly in light of the
fact that a special committee and
independent counsel were retained after
Plaintiffs' demand was made. However,
as set forth below, we do not find that
Plaintiffs' motion for disqualification is
premature. Additionally, the Directors
have not yet filed a motion to dismiss.

should separate counsel have to be retained in the
middle of litigation"). Finally, there exists a
chance that confidences obtained from one client
could be used to the detriment of the other,
particularly if the motion to dismiss is denied. See
Cannon, 398 F.Supp. at 218. In our view the
potential for harm requires that Keystone retain
independent counsel.

there is no conflict of interest requiring
disqualification in the narrow instance when one
law firm represents a derivatively sued corporation
and its individually sued directors and the law firm
initially files a motion to dismiss on behalf of its
clients, does not otherwise participate in the lawsuit,
and withdraws from representation of either the
corporation or the individual directors when either
the motions are overruled or when it becomes
necessary to participate in the defense of the
corporation and the individual directors. At this
stage of the proceedings, when the court must make
a determination on whether as a matter of law the
defendants should be in the lawsuit, unless it can be
shown that an actual conflict exists or that certain
confidences are being jeopardized, I think the
client's right to select the counsel of his choice
outweighs any potential conflict of interest.
Id. at 661.

Our decision to grant Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify
Drinker, Biddle & Reath from representing
Keystone does not, in any way, call into question
the good faith of the firm. Rather, in cases such as
this, where the potential for conflict is great, the
better approach is to require the corporation to
obtain independent counsel. See Bell Atlantic, 2
F.3d at 1317. FN5

The decision in Clark is not without merit.
Keystone will be forced to incur additional cost to
retain independent counsel and disqualifying
Drinker impinges upon Keystone's right to select its
own counsel. Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance
Co., 230 N.W.2d 905, 915 (Iowa 1975). However,
we believe the factual situation in the case at bar
dictates that independent counsel be retained by the
bank. See id. There is a clear divergence of
interests between Keystone and its directors on the
face of Plaintiffs' complaint, which weighs against
joint representation. Lewis, 218 F.Supp. at 239-40.
Additionally, permitting Drinker to represent two
clients with conflicting interests, even if only until a
motion to dismiss is decided, could result in
substantial difficulty for all parties and the court.
See, e.g., Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 89
(E.D.Tex.l981) ("While an actual conflict may not
transpire at trial, there would be tremendous
hardship imposed on the court and all parties alike

FN5. It is unclear whether Plaintiffs seek
to disqualify Drinker from representing any
Defendant in this litigation, or whether
they merely seek to prevent the firm from
representing Keystone. In any event,
there is nothing to prevent Drinker from
continuing to represent the Directors. See
Lewis, 218 F.Supp. at 239. Our decision
requires only that Drinker withdraw its
representation of Keystone and LVNB.
B. Retention of Independent Counsel

[4] Although not expressly raised by the parties, we
will briefly address the manner in which Keystone
is to select independent counsel. This issue has
produced varying results. At least one court
appointed counsel for the corporation itself. See
Rowen, 230 N.W.2d at 916. Other courts have
declined to appoint counsel, or direct the
corporation how to do so, irrespective of the fact
that the directors who were defendants were
involved in the decision-making process. See, e.g.,
*839 Cannon, 398 F.Supp. at 220; Lewis, 218
F.Supp. at 240. However, we believe the most
suitable procedure was adopted by the court in
MeSSing.
In that case, the corporation appointed an ad hoc
committee of two non-defendant directors, and
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indicated that, upon court order, it would have the
ad hoc committee select independent counsel. The
court, without approving or disapproving of the
corporation's proposal, determined that the
corporation should
resolve this problem as it would any other issue as
to which the existence of interested directors
renders the usual corporate decision-making process
unavailable .... It is the duty of the directors, in this
as in other matters, to act in the corporation's best
interest. If they are disqualified from acting on this
or on any other matter, then it is for them, in the
first instance, to devise a method to accommodate
the need to continue the corporate enterprise while
refraining from participating in any corporate
decision in which they might have a personal
interest. They act, or fail to act, at their peril.

M.D.Pa.,1995.
Musheno v. Gensemer
897 F.Supp. 833
Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top)
• 1:95cv00570 (Docket) (Apr. 12, 1995)
END OF DOCUMENT

Messing, 439 F.Supp. at 783-84. We also will not
appoint counsel FN6, nor will we dictate how
Keystone chooses its new attorneys. Rather,
Keystone should select independent counsel in the
manner it would act in any other circumstance
where a conflict of interest exists.

FN6. "Of course, the directors may request
this or any other court with jurisdiction
over the matter to relieve them of this duty.
" Messing, 439 F.Supp. at 783.
We will issue an appropriate Order.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 10th day of July, 1995, upon
consideration of the Plaintiffs motion for
disqualification, filed May 19, 1995, it is Ordered
that:
1. The motion is granted insofar as it seeks
disqualification of Drinker, Biddle & Reath from
representing Keystone Heritage Group, Inc. or
Lebanon Valley National Bank.
2. Keystone Heritage Group, Inc. and Lebanon
Valley National Bank shall retain independent
counsel in accordance with the analysis set forth in
the accompanying memorandum. New counsel
should be retained within fifteen (15) days hereof.
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H
Hernandez v. Banco De Las Americas,Ariz. 1977.
Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.
Paul R. HERNANDEZ, Appellant,

v.
BANCO DE LAS AMERICAS, a corporation,
Appellee.
No. 12946-PR.

101k53 Constitution and By-Laws
101 k56 k. Adoption and Amendment.
Most Cited Cases
Bylaws may be amended informally as well as
formally, orally or in writing, by acts as well as by
words, and may be evidenced by a course of
proceeding or conduct on part of corporation
inconsistent with bylaws claimed to have been
amended or repealed.

Oct. 5, 1977.

[2] Corporations 101 (;=>57
Suit was instituted for alleged breach of
employment contract. The Superior Court, Pima
County, Cause No. 145860, J. Richard Hannah, J.,
directed a verdict for defendant on all issues raised
in complaint except for granting plaintiff five days'
contract damages and assessing jury costs against
him, and plaintiff appealed from portion of
judgment denying him damages for breach of
contract. The Court of Appeals 117 Ariz. 237, 571
P.2d 1033, reversed the judgment of the trial court
and, thereafter, application for review was granted.
The Supreme Court, Holohan, J., held that
employment contract which board of directors of
defendant bank entered into with plaintiff was valid
even though it extended beyond term of board and,
hence, was binding on successor board where
contract was for a reasonable period of time,
particularly when viewed against length of time for
which prior contract with plaintiffs predecessor was
made, and board not only had authority to make and
enter into contracts on behalf of bank, but also had
authority to alter or amend bylaw providing that
officers were to serve for one year during term and
at pleasure of board.
Opinion of the Court of Appeals vacated, judgment
of the trial court reversed, and case remanded for
new trial.
West Headnotes
[I] Corporations 101 €::=>56
101 Corporations
101 VI Constitution and By-Laws

101 Corporations
10 I VI Constitution and By-Laws
101 k53 Constitution and By-Laws
101 k57 k. Operation and Effect. Most
Cited Cases
When a board of directors has power to adopt
bylaws, it also has power to waive bylaws which it
adopts.

[3] Banks and Banking 52 (;=>51
52 Banks and Banking
52II Banking Corporations and Associations
52II(D) Officers and Agents
52k51 k. Election or Appointment,
Qualification, and Tenure. Most Cited Cases
Act of board of directors of defendant bank in
entering into a one-year contract with plaintiffs
predecessor that extended beyond term of board
operated as an informal modification or waiver of
bylaw providing that officers would serve for one
year during term and at pleasure of board of
directors.

[4] Banks and Banking 52 (;=>54(7)
52 Banks and Banking
52II Banking Corporations and Associations
52II(D) Officers and Agents
52k53 Rights and Liabilities as to Bank
and Stockholders
52k54 Nature and Extent
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52k54(7) k. Compensation. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 52kl05(l))
When board of directors of defendant bank agreed
to pay balance of salary and benefits of plaintiffs
predecessor in order to cancel his contract before it
expired, board recognized that there was a valid
employment contract and that predecessor was
entitled to be compensated.
[5] Banks and Banking 52 <8=51
52 Banks and Banking
52II Banking Corporations and Associations
52II(D) Officers and Agents
52k51 k. Election or Appointment,
Qualification, and Tenure. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 52k105(!))
Power which board of directors of defendant bank
had under bylaws to remove an officer at its
discretion was subject to rights of an officer under
an employment contract such as plaintiff and did
not carry with it power to terminate that contract
without liability.
[6] Corporations 101 <8=308(3)
101 Corporations
101 X Officers and Agents
101 X(C) Rights, Duties, and Liabilities as to
Corporation and Its Members
101k308 Compensation
1OIk308(3) k. Contracts or Resolutions
Providing Therefor. Most Cited Cases
Employment contracts are designed to be a benefit
to both an officer and a corporation, and since
corporation wishes to secure special services of
officer, and officer wishes to have some financial
security, corporation may not ignore contract at will
and officer may not leave corporation at any time
without liability no matter how essential or valuable
his services.
[7] Contracts 95 <8=1
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95I(A) Nature and Essentials in General
95kl k. Nature and Grounds

Contractual Obligation. Most Cited Cases
Modern business practice mandates that parties
must be bound by contracts they enter into absent
fraud or duress.
[8] Banks and Banking 52 <8=105(1)
52 Banks and Banking
52III Functions and Dealings
52III(B) Representation of Bank by Officers
and Agents
52k105 Contracts
52kl05(!) k. Directors. Most Cited
Cases
Employment contract which board of directors of
defendant bank entered into with plaintiff was valid
even though it extended beyond term of board and,
hence, was binding on successor board where
contract was for a reasonable period of time,
particularly when viewed against length of time for
which prior contract with plaintiffs predecessor was
made, and board not only had authority to make and
enter into contracts on behalf of bank, but also had
authority to alter or amend bylaw providing that
officers were to serve for one year during term and
at pleasure of board.

*553 **495 Stompoly & Even by John S. Stompoly
and James L. Stroud, Tucson, for appellant.
Russo, Cox, Dickerson & Cartin by Jerold A.
Cartin, Tucson, for appellee.
HOLOHAN, Justice.
This case involves a suit by appellant (Paul
Hernandez) against appellee, Banco De Las
Americas (Banco), for damages arising out of an
alleged illegal breach of contract for Hernandez'
employment by Banco in 1973. After four days of
trial, the trial court directed a verdict for Banco on
all issues raised in the complaint except for granting
plaintiff five days' contract damages and assessed
jury costs against him. Plaintiff appealed only that
portion of the judgment denying him damages for
breach of contract. Banco attempted to appeal the
trial court's finding of a valid contract by a cross
assignment of error. [FNI] The Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment below.

of
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FNI. Because the bank in essence sought
to enlarge the trial court's judgment on this
issue, the proper procedure would have
been to file a cross appeal, which the bank
did not do. Therefore, under 16 A.R.S.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 73(b),
Banco is precluded from raising this issue.
Maricopa
County
v.
Corporation
Commission of Arizona, 79 Ariz. 307, 289
P.2d 183 (1955).
We granted review because this case involves the
need for clarification of certain *554 **496
statements made in Tucson Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Aetna Investment Corp., 74 Ariz. 163, 245
P.2d 423 (1952) regarding corporate employment
contracts. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is
vacated.
Appellee Banco is a banking corporation which has
been licensed in Arizona since 1971. Pursuant to
Article I, Section 1 of Banco's By-Laws, the bank's
annual meeting of stockholders was held in early
June of 1972, and a Board of Directors was elected
to serve for a term of one year. On July 19, 1972 the
Board of Directors entered into a written contract
with Morris Herring (one of the original
incorporators) calling for the employment of
Herring as Bank President for a period of one year
at a salary of$25,000.
Dissention apparently developed between Herring
and a majority of the Board during the year, and on
April 5, 1973, Herring wrote the Chairman of the
Board setting forth the terms of an agreement
reached between him and the Board regarding his
resignation. The agreement, as approved by the
Board, included inter alia a provision that Herring
was to be paid a lump sum at the time of his
resignation representing "the unpaid balance of my
annual salary due under the terms of my contract
dated July 19, 1972." Eleven of the fifteen Board
members
approved
and
accepted
Herring's
resignation on the stated terms at a special meeting
of the Board of Directors of Banco held on April 8,
1973.
The Chairman of the Board thereupon appointed a
committee comprised of several members of the

Board to search for a permanent president for the
bank. The record reflects that during the time that
the committee was searching for a new bank
president, Morris Herring launched a proxy fight in
an attempt to elect a new board.
Meanwhile, the committee's search for a president
had come to fruition in the selection of the
appellant, Paul Hernandez, as President of the bank
on June I, 1973. The corporate minutes reflect that
a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the
bank, attended by nine members, was held on June
1, 1973. At that meeting the Chairman of the Board
recommended that a one-year contract be entered
into between Banco and Hernandez. All nine
members of the Board of Directors in attendance at
the special meeting on June 1, 1973 voted to offer
Hernandez a contract.[FN2]

FN2. The vote of the nine directors in
attendance was unanimous. Since nine of
the fifteen Board members were present at
the
meeting,
the
bank's
quorum
requirements were met.
Banco by and through its Chairman, George
Sandoval, then entered into a written contract of
employment wherein Hernandez was to serve as
President of the bank for one year commencing
June 1, 1973 and terminating May 31, 1974. In
addition to the one-year term of employment the
contract provided inter alia that Hernandez accepted
and agreed to his hiring, engagement and
employment in accordance with the customary
requirements of the position, including the Articles
of Incorporation, the By-Laws and appropriate
regulatory agency directives. The contract also
provided that its interpretation would be according
to the laws of the State of Arizona.
Hernandez began his duties as President of the bank
on June 1, 1973. On June 4, 1973, however, the
Herring faction was successful in its proxy fight and
a Board favorable to it was elected. On June 8,
1973 the newly elected Board of Directors met,
discharged appellant Hernandez, and reappointed
Morris Herring President of the bank.
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This case presents essentially one issue, namely,
whether the Board of Directors had authority to
enter into a valid and binding employment contract
with appellant which would be binding beyond its
term of office.
There is no doubt that the Board of Directors of
Banco had the express authority to make and enter
into valid and binding contracts. The main
contention of Banco is that the Board as constituted
prior to June 4, 1973 did not have the authority to
enter into a valid employment contract binding the
subsequent Board. Banco has relied heavily on the
statement in Tucson Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Aetna Investment Corp., supra:
*555 **497 "The directors of the Tucson Federal
are elected for a three-year term, while this contract
was to remain in force and effect for ten years from
the date of its execution. It is contended by Tucson
Federal that the contract is void for the reason that it
extends and binds the corporation beyond the terms
of the then acting officers and directors. To support
this proposition we are referred to Edwards v.
Keller, Tex.Civ.App., 133 S.W.2d 823; Clifford v.
Firemen's Mut. Benev. Ass'n, 232 A.D. 260, 249
N.Y.S. 713; Massman v. Louisiana Mfg. Cooperage
Co., 177 La. 999, 149 So. 886; Kline v. Thompson,
206 Wis. 464, 240 N.W. 128. We have examined
these cases and find they all involve employment
contracts whereby the corporate officers have
attempted to employ a person for a period extending
beyond their terms. The courts held that the
contracts were void because one board of directors
cannot bind subsequent boards as to future
personnel to carry out administrative details of the
corporation. These cases limit the application of the
rule to employment contracts, which we believe is
sound." 74 Ariz. at 170, 245 P.2d at 427.

Tucson Federal concerned the effect to be given a
contract to buy and sell insurance which was of 10
years' duration, where the board which negotiated
the contract served for a three-year term. Our
comments on corporate employment contracts must
be considered dicta. This is the first instance in
which we have been faced with the issue of an
employment contract extending beyond the term of
the Board of Directors. Under the circumstances we

find no obstacle to considering the matter as one of
first impression in this jurisdiction.
It is asserted by Banco that the contract made
between the Board of Directors and Hernandez was
void because it was in contravention of the
By-Laws which provide that officers are to serve for
one year during the term and at the pleasure of the
Board of Directors.[FN3] We note that the identical
By-Law was in effect at the time of Herring's
contract. [FN4]

FN3. Article IV s 1 of the By-Laws
provides as follows: "TERM OF OFFICE.
The President, Vice-President, Cashier or
Assistant Cashiers shall hold office during
the term of the board by whom they are
elected, subject to the power of the board
to remove them at its discretion. Any
vacancies occurring in any of the said
offices shall be filled by the Board of
Directors."
FN4. Herring's contract ran from July 19,
1972 to July 19, 1973. The Board's term
under the Articles of Incorporation (Article
VII) ran from the first Monday of June
1972 to the first Monday of June 1973.
There are two theories which support the conclusion
that the Hernandez contract was valid although it
extended beyond the Board's term. One theory
centers on the conclusion that the Board by its prior
acts with regard to Herring informally altered or
modified the By-Laws. The other theory concludes
that because the Board had the authority under the
By-Laws to alter the By-Laws at any time, the
Hernandez contract was pro tanto a modification
which prevailed over the By-Laws.
The Articles of Incorporation gave the Banco Board
of Directors the power to amend by-laws; [FN5]
further, Article X of the By-Laws provides:

FN5. Article VII of the Articles of
Incorporation provides: "In furtherance,
and not in limitation of the powers
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conferred by law, the board of directors is
expressly authorized to adopt, amend and
rescind by-laws for the corporation by a
vote of a majority of the board of directors,
until and unless otherwise provided by
resolution of the shareholders, and such
by-laws be binding on the directors,
officers, shareholders and all parties
contracting or in any way dealing with the
corporation. The board of directors is
further
expressly authorized to fill
vacancies in any office or in the board of
directors resulting from any cause."
"The Directors may, at any regular meeting, alter or
amend these By-Laws, in a way not inconsistent
with the law, provided that the number of those
voting in favor of such amendment is equal to or
greater than a majority of the whole Board of
Directors; ... "
[1][2][3] It is accepted law that by-laws may be
amended informally as well as formally, *556 **498
orally or in writing ... by acts as well as by words,
and may be evidenced by a course of proceeding or
conduct on the part of the corporation inconsistent
with the by-laws claimed to have been amended or
repealed. See Bay City Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 8
Wash.2d 191, III P.2d 771 (1941). Moreover,
when a Board of Directors has the power to adopt
by-laws, it has power to waive those adopted,[FN6]
and we therefore hold that when the Board entered
into a one-year contract with Herring which
extended beyond the then-Board's term, the By-Law
at issue was informally modified, or waived. See
Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d
636, 639 (3rd Cir. 1930); United Producers and
Consumers Co-op v. Held, 225 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.
1955).

FN6. Hill v. American Co-operative Ass'n,
195 La. 590, 197 So. 241 (1940).
[4] When the Board agreed to pay the balance of
Herring's salary and benefits in order to cancel his
contract before it expired, we conclude that the
Board recognized that there was a valid
employment contract and Herring was entitled to be

compensated.
[5][6] Banco argues that the Board of Directors has
the power under the By-Laws to remove an officer
at its discretion.[FN7] This power of removal,
however, is subject to rights of the officer under the
employment contract. The power to remove an
officer of the corporation does not carry with it the
power to terminate a valid employment contract
without liability. See Cuppy v. Stollwerck, 216
N.Y. 591, III N.E. 249; 158 A.D. 628, 143 N.Y.S.
967 (1916); In re Paramount Publix Corporation, 90
F.2d 441 (2nd Cir., 1937). It must be remembered
that employment contracts are designed to be a
benefit to both an officer and a corporation. The
corporation wishes to secure the special services of
the officer; on the other hand the officer wishes to
have some financial security. If the corporation may
ignore the contract at will, so also could the officer
leave the corporation at any time without liability
no matter how essential or valuable his services.
Such a result would be disruptive of modern
business practice. See In re Paramount Publix
Corporation, 90 F.2d 441, 443 (2nd Cir., 1937).

FN7. See footnote 3, supra.
[7] Most commentators now are in agreement that
modern business practice mandates that parties must
be bound by the contracts they enter into absent
fraud or duress. The Arizona legislature has
recently adopted this view. [FN8]

FN8. See Title 10, Corporations and
Associations, A.R.S. s 10-051 which
provides: "Any officer or agent may be
removed by the board of directors
whenever in its judgment the best interests
of the corporation shall be served thereby,
but such removal shall be without
prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of
the person so removed. Election or
appointment of an officer or agent shall not
of itself create contract rights."
[8] We believe that the contract here was for a
reasonable period of time particularly when viewed
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against the length of time for which the prior
contract with Herring was made. The Board had the
authority to make and enter into contracts on behalf
of the corporation, and it had the authority to alter
or amend the corporation By-Laws. There were no
statutes in effect at the time the contract was entered
into to bar its legality.[FN9]

FN9. Although no statutes regarding this
matter were in effect at the time this action
arose, future banking corporation boards
will have to consider the ramifications of
A.R.S. s 6-417(7) (1974) which we note,
but do not comment on. That section
provides: "The board of directors may
adopt or amend by-laws, but no by-law
shall be effective until it has been
submitted to and approved by the
superintendent as being in conformity with
this chapter. Each adopted amendment
shall be subject to the same inquiry by the
superintendent
as
the
corresponding
provision in the original by-laws of the
association.
The
superintendent
may
require approval by a majority vote of the
members for an amendment changing the
location of the business office of the
association."
Judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and this
case is remanded for a new trial on the issue of
damages.
CAMERON, C. J., STRUCKMEYER, V. C. J., and
HAYS and GORDON, JJ., concur.
Ariz. 1977.
Hernandez v. Banco De Las Americas
116 Ariz. 552, 570 P.2d 494
END OF DOCUMENT
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& CO. C 4258222327

:12087468421
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RODERICK C. BOND
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR.~ ISB No. 7563
NED A. CANNON~ ISB No. 2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-:IE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person;

Case No.: CV-07-00208

Plain.tiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNIE DANTINI

v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., ao.
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thcrcof~
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

Defendants.
STATE OF WASHINGTON

)

COUNTY OF KING

)

) 53:

I, Ernie Dantini, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

--J

1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and

~ run Reed Taylor's Accountant.

I make this Affida.vit on my personal knowledge.

-

{ !J
~

~FFIDAVIT OF ERNIE DANTINI - 1

MAR - .L - 2007

00: 54

2.

FROM: E. J.

INI

& CO.

C 4258222327

: 12087468421

Attached. as EXhibit AI i~ a gel'l.ulne and authentic copy of the email that I

received from John Taylor on October 7? 2005, the subject line of which read ~'Rceds
note."
DATED: This 1st day of March, 2007.

~~

MI\rc.h

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '1:fft day ofFe'bttm~. 2007.

Not

Residi,at; ..,........~~:t""."--'-:---=--=:---:1'_ _
My commission expire!.;: _~""'::"'-L---"""'---J'----

AFFIDAVIT OF ERNIE DANTINI - 2

"1AR-: -2007

00: 55

FROM: E. J.

:12087468421

INI & CO. C 4258222327

Pa.ge lof2

Print - Close Window
Frorm

"John Tt1Y1or" <JTayfOr@AIAlnsurnnca.com:>

"J'o~

"Ernla D;mUnl (E"mllll)- <Mantlnl@yahoO.r;Om>

I t · ... . - - - - · ·

SubjBd:: Reeds note
I>t1tet

-_._

FrI, 7 Oct: 2005 l5!:;JS!25 -0700

._----,-----_ . ..._-" ... ....
,

.,

....... -------_._---

I will send you by separate e mails expected cash flow reports for AlA andCrop as It now stands.

We need 10 mUllon new crop priemium to get by this period and to be able to do a bond offertng, I will
have dotalled cash flows later this month but these 9re my bftst guess.

.'
;;}:.

I hope that YOll And he can com& up wHh some speclDr: proposels to mOdIfY the debt tlnd move us
tawerd putting the twa companies back together. Jt would be better for aH of us to be on the same
side of the table. We both have mounds of personal debt ( and I'm about to get a shrt load more)
because we have not taken as muoh out of tho Compeny oV8r the leet three years.

I am wntlng to axplore all options, bu1 wnl need a wr1tten proposal.
, propose that we enter Info a joint cross agreement like the one we almost did three years ago.

(i

Alternately: I would like to reVl'!f5e the transactIon of 10 yeam ego. AlA would /SSIJO 71,000 prefarrcd B shares
to Rood. They WOuld be law par value booQUSEI we can't book any goodwRl. In lieu of If: of shares
then W9 COUld exchang9 for Crop Interest.
We would \han enter Into a redemption 8chadulo In traunchet over over the next throe years.

",

1,

Those are tho relaled Issues:
,. Manedatory rodamptjon will not work, have to book the liability. no holp to fls
2. Set;;urlty for the rademptJonm
3. Who redeems? CropUSA may ba better one
4. Cropusa exchange right
5. How to payoff the GGMIT debt by yoor end
6. Rodeem Donne first?
7
If Reed wanl$ all the accrued intorest, I need back salary adjustment
to my orglnal contract amount
a Plan to gat the remaInIng C sheres out of 401 k, whIch Reed and' aro blggost owners.
9. Suggest e rodempUon schedule basad on Gross Crop sales, It II; ~ common belief that
Road, through Jay, ill competing wIth crop and dlsrup11ng sales efforts.

You need t~ be awarn:;
1. chang£t In control gives the assocIations Eln out of GGMIT and ASAMIT
2.

Any default will fresze up all money to Reed, Donna (and likely me) until all tl\e
GGMIT debt is paid. Alot of this $ dates back to Universe bankruptcy. but

also r&latee to advanOO$ from 1he !rust for faes and oommlssrons 11119 year..
3. AlA cannot tun without Bryan Dnd Ken. nl'luse they keep the old Trustmerk

rating and billing systam going on tha old AS 400. Its e dInosaur, but neoded yet.

"r;.

4. AlA could sldnny down BxpenSGS more, but alot of thf!l expanses am beIng assumed
by crop, 90 thoro:! not a lot of room to reduce costs faster !han the revenues wUl

declirlo.

.

5. The net valuo of AlA In lfquldatlDn or runDff will not be mUCh more than payoff Donna, and sDltle
the leese 01'1 buildIng with the state. Reed should be EIItIIato that there Is II reB/ pDBslbllly
that the net prasent value could be minimal.
6. Three of tho four investors 01 Crop l<now Reed pemona/ly. The fourth Is Jim Becks buddy lltld tho
major owner of the brokerage hOUse that does tha bond deals. If full nOlo Is put in default, I will
not bOBbie to keep any them On board to do any type buyout, mergQf or dosl WIth Reed.
7. I do not want to live In Kansas CIty,
!".

http://uR.f:3:12.:m..Ri1:yabno.~mn/ym:lSMwr...etteflMx!:!'<I:ttboX&Msglti~8632j168158.1_1StJ05... ],0/81l00.5

AFFIDAVIT OF ERNIE DANTIN!

r

EXH IBIT A

*1

(j

FILE

/'

l1/

2JIll ~ l ppt 1 15
RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR
and CONNIE T AYLOR, individually and
the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

Case No.: CV-07-00208
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO JOHN TAYLOR, AIA
INSURANCE, AND AlA SERVICES'
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION RE: PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT AI

Defendants.

Contrary to John Taylor's testimony, there were never any modifications to Reed
Taylor's Promissory Note and Agreements as evidenced by his own email dated October 7,
2005. John Taylor testified at the hearing that there was an oral modification of the agreements
that took place in March 2003, with only himself and Reed Taylor present. When questioned at

-

PLAINTlFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUMRE: PLAINTlFF'S EXHlBIT AI-1

yesterday's hearing, John Taylor testified that he had no recollection of the October 7, 2005,
email he sent to ErnieDantini,thesubjectlineofwhichwas"Reedsnote." Plaintiffs Ex. AI
(emphasis added). Consequently, Reed Taylor submitted the Affidavit of Ernie Dantini, with the
email attached as Exhibit AI.
John Taylor admits significant facts in his email which undisputedly demonstrate that no
oral agreement ever was reached:
I hope that you and [Reed Taylor] can come up with some specific proposals to modify
the debt and move us toward putting the two companies back together. .. r am willing to
explore all options, but will need a written proposal. . .I propose that we enter into a joint
cross agreement like the one we almost did three years ago ...Altematively; I would like to
reverse the transaction of 10 years ago ... Suggest a redemption schedule based on Gross
Crop sales ...
Dantini Aff., Ex: AI (emphasis added).
John Taylor's email provides clear and convincing evidence that the no alleged oral
modification ever occurred. John Taylor's email was sent to Reed Taylor's accountant more
than two years after the alleged March 2003, "oral agreement."
John Taylor's email supports Reed Taylor's testimony that no modification occurred and
that AIA Services was and is in Default when Reed Taylor exercised his right to vote the shares.
The Court should deny John Taylor, AIA Insurance, and AlA Services' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and award Reed Taylor attorneys' fees and costs, as authorized by I.R.C.P. 65(c), for
overturning the Temporary Restraining Order.

PLAINTIFF' S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT AI - 2

DATED: This 2

nd

day of March, 2007.

SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

By: _ _ _---:
Roderic
Paul R.
sman, Jr.
Ned A. Cannon
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed Taylor

PLAINTIFF' S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT AI - 3

L/oL/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of the Reed J. Taylor's Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition to John Taylor, AlA
Insurance, and AIA Services' Motion for Preliminary Injunction Re: Plaintiffs Exhibit AI on the
following person(s) via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
eX) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and R. John
Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Signed this 2nd day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287 -9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
ALA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; ALA INSURANCE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and
the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Reed Taylor, moves the Court, pursuant to LR.C.P. 65 and all other applicable
authority, for entry of a Preliminary Injunction enjoining Defendants from interfering in any way
with:

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 1
68350.1 (#100021.1)

Lj of.,

ORIGI

l

1.

Reed Taylor's right to vote the shares of ALA Insurance, Inc.; and

2.

The corporate actions taken by the February 22,2007, Consent in Lieu of Special

Meeting of Shareholders of AIA Insurance, Inc., Plaintiffs Exhibit K to the February 26, 2007
Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Emergency Motion, and also Plaintiff's Exhibit K, at
the March 1, 2007, Preliminary Injunction Hearing; and with the February 22, 2007 Consent in
Lieu of Meeting of the Board of Directors of AIA Insurance, Inc., Exhibit L to the February 26,
2007, Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Emergency Motion, and also Plaintiffs' Exhibit L
at the March 1, 2007, Preliminary Injunction Hearing. I
In light of the fact that Defendant, AIA Services Corporation, owes Plaintiff in excess of
$8,189,614, and in the unlikely event that Plaintiff is found not to be entitled to the Preliminary
Injunction sought by this Motion, because any resulting damages will not exceed the sums owing
to Plaintiff, Plaintiff requests that he not be required to post security in accordance with
LR.C.P. 65(c), and that the Court enter a finding to that effect, and that no such damages will
exceed the sums owing to Plaintiff, as required by Hutchins v. Trombley, 95 Idaho 360,509 P.2d
579 (1973).
This Motion is based upon Plaintiff's Emergency Motion (1) to Enforce Shareholder
Vote and Board of Directors' Resolutions, and (2) to Confirm Termination of Counsel for ALA
Insurance, Inc.; Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Emergency Motion; Affidavit of
Roderick C. Bond in Support of Emergency Motion; Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Memorandum of
Law in Support of His Emergency Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and in
Opposition to Motion of John Taylor, ALA Insurance, and AIA Services for Preliminary
Injunction; Paragraphs 1, 2, and 5 of the. Affidavit of Aimee Gordon; Affidavit of Ernie Dantini,
the statements and arguments of counsel at both the February 26, 2007 hearing on Plaintiffs
I Contemporaneously with the filing of this Motion, out of an abundance of caution, Plaintiff is filing a Motion to
Amend Complaint to make it clear that he seeks the relief sought by this Motion.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2
68350.1 (#100021.1)

Emergency Motion and Motion of AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and R. John
Taylor for Temporary Restraining Order, and the March 1,2007 hearing on Defendants' Motion
for Preliminary Injunction; and the testimony and evidence taken at the March 1, 2007 hearing
on Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
th

DATED: This 6 day of March, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON

& BOND PLLC

BY:_=--:-...-:--;::;---=iF

Roderick C. '
Paul R. C
an, Jr., ISBA #7563
Ned A.
on, ISBA #2331
508
hth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Fax: (208) 743-9428
Attorneys for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 3
68350.1 (#100021.1)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of the Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and [Proposed] Preliminary Injunction
on the following parties via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, Washington 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman
Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321- 13 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendants, AIA Services
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and
R. John Taylor
Jonathan D. Halley
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
C~)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

C ) Hand Delivered
C ) Overnight Mail
C~)

Facsimile

Via:

C.) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

C ) Hand Delivered

( ) Overnight Mail

C.) Facsimile

Via:

C.)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

C ) Hand Delivered
C ) Overnight Mail

C.) Facsimile

Signed this 6 th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 4
68350.1 (#100021.J)

CONSENT IN LIEU OF
SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS OF
AlA INSURANCE, INC.

The undersigned, being the exclusive person entitled to vote all of the outstanding shares
pledged to him of AlA Insurance, Inc. (the "Corporation") pursuant to the right vested in the
undersigned because of the various defaults under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
dated July 1, 1996, the $6 Million Promissory Note dated August 1, 1995, the Amended and Restated
Security Agreement dated July 1, 1996, and Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement dated July 1,
1996, hereby consents to the following corporate actions without holding a formal Special Shareholder
Meeting of the Corporation.
Removal of Directors
Effective immediately, the following individuals are unanimously removed from the Board of
Directors of the Corporation:
R. John Taylor
JoLee Duclos
Bryan Freeman

Election of Director
Effective immediately, the following individual is unanimously elected to the Board of
Directors, to serve in that capacity until the next annual meeting of the Corporation or until removed or
replaced pursuant to the provisions contained in the Bylaws of the Corporation:
Reed J. Taylor

DATED: February 22,2007.

==----- L{ /1)
df.;{~'
E IBIT ~

Rfed 1. Taylor

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION -1-
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CONSENT IN LIEU OF
MEETING OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
AIA INSURANCE, INC.

The undersigned, being the sole member of the Board of Directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. (the
"Corporation"), hereby consents to the following corporate actions without holding a formal Board
Meeting of the Corporation.

Removal of Officers
It is resolved that, effective immediately, the following individuals are unanimously removed

from the corporate office or position set forth opposite their respective names:
President
Secretary
Treasurer
Vice-President

R. John Taylor
JoLee Duclos
Martin Hanna
Bryan Freeman

.dlection of Officers
It is resolved that, effective immediately, the following individual is unanimously elected to the

corporate offices set forth below to serve as such until the first annual meeting or the election and
qualification of their successors:
President
Secretary
Treasurer

Reed J. Taylor
Reed J. Taylor
Reed J. Taylor

R. John Taylor
It is resolved that, effective immediately and in addition to being removed as an officer of the
Corporation, R. John Taylor is terminated as an employee of the Corporation and allpayments to him
shall cease, including, without limitation, all payments to R. John Taylor for alleged lease payments on

L"'l.e parking lot. R. John Taylor shall not be permitted in the Corporation's offices at 111 Main Street,

L1ft
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

-1-

I IT L-

Lewiston, Idaho for any reason. All ofR. John Taylor's personal property located at the Corporation's
Jffices at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho shall be locked up in stored there until delivery can be
arranged to R. John Taylor. No papers, files, documents, draft documents, electronic files, email or
any other information shall be released to R. John Taylor until it is ascertained that it owned by him
and not the property of the Corporation.
Change of Locks
It is resolved that a locksmith shall be hired to replace and/or change the locks on all doors at

the Corporation's offices located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho.

The locksmith shall also

attempt if possible to change/replace/install a separate lock on the door to R. John Taylor's personal
office to secure his personal property until delivery of his personal property can be arranged. The
locksmith may rely on these Resolutions as full and complete authority to enter the premises and
change/replace/install the locks described above as the Corporation's offices located at 111 Main
treet, Lewiston, Idaho.

Keys shall only be issued to personnel authorized in writing by the

undersigned.
Security Guard
It is resolved that a security guard shall be posted outside the offices of the Corporation at times

deemed appropriate by the undersigned.

The security guard shall ensure that no unauthorized

personnel enter the Corporation's offices, including, without limitation, R. John Taylor or any person
acting on his behalf

All security guards may rely in this Consent as full authorization by the

undersigned to comply with and/or enforce all of the Resolutions.
Security System
It is resolved that the code for the security system shall be changed to a code only known to the

undersigned. The undersigned may provide the security code to other officer(s) or employee(s), but
\ly upon written consent from the undersigned.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION -2-

Authority to Bind Corporation
It is resolved that the undersigned shall be the only authorized signatory authorized to act on

behalf of the Corporation to transfer funds, sign checks and/or execute contracts.

Effective

iIllmediately, R. John Taylor is removed as an authorized signatory to transact any business on behalf

of the Corporation. R. John Taylor is removed and not authorized to act as an authorized signatory on
any and all of the Corporation's bank accounts, credit card accounts, open accounts, and is stripped of
all authority to act in any way on behalf of the Corporation. All banks and financial institutions may
rely on these Resolutions to remove R. John Taylor from all accounts and add the undersigned as an
authorized signatory.
DATED: February 22, 2007.

L/{3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof,
BRIAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV07-00208
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This matter is before the Court on Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants
AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor. Hearing on the motion was
held March 1,2007. Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John
Taylor were represented by attorney Michael E. McNichols. Plaintiff Reed Taylor was
represented by attorneys Paul R. Cressman, Jr. and Roderick C. Bond. The Court, having read

Taylor v. Taylor
Opinion on Motion for Preliminary Injunction

the motion, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the parties, having heard the testimony of
witnesses and the oral argument of counsel, having considered only that evidence the Court
found admissible, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
AlA Insurance Inc. is a business under the umbrella of AIA Services Corporation. The
founder of the business was Plaintiff Reed Taylor. Eventually the Plaintiffs brother, Defendant
R. John Taylor, joined the business and together, the brothers developed the parent company into
a holding for numerous diversified insurance businesses. In 1995, Plaintiff Reed Taylor decided
to retire. In order to effectuate his retirement, Reed Taylor and AlA Services, along with counsel
for the respective parties, entered into a stock redemption agreement. The agreement included a
promissory note payable to Reed Taylor in the amount of $6,000,000.00 plus interest, which was
executed on August 1,1995. 1 In 1996, the agreement was amended and the parties executed an
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and an Amended and Restated Security
Agreement. 2
Some ten years later, in a letter dated December 12, 2006, Plaintiff Reed Taylor's
attorney notified Defendant John Taylor and AlA Services Corporation that AlA Services was in
default under several sections of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, including but not
limited to failure to pay the $6 million promissory note. 3 The letter further notified the
Defendants that Plaintiff intended to exercise his right to vote the redeemed shares pursuant to a
reversion of voting rights upon default as provided for in the Pledge Agreement. Included in the
letter was Plaintiff's demand for a special meeting of the shareholders for the purpose of electing
Plaintiffs Exhibit "A".
Plaintiffs Exhibit "e" and Exhibit "E".
3 Plaintiffs Exhibit "F".
1

2

Taylor v. Taylor
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a new board of directors, with the special meeting to occur on December 26,2006. Plaintiffs
demand for a December 26,2006 special shareholder's meeting was rejected.
On January 29,2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor filed the above-entitled action seeking
recovery of amounts owed under the Promissory Note, but making no claim seeking enforcement
of other terms of the parties' written agreements. On an unknown date, Plaintiff made a second
demand for a special shareholder's meeting to occur on February 5, 2007. Plaintiffs second
demand for a special shareholder's meeting was denied by the Board's secretary, JoLee Duclos,
in a letter dated February 1,2007. 4
On February 22, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor executed a Consent in Lieu of Special
Meeting of Shareholders of ALA Insurance, Inc., in which Plaintiff removed the current ALA
board members and elected himself, Reed Taylor, the sole board member. 5 At 3:00 a.m. on
Sunday, February 25,2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor went to the business offices of ALA Services
Corporation along with a locksmith and security personnel hired by the Plaintiff, and changed
the locks on certain doors within the building housing ALA Insurance. 6 However, the activity
caused an alarm system to go off and police arrived on scene. The police determined the matter
was civil in nature, the old locks were put back in place and both parties had representative
remain at the premises.
On Monday morning, February 26, 2007, Defendants John Taylor and ALA Services
Corporation filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Later the same day, Plaintiff filed
an Emergency Motion (1) to Enforce Shareholder Vote and Board of Directors Resolution, (2) to
Confirm Termination of Counsel for ALA Insurance Inc. along with affidavits and a Motion for
Order to Shorten Time. The Court took up the motions of the parties on the afternoon of
Plaintiffs Exhibit "H".
Plaintiffs Exhibit "K".
6 The building houses other business as well that lease space from AlA Services Corporation.
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February 26, 2007 and entered a Temporary Restraining Order against the Plaintiff and granted
Plaintiff's Motion to Shorten Time. The Court then set a hearing on March 1, 2007 for
Defendant's motion for preliminary injunction and the Plaintiff's pending motion.
At the March 1, 2007 hearing, the Court informed the parties that, after reviewing the
flurry of pleadings and other documents filed over the three days, including several binders
worth of exhibits, the Court had determined it would not hear the Plaintiff's lengthy and complex
motion upon the grounds stated in open Court. The Court then proceeded on the preliminary
injunction hearing only.

STANDARD

Idaho Civil Rule of Procedure 65(e) provides that a defendant may be granted a
preliminary injunction (1) when it appears the defendant is "entitled to the relief demanded and
such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of acts
complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually" or (2) when it appears "that the
commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or
irreparable injury" to the defendant. LR.C.P.65(e). In addition to showing irreparable injury, a
party seeking only an injunction must show a likelihood of prevailing at trial. Harris v. Cassia
County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984); Farm Service, Inc. v. Us. Steel Corp, 90 Idaho
570, 414 P.2d 898 (1966). The necessary standard oflikelihood of prevailing cannot be met,
however, where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt. Harris v.
Cassia County, 106 Idaho at 518. The decision to enter a preliminary injunction is within the

discretionary powers of the trial court. Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 95 P.3d 69 (2004).
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ANALYSIS
In the instant case, the determination of whether the Defendants have met the burden
necessary to obtain a grant of the requested preliminary injunction is not an easy task. At risk is
a lucrative business that, while founded and made successful because of the efforts of Plaintiff
Reed Taylor, has been under the supervision and management of Defendant John Taylor for the
last ten years. If the business management is turned upside down, as Plaintiff seeks to have
done, both parties appear to be at substantial risk of losing millions of dollars. The key question
on which all other issues hinge is whether the Defendants are in default of the redemption
agreement made with Plaintiff Reed Taylor. If a default has occurred, Plaintiff may have the
right to vote his redeemed shares under the agreement and may have the right to demand a
special shareholder's meeting. On the other hand, if the agreement has been orally amended, as
asserted by Defendant John Taylor, then no reversion of voting rights occurred and the actions of
Plaintiff Reed Taylor were taken without a lawful right to do so. However, despite the efforts of
both parties to confuse and convolute the issues, the Court finds it must step back, remain
focused, and look at the bigger picture.
If Plaintiff Reed Taylor believed the redemption agreement was in default and that he
was being denied 'a special shareholder's meeting in violation of his rights, Plaintiff had the
ability to seek a court ordered special shareholder's meeting pursuant to I.C. § 31-1-703.
Instead, Plaintiff attempted to (a) obtain relief through self-help in the middle ofthe night; (b) by
means certain to be hotly contested and with a desired result of placing the Plaintiff in exclusive
control of two Defendants; (c) based on a disputed theory. The Plaintiffs efforts to effectuate a
hostile take-over of the business after being in retirement for ten years is reasonably likely to
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cause irreparable harm to the parent company, its subsidiaries and to all persons holding an
interest in the companies, including the Plaintiff. Given the substantial risk of financial loss that
all of the parties will suffer if this matter is not addressed with a greater degree of composure and
temperance, the Court fmds irreparable harm is likely if Plaintiffs conduct is not kept in check
while the critical issues are researched and resolved. Which party is likely to prevail on the
question of default and voting rights has yet to be determined. Nevertheless, the Court finds the
risk of irreparable harm of sufficient significance to merit granting a preliminary injunction that
will provide a degree of protection for all the parties until the complex legal issues can be
determined.
Pursuant to LR.C.P. 65(d), the Court finds a preliminary injunction shall be entered
restraining the Plaintiff, Reed Taylor, from harassing and/or interfering with the management of
the businesses known as AlA Insurance, Inc. and AlA Services Corporation. Plaintiff Reed
Taylor shall not enter upon the premises of AlA Insurance and AlA Services Corporation
without the express permission of Defendant John Taylor, nor act or attempt to act as a director
or officer of AlA Insurance Inc. Reed Taylor is also not to harass or annoy, directly or
indirectly, any employee of AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance Inc, in person, by
telephone, or by written communications.
By entering a preliminary injunction, the Court does not intend to discourage Reed
Taylor and John Taylor from working together to reach resolution in this matter, rather, the
Court encourages such conduct by the parties. However, in order to protect the parties from the
potential irreparable harm that would likely occur if the matter is again allowed to become
hostile, the Court finds it necessary to restrict the conduct of the parties by this preliminary
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injunction until such time that the parties have had sufficient opportunity to complete discovery
and the issues can be decided on the merits.
It is the further finding of the Court that the issues raised in this matter are conducive to

mediation. In an effort to encourage the parties to resolve these issues in a manner consistent
with appropriate corporate management, the Court is ordering the parties into mediation. The
parties are to commit their best efforts to reaching agreement on a mediator and then submit the
name of the selected mediator to the Court no later than March 23,2007. If, however, the parties
are unable to reach agreement on a mediator, the parties are to notify the Court of the impasse by
March 23,2007, and submit nominations for mediator, after which the Court will designate one.

ORDER
Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby GRANTED consistent with the
terms as articulated above.
Further, the Court Orders the parties into mediation in the matter and to notify the Court
regarding mediation consistent with the terms as articulated above.

Dated this - - -
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE,
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
T AYLOR and CONNIE T AYLOR,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person,

Case No.: CV-07-00208
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND
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SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION
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AGAINST REED J. TAYLOR
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Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court to reconsider its
findings and decision to enter a Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor:
I. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
"A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be
made at any time before the entry of the final judgment. .. " LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B).
A.

AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and John Taylor Have
No Standing to Obtain a Preliminary Injunction

The circumstances under which a preliminary injunction may be granted to a
defendant are governed by LR.C.P. 65(e)(5), which states in pertinent part:
A preliminary injunction may also be granted on the motion of the
defendant upon filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon
any of the grounds mentioned above in this section, subject to the same
rules and provisions provided for the issuance of injunctions on behalf of
the plaintiff.
LR.C.P.65(e)(5).
Here, the Defendants have no standing to seek a Preliminary Injunction because
they failed to file the required counter-claim before the hearing praying for the
affirmative relief necessary to support a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction under
LR.C.P.65(e)(1)-(4).1 See LR.C.P. 65(e)(5).
B.

Even if the Defendants Had Standing, They Failed to Demonstrate
That They Are Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction

"One who seeks an injunction has the burden of proving a right thereto." Harris
v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988 (1984) citing Lawrence Warehouse
Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 (1965).

I The Defendants failed to cite applicable authority for a preliminary injunction under LR.C.P. 65(e). The
Court addressed I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1)-(2) in its Opinion, which appears to be the only applicable subsections
based upon the Defendants' arguments and evidence (assuming the Defendants had filed a counter-claim
before hearing their motion).
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Under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1), a party must demonstrate that based upon the complaint
or counter-claim, he or she is entitled to the relief demanded and that he or she is likely to
prevail at trial. Id.
Under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2), a preliminary mandatory injunction may only be granted
in "extreme cases where the right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will
flow from its refusal." Id. Because Reed Taylor is owed over $8,000,000, there can be
no irreparable injury as any alleged and proven damages would be an offset to amounts
owed to Reed Taylor.
The Court did not make critical findings that: (1) the Promissory Note had been
orally modified; (2) a Default does not exist; (3) Reed Taylor did not have a right, as the
sole shareholder, to vote the shares of ALA Insurance. Instead the Court merely stated:
"[w ]hich party is likely to prevail on the question of default and voting rights has yet to
be determined." Opinion and Order, p. 6.

Such a fmding is insufficient to support

granting a Preliminary Injunction to Defendants.
The evidence clearly supported a finding that ALA Services is in Default for
(1) the failure to pay interest or principal; and (2) being insolvent. The Court failed to
address ALA Services' undisputed insolvency, or that Reed Taylor's collateral (including
the pledged shares) was impaired ALA Insurance's guaranty of the $15,000,000 revolving
loan for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (of which ALA Insurance owns no interest).
Instead, the Defendants alleged as their sole defense that they are not in Default
because of an alleged and unproven "oral modification" to the Promissory Note.
However, as set forth in Reed Taylor'S Memorandum of Law, an oral modification must
be proven by clear and convincing testimony. Quite to the contrary, John Taylor's e-mail
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to Ernie Dantini constitutes clear and convincing evidence that there was no oral
modification.2
There is no credible evidence to suggest that the Defendants will prevail at trial or
that they have not committed numerous Defaults. The Defendants have failed to present
any credible evidence to show that Reed Taylor was not entitled to vote the shares and is
not entitled to take control of AlA Insurance. Reed Taylor has the right to vote the shares
to protect his interest as any financial institution has for protecting an interest in
collateral.
The Defendants have failed to meet the burden of proving that they have a right to
enjoin Reed Taylor from voting the pledged shares.
C.

Even if the Defendants Had Standing, the Court
Failed to Set Security for the Preliminary Injunction

A Court may not issue a preliminary injunction:
except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such a sum as the
court deems proper, as for the payment of such costs and damages
including attorney's fees to be fixed by the court, as may be incurred or
suffered by any party who is found to be wrongfully enjoined...
I.R.C.P. 65(c) (emphasis added).
Here, the Court failed to provide for a bond or other security to offer protection to
Reed Taylor for the damages which will be incurred by him. There is no evidence to
suggest that Reed Taylor will not prevail and that security is not warranted. In fact, every

2 John Taylor testified that the last date of oral modification occurred in March 2003, and his e-mail to
Ernie Dantini sent some three years later directly contradicts his testimony that any modification occurred.
See Affidavit of Ernie Dantini, Ex. AI. Significantly, John Taylor testified that he "did not recall the
email." Assuming an oral modification occurred, John Taylor testified that the interest payments had been
allegedly lowered to $15,000 per month, plus payroll services provided to Reed Taylor. Even if the
Defendants were able to demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence that such a modification
occurred, John Taylor admitted in his testimony that several payments had been skipped and were owed.
Thus, AlA Services would even be in Default of the alleged orally modified agreement. Under either
theory, AlA Services is in Default of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and has failed to cure the
Defaults.
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day that the Defendants retain control of AIA Insurance results in funds being improperly
used for other unrelated entities thereby depriving Reed Taylor of such funds.
Even if the Defendants had standing and the Preliminary Injunction was
supported by the law and the evidence, the Court should have set at least a $2,000,000
bond, the amount John Taylor testified ALA Insurance was worth, to protect Reed
Taylor's interests.
D.

The Status Quo Is Abnormal and Should NOT Be Maintained

Although Reed Taylor is mindful of the Court's position, the evidence and oral
testimony demonstrates that ALA Insurance is being operated for the benefit of John
Taylor, the other Defendants, and unrelated entities such as Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc. The evidence demonstrates that John Taylor has been utilizing ALA Insurance as his
own bank to operate other businesses not owned by AlA Insurance, all under the
watchful eyes of the present management of AlA Insurance.

Through the Court's

Preliminary Injunction, the Court is encouraging such activities to continue and
suggesting that such behavior is proper corporate governance.
In addition, the Court's concern for the other shareholders of AIA Services is
misplaced because of the significant funds owed to Reed Taylor. All shareholder equity
in ALA Services will be decimated at such time as Reed Taylor obtains a judgment for
amounts owed under the Promissory Note. Even now, there is no shareholder equity in
ALA Services.
Reed Taylor is being prejudiced and irreparably harmed by the Court's decision to
uphold the status quo by enjoining him from operating or monitoring AlA Insurance. 3
Although mindful of the voluminous infonnation submitted to the Court, the Court also erred in finding
that AlA Insurance is a lucrative business. In fact, AlA Insurance's business has been steadily
deteriorating, while being subject to a guarantee of a $15,000,000 revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc., a company in which it holds no ownership interest. Not surprisingly, John Taylor
is the holder of approximately 40% of the outstanding shares oferop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.

3
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E.

The Evidence Shows that the Defendants Were in Default and Remain
in Default of Numerous Provisions of the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, which Entitles Reed Taylor to Vote the Pledged Shares

Reed Taylor demonstrated through briefing, exhibits, and testimony that AIA
Services was in Default and remains in Default for the failure to pay interest, failure to
pay principal, impairing Reed Taylor's collateral, and insolvency.4
The only credible evidence before the Court demonstrates that AIA Services is in
Default under numerous provisions of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.

F.

Reed Taylor was NOT Required to Request
a Shareholder Meeting Under I.e. § 30-1-703

The intent of I. e. § 30-1-703 is to provide a mechanism for a shareholder to be
heard by the court ordering a meeting. See I.C. § 30-1-703(2). Reed Taylor is the holder
of the right to vote all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance. No purpose would be
served by requesting that the Court order a shareholder meeting because the results would
be the same, Reed Taylor would remove the board and take all actions he deems
appropriate. 5
It should be noted that I.C. § 30-1-704 specifically provides that a shareholder
meeting may be taken without a meeting "if the action is taken by all the shareholders
entitled to vote on the action."

I.e. § 30-1-704(1).

As the holder entitled to vote all of

4 AlA Services is Default if, among other things, it: (1) fails to pay interest due on the Promissory Note;
(2) fails to pay principal due on the Promissory Note; (3) becomes insolvent; or (4) the value of Reed
Taylor's collateral (the pledged shares) is impaired. John Taylor testified that he believed AlA Services'
value was approximately $2,000,000 when NOT using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. It is
undisputed that Reed Taylor is owed over $8,000,000, which leaves AlA Services' assets far less than its
debts. AlA Insurance guaranteed a $15,000,000 for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., in which it holds
no ownership interest. This has significantly impaired the collateral provided to Reed Taylor. AIA Services
is in Default under all of the above events of Default as set forth in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
5 The Court places emphasis on the fact that Reed Taylor elected to change the locks on the building at
3:00 a.m. Reed Taylor's actions in this regard are analogous to a bank repossessing a car. Like a bank,
Reed Taylor had the right to take all actions he deemed appropriate. He took the action at a time that he
believed would not breach the peace.
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the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor took appropriate action when he
executed the Consents as pennitted under I.e. § 30-1-704.
As discussed in Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law, no Preliminary Injunction
may be granted for an action that has already been done. Cooper v Milam, 256 S.W.2d
196,201 (1953) (the Bank's vote of shares cannot be enjoined because the vote already
took place). The Defendants had over 70 days to seek a TRO or Preliminary Injunction
enjoining Reed Taylor from voting the shares, but they failed to do so, and Reed Taylor
voted the shares. Reed Taylor voted the shares, and no Preliminary Injunction may be
granted to undo such vote.
G.

The Court Should Have Considered
John Taylor's Lack of Credibility

The credibility of witnesses who testify in open court is for the trier of fact to
determine. DeBaca v. McAffee, 109 Idaho 800, 711 P.2d l320 (Ct. App. 1985).
The Defendants' sole defense rests exclusively with John Taylor's testimony
regarding an alleged "oral modification" of the Promissory Note. Significantly, John
Taylor testified that: (1) he could not recall the email he wrote to Ernie Dantini; (2) that
AIA Insurance had received complaints from a person regarding its use of funds
belonging to a Growers Trust; (3) his over $200,000 in compensation was actually
benefits such as a vehicle when he wrote a letter to Donna Taylor stating he had taken no
salary in 2001; (4) that AIA Insurance's balance sheet should be viewed without using
GAAP; and (5) AIA Insurance resources were being used by other entities, and that all
such use was properly allocated and paid by the correct entity, but then later testified that
he spent approximately one-half of his time working for Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc., yet none of his salary was paid by Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and all of his
salary was paid by AIA Insurance.
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As described above and as seen by the numerous examples of improper corporate
actions in the record, the Court should be very cautious of John Taylor's testimony.

H.

Reed Taylor Should Be Awarded His Attorneys' Fees
and Costs Incurred for Being Wrongfully Enjoined

A party wrongfully enjoined is entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs
incurred as a result of being wrongfully enjoined. LR.C.P.65(C).
Reed Taylor has been wrongfully enjoined from voting the shares pledged to him
and should be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs.

II. CONCLUSION
The Court should set aside the Preliminary Injunction and award Reed Taylor his
attorneys' fees and costs incurred for being wrongfully enjoined.
Reed Taylor requests oral argument.
DATED: This 12th day of March, 2007.
SMITH CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN P

By: _ _ _ _ _-#_...."",.=-=-_ _ __

Pau R. Cressman, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction on the
following parties via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, Washington 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
(X) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
(X) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
(X) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287 -9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;
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Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") submits the following Supplemental
Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion for Reconsideration of Preliminary
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Injunction against Reed Taylor:
I. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
A.

The Court Failed to Make Specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Necessary to Support an Injunction against Reed Taylor.

LR.C.P. 52(a) sets forth the required findings of fact and conclusions of law
which pertain to a preliminary injunction:
and in granting or refusing to interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its
action .... In the application of this principle regard shall be given to the special
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who
appear personally before it.
LR.C.P. 52(a) (emphasis added).
The Court failed to make findings of fact or conclusions of law necessary to
support granting a preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor as required by LR.C.P.
52(a).
The Court should enter findings to indicate whether the Defendants were in
Default, whether Reed Taylor had a right to vote the shares, whether John Taylor was
credible, whether clear and convincing evidence was submitted to support an oral
modification, and such other warranted and required findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
II. CONCLUSION
The Court erred by not making specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
required for a preliminary injunction pursuant to LR.C.P. 52(a).

III
III
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The Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor should be set aside and the Court
should enter findings of fact and conclusions of law which conform to the evidence and
law.
DATED this l3 th day of March, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

By:------If-~7'------
Roderick C.
NedA. C
on
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of
Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor on the following parties
via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, AIA
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Signed this 13 th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.

I

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4

I

F\LED
Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile)
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Attorneys for Defendants
AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc. and
R. John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho)
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and )
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
)
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No: CV 07-00208
ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES
CORPORATION, AIA
INSURANCE, INC., AND
R. JOHN TAYLOR

Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., andR. John Taylor
("these defendants"), answer plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as follows:
I.

Defendants admit paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 and 2.1.

ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES
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II.
Defendants deny paragraphs 2.2, 2.3, 2.12, 2.15,2.16,2.24,3.2,3.3,4.2,4.3,
5.2,5.3, 6.2, 6.3, 7.2, 8.2, 8.3, 9.3, 9.4, 10.2, 10.3, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 and 12.2. Defendants
deny paragraph 2.23 for lack of information and belief.
III.
Defendants reallege their admissions in paragraphs 3.l, 4.1,5.1,6.1, 7.l, 8.1,
9.1, 10.1, 11.1 and 12.1.
IV.
Answering paragraph 2.4, these defendants admit the first sentence and the
third sentence and allege that in 1995 Reed desired to retire and have AlA Services
Corporation redeem his stock, and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.4.
V.

Answering paragraph 2.5, these defendants admit that AlA Insurance, Inc., is
a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services Corporation and deny all the other allegations.
VI.
These defendants admit paragraph 2.6 but allege that the agreements were
amended at a later time.
VII.
These defendants admit paragraph 2.7 but allege that the Promissory Note
provided that it was subordinate to the payment of redemption obligations owed by AlA
Services Corporation to Donna Taylor and that the agreements were amended at a later time.
VIII.
Answering paragraph 2.8, these defendants admit that AlA Services
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Corporation agreed to execute a Security Agreement and Stock Pledge Agreement and deny
all the other allegations.
IX.

Answering paragraph 2.9, these defendants admit the first two sentences, but
allege that the agreements were amended at a later time. These defendants deny the third
sentence of paragraph 2.9 and deny all the other allegations.
X.

These defendants admit paragraph 2.10 but allege that the agreements were
later amended.
XI.

Answering paragraph 2.11, these defendants allege that the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement speaks for itself, and deny all of the other allegations in paragraph
2.11.
XII.

Answering paragraph 2.13, these defendants allege that the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement speaks for itself and deny all ofthe other allegations of paragraph 2.13.
XIII.

Answering paragraph 2.14, these defendants admit that plaintiff was the largest
creditor of AlA Services Corporation and deny all the other allegations.
XIV.
Answering paragraph 2.17, these defendants admit that plaintiff, through his
counsel, claimed that AlA Services Corporation was in default and deny all the other
allegations.
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xv.
Answering paragraph 2.18, these defendants deny that they have failed to
comply with the agreements as amended and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.18.
XVI.

Answering paragraph 2.19, these defendants admit that plaintiff attempted
to schedule a special shareholder meeting for December 26, 2006, a date on which the
offices of AlA Insurance, Inc., were scheduled to be closed, admit that no special
shareholders meeting was held, and deny all ofthe other allegations of paragraph 2.19.
XVII.

These defendants deny paragraph 2.20 and allege that none of them is in
default under the terms of any of the agreements as amended.
XVIII.

Answering paragraph 2.21, these defendants admit that AlA paid
$1,510,693.00 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares in AlA Services Corporation from
an entity in which John was the single largest shareholder but allege that the stated value
of the Series C Preferred Shares, together with mandatory accumulated dividends likely
exceeded $3,000,000.00 and that the transaction was substantially beneficial to AlA
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. These defendants admit that the 401 (k)
plan of AlA Services Corporation held Preferred C shares and that no shares were
purchased or redeemed from the plan and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.21.
XIX.
Answering paragraph 2.22, these defendants admit that John purchased a
parking lot and rents the parking lot to AlA Insurance, Inc., for $1,250.00 per month and
denies all the other allegations in paragraph 2.22.
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xx.
Answering paragraph 9.2, these defendants admit that as of2002 or 2003 John
owed AlA Services Corporation $307,271.00 and allege that in 2002 or 2003 John and
plaintiff entered into an agreement to extinguish John's debt to the corporation and to reduce
the corporation's debt to Reed by an amount of $307,271.00 and other sums, as a part of a
proposed transaction between Reed, John and AlA Services Corporation which Reed later
repudiated and refused to complete, and denies all the other allegations in paragraph 9.2.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

On July 1, 1996, plaintiff, AlA Services Corporation and Donna 1. Taylor
entered into a SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT which provides
that no principal payments may be made by AlA Services Corporation to plaintiff until the
entire redemption price due Donna Taylor is paid in full. The redemption price due Donna
Taylor has not been paid in full. Therefore, no principal payments are due to plaintiff.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

At different times since the written agreements were executed, plaintiffs and
some defendants have orally modified the written agreements. The modifications include,
without limitation, an agreement that the interest payable to plaintiff from AlA Services
Corporation would be paid in installments of $15,000.00 per month (together with the
assumption of responsibility for other expenses). AlA Services Corporation has paid
plaintiff the sum of $15,000.00 per month and has assumed responsibility for the other
agreed expenses in accordance with the modified agreement since they were entered into and
plaintiff has accepted those payments. None of these defendants is in default of the modified
agreements with plaintiff.
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The claims of the plaintiff are barred by applicable statutes of limitation,
including Idaho Code §§ 5-216,5-218,5-224 and 5-237.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting his claims against these defendants.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has waived his right to assert claims against these defendants.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff s claims against these defendants are barred by the equitable doctrine
of unclean hands.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims in his THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION violate Rule 9(b)
LR.C.P.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff s claims are barred by the doctrine of laches.

These defendants counterclaim against the plaintiff as follows:

FIRST COUNTERCLAIM
In 1995, plaintiff was the majority shareholder of AlA Services Corporation.
AlA Services Corporation was the sole shareholder of AlA Insurance, Inc.
In 1995, AlA Services Corporation redeemed plaintiffs interest in AlA
Services Corporation through a corporate redemption of the plaintiff s stock.
After the purchase ofplaintiff s stock, plaintiff intentionally undertook a course
of action to injure AlA Insurance and to devalue the businesses of AlA Services Corporation.

ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES
CORPORATION, AlA INSURANCE,
INC., AND R. JOHN T AYLOR

-6-

Y4()

Plaintiff s intentional course of action included intimidating the management of the
businesses of AlA Services Corporation, inducing AlA Insurance, Inc., employees and agents
to terminate their employment and contracts with AlA Insurance, Inc., and to accept
employment and contracts with plaintiff and/or his controlled organizations. Plaintiff, with
the former employees and former agents of AlA Insurance, Inc., engaged in business
competitive with AlA Insurance, Inc., and seriously damaged the business and value of AlA
Insurance, Inc., and the value of the businesses of AlA Services Corporation.
Because ofplaintiffs intentional injury to the business of AlA Insurance, Inc.,
AlA Services Corporation was unable to pay plaintiff all of the amounts of money due at the
times due, prior to the amendment of the agreements. Before the agreements were amended
plaintiff threatened to sue AlA Services Corporation and to foreclose and take over AlA
Insurance, Inc., and threatened and coerced these defendants into employing friends and
relatives of plaintiff and paying plaintiff s friends and relatives salaries and compensation
substantially in excess of the value of their services. Plaintiff also told those friends and
relatives that they were not obligated to report to or take direction from these defendants'
management.
Plaintiffhas intentionally breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implied in the agreements with these defendants and has damaged these defendants in
amounts to be proved at trial.
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Plaintiff has intentionally inflicted emotional distress on John Taylor and
damaged John Taylor in an amount to be proved at trial.
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THIRD COUNTERCLAIM
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE
ECONOMIC ADV ANTAGE/INTENTIONAL INDUCEMENT
OF TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS WITH COMPANIES
OWNED IN PART BY R. JOHN TAYLOR
Plaintiffhas damaged these defendants by intentionally causing businesses to
terminate contracts with companies owned in part by these defendants and therefore
diminishing the value of these defendants' investment in those companies. Plaintiff has
damaged these defendants in an amount to be proved at trial.

FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM
DECLARATION OF INVALIDATION OF PROXY
The written agreements provide that plaintiff will have an irrevocable proxy
from AlA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AlA Insurance, Inc., in the event and
only in the event of an uncured default by AlA Services Corporation.
Plaintiff claims that AlA Services Corporation is in default and has thus
claimed the right to act as AlA Services Corporation proxy and to vote its shares in AIA
Insurance, Inc. Defendants deny that AlA Services Corporation is in default.
Plaintiffhas stated in writing his intention to vote AlA Services Corporation's
shares in AlA Insurance, Inc., to remove all of the current directors of AlA Insurance, Inc.,
and then to cause new directors to be appointed to remove all of the officers of AlA
Insurance, Inc.
The immediate removal of all of the directors and officers of AlA Insurance,
Inc., would result in catastrophic losses to AlA Insurance, Inc., all to the substantial
detriment of AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation.
A proxy is an agent of his principal and owes a fiduciary duty to his principal.
Plaintiff seeks to act as a proxy for AIA Services Corporation but has announced his
intention to do serious and catastrophic damage to his principal, AlA Services Corporation.
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Because of plaintiff s announced intention to violate his fiduciary duty to AlA
Services Corporation and to take actions which will result in catastrophic losses to AlA
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., the Court should find, order and determine
that plaintiff does not have a right to act as a proxy for AlA Services Corporation in the
voting of its shares of AlA Insurance, Inc.
FIFTH COUNTERCLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

At approximately 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, February 24,2007, without notice to
any defendants, plaintiff and several individuals entered the offices of AlA Insurance, Inc.,
and AlA Services Corporation at III Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho.
Accompanying plaintiff and his security personnel was a locksmith whom
plaintiff directed to begin to change the locks on the offices of AlA Services Corporation and
AlA Insurance, Inc., for the purpose of preventing access to those offices by their current
management and employees.
The action and conduct of plaintiff and his associates constituted a trespass
upon the property of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., which, if it had been
successful, would have caused irreparable injury to both AlA Services Corporation and AlA
Insurance, Inc.
Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing and/or interfering with the
management of the business known as AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation.
Plaintiff should be enjoined from entering upon the premises of AlA Insurance, Inc., and
AlA Services Corporation without the express permission of John Taylor. Plaintiff should
be enjoined from acting or attempting to act as a director or officer of AlA Insurance, Inc.
Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing or annoying, directly or indirectly, any employee
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of AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc., in person, by telephone, or by written
communications.
NOTICE OF INTENT TO AMEND
These defendants hereby give notice of their intention to request the Court to
permit them to amend these counterclaims to include a claim for punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, these defendants request the Court:
1. To dismiss the First Amended Complaint ofthe plaintiff, with prejudice and
to award these defendants their costs and reasonable attorneys fees.
2. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in the amounts proved at triaL
3. To award these defendants damages for plaintiff s intentional infliction of
emotional distress, in the amounts proved at triaL
4. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs intentionally causing
businesses to terminate contracts with companies owned by him in amounts to be proved at
trial.
5. To find, order and declare that plaintiff did not have a right to act as a proxy
for AlA Services Corporation in the voting of its shares of AlA Insurance, Inc.
6.

To enjoin the plaintiff from harassing and/or interfering with the

management of the business known as AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation
and to enjoin the plaintiff from entering upon the premises of AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA
Services Corporation, without the express permission of John Taylor and to enjoin the
plaintiff from acting or attempting to act as a director or officer of AlA Insurance, Inc., and
to enjoin the plaintiff from harassing or annoying, directly or indirectly, any employee of
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AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc., in person, by telephone, or by written
communications.
7. For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just.
Dated: March 15,2007.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
These defendants demand a trial by jury of all of the issues in this case that are
triable to a jury.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

X
U.S. MAIL
- - --HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
- - - - TELECOPY (FAX)

Michael E. McNichols

ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES
CORPORATION, AlA INSURANCE,
INC., AND R. JOHN TAYLOR

-12-

Michael E. McNichols
Cleme~ts, Brown & McNichols, P.A.
321 13 Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-6538
Facsimile: (208) 743-9295
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc.
and R. John Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT C01JRT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 07-00208
MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and John Taylor,
submit this memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration of the
Preliminary Injunction.
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I.

Introduction

Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration is little more than a re-argument of the
same issues he presented to the Court leading up to and at the preliminary injunction
hearing. This memorandum will not repeat Defendants' position with regard to the issues
that were fully briefed by both sides leading up to and at the preliminary injunction
hearing. The Court has already ruled on the various issues re-raised by plaintiff, and
Defendants will not re-brief those issues here. The only new argument, that Defendants
lack standing to seek injunctive relief, is both erroneous and moot.
II.

Argument
A.

Defendants Have Standing To Seek Injunctive Relief
1.

Rule 65(e) Allows For The Relief Sought By Defendants

Plaintiff focuses only on Rule 65( e)( 5) and its "upon filing a counterclaim"
language.

As an initial matter, plaintiff waived this argument by not bringing it in

opposition to Defendants motion for Preliminary Injunction.

If plaintiff thought

Defendants lacked standing to seek injunctive relief, he should have raised the issue in
his opposition brief rather that waiting until now. Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a motion for reconsideration
"may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they
could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation").
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Moreover, the relief Defendants sought and obtained is expressly provided for in
Rule 65(e)(6), which, without any mention of the need for filing a counterclaim,
provides:
The district courts, in addition to the powers already
possessed, shall have power to issue writs of injunction for
affirmative relief having the force and effect of a writ of
restitution, restoring any person or persons to the possession
of any real property from the actual possession of which the
person or persons may be ousted by force, or violence, or
fraud, or stealth, or any combination thereof, or from which
the person or persons are kept out of possession by threats
whenever such possession was taken from them by entry of
the adverse party on Sunday or a legal holiday, or in the
nighttime, or while the party in possession was temporarily
absent therefrom. The granting of such writ shall extend only
to the right of possession under the facts of the case, in
respect to the manner in which the possession was obtained,
leaving the parties to their legal rights on all other questions
the same as though no such writ had issued: provided, that no
such writ shall issue except upon notice in writing to the
adverse party of at least five (5) days of the time and place of
making application therefor.
(Emphasis added).
Thus, Rule 65 specifically contemplates injunctive relief in instances where a
party attempts to take possession of property "on Sunday" ... in the nighttime, or while
the party in possession was temporarily absent therefrom." This is precisely the type of
activity that can only be remedied by a court taking action to preserve the status quo.
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2.

The Issues Raised By Defendants Are The Same Issues Already
Raised by Plaintiff

Plaintiff s initial Complaint only raised the issue of whether Defendants are in
default under the terms of the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
Restructure Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement. The initial complaint did not
raise the issues of whether plaintiff was entitled to vote all of the AlA Services
Corporations' shares in AlA Insurance and take physical control of the AlA offices.
Rather than allow the court to make the detennination, plaintiff took the matter into his
own hands and, in the middle of the night, attempted to change the locks. That act is
what brought about the need for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo.
Plaintiff argues that the Defendants lack standing to obtain injunctive relief merely
because Defendants had not yet filed a counterclaim at the time Defendants sought and
obtained injunctive relief. This argument, however, ignores the fact that plaintiff has
sought injunctive relief on the exact same issues raised in Defendants motion for
preliminary injunction. Plaintiff asked the Court to determine that he has the right to vote
the AlA Services shares and take control of AlA Insurance; plaintiff asked the Court to
order mandatory injunctive relief allowing plaintiff to alter the status quo. Defendants
took the opposite position, i.e., that the court should not take the premature step of
resolving the issues on the merits now, but rather should preserve the status quo by
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prohibiting plaintiff from taking the matter into his own hands in the way he had already
covertly attempted.
Plaintiff sought the Court's equitable remedies, and is now disappointed in the
equitable remedy fashioned by the Court. However, he should not now complain that the
Court lacked the authority to consider the same issues he had also brought before the
Court.
3.

The Standing Issue Is Moot

Plaintiffs position is that Defendants lack standing because no counterclaim had
been filed at the time injunctive relief was sought. That issue, if it ever existed, has now
been cured.

Defendants have now filed a counterclaim seeking the injunctive relief

already granted by the Court. Plaintiff s argument would do no more than require the
Court to start over and hold another preliminary injunction hearing in which the exact
same witnesses would undoubtedly present the exact same testimony and evidence.
There would be no reason for the Court to reach any different conclusion other than the
conclusion it has already reached that the status quo should be maintained until the Court
is able to judiciously consider the issues.
4.

The Court Has The Inherent Authority To Grant Injunctive
Relief To Maintain The Status Quo

Plaintiff argues that Defendants somehow lack standing to obtain injunctive relief
merely because Defendants had not yet filed a counterclaim at the time Defendants
sought and obtained injunctive relief. Plaintiffs argument ignores the inherent power of
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the Court to preserve the status quo by ordering injunctive relief and is no more than an
attempt to divest the court of its authority to grant injunctive relief.

The court has

inherent authority to grant injunctive relief, especially where injunctive relief is the only
way to preserve the status quo. As explained in Baldwin v. Idoni, 944 So.2d 426, 426
(Fla. App. 2006):
Where there was a legitimate dispute as to the ownership of
the vehicle, the trial court had the inherent authority to grant
an injunction so as to preserve the property until a final
resolution of the case.
Id. (emphasis added).
Moreover, Idaho courts hold that a party is entitled to injunctive relief where
actions fall within a "subject" that is proper for investigation by the court of equity:
In order to entitle a party to an injunction pendente lite, it is
not necessary that such a showing should be made as would
entitle him to the relief prayed for upon final hearing. It is
sufficient to show a state of facts that makes the transaction a
proper subject of investigation by a court of equity, justifying
the protection of property during the pendency of the action.
White v. Coeur D'Alene Big Creek Mining Co., 55 P.2d 720, 722 (Idaho 1936).
Here, plaintiff attempted to surreptitiously wrest control of AlA Insurance from its
current management. Rather than allow the court to reach a final resolution in a timely
and judicious manner, plaintiff took the matter into his own hands. The Court clearly has
the inherent authority to preserve the status quo by allowing AlA Insurance to remain
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under its current management until the issues can be resolved by the by the Court after a
trial.
B.

Plaintiff Miscomprehends The Nature Of The Relief Sought By
Defendants

Plaintiffs assertion of errors committed by the Court demonstrates his
misunderstanding of the nature of injunctive relief.

At page 3 of his motion, he

complains that:
The Court did not make critical findings that: (1) the
Promissory Note had been orally modified; (2) a Default does
not exist; (3) Reed Taylor did not have a right, as the sole
shareholder, to vote the shares of AlA Insurance. Instead the
Court merely stated: "[w]hich party is likely to prevail on the
question of default and voting rights has yet to be
determined." Opinion and Order, p. 6. Such a finding is
insufficient to support granting a Preliminary Injunction to
Defendant.
Plaintiff ignores the fact that the purpose of a preliminary injunction hearing is not hold a
trial on the merits. Such is especially the case where the relief requested is merely to
maintain the status quo rather than to create irreparable harm by altering the status quo.
The Court properly determined that this is a case where Plaintiff s acts warrant injunctive
relief because of the irreparable injury they would cause. See I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2). The
Court clearly recognized the difference between temporary injunctive relief and a trial on
the merits when it explained that "which party is likely to prevail on the question of
default and voting rights has yet to be determined."
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Moreover, plaintiff continues to miscomprehend that injunctive relief to maintain
the status quo is much more easily obtained than the type of mandatory injunctive relief
that seeks to alter the status quo. See Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114
(9th Cir. 1979) ("A mandatory injunction goes well beyond simply maintaining the status
quo pendente lite [and] is particularly disfavored.") (citations omitted).
Moreover, the injunctive relief sought by plaintiff, an order allowing him to take
control of AlA Insurance, would effectively give plaintiff the relief he seeks without
bringing the case to trial. Idaho Courts do not allow for such a result:
A temporary injunction will not usually be allowed where its
effect is to give the plaintiff the principle relief he seeks,
without bringing the cause to trial; neither should a
preliminary injunction be dissolved where its effect would be
such as to give the defendant the relief he seeks without
bringing the cause to trial. The granting of a preliminary
restraiJ;ling order is not a matter of right but rests in the sound
discretion of the court.
Rowland v. Kellogg Power & Water Co., 233 P. 869,872 (Idaho 1925).
C.

There is a bond.

Though the plaintiff claims that the Preliminary Injunction was issued
without a bond, the same bond that was posted as a condition for issuing the
Temporary Restraining Order remains on deposit with the Court as security for the
payment of costs and damages, including reasonable attorney fees that may be
incurred if the plaintiff is found to have been wrongfully enjoined.
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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, these Defendants ask the Court to deny plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2007.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

BY:~C1JJ4Q,~~.~~~~
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

X

U.S. MAIL
- - - - - HAND DELIVERED
_ _ _ _ OVERNIGHT MAIL
_ _ _ _ TELECOPY (FAX)

~~

Michael E. McNichols

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RFf:ONSIDERATION
- 10-

(&l
FilED

Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993

2Wl tiWi 2.0 ftP\ 9 19
PATTY O. WEEK.S mRIJ j _
CJ'~~ K F T.\-l r DI .T.

r

6 U'llEPUTY

I /

2/ip';I1.JfM

Attorneys for Defendants
AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc. and
R. John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;

)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No: CV 07-00208

)
)

vs.

)
)

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

)

Defendants.

)

Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John
Taylor submit this MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
The Court should deny plaintiff s motion on the grounds and for the reasons
set forth in the Court's OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION entered on March 8, 2007, in which the Court found that
"The key question on which all other issues hinge is whether the Defendants are in default
of the redemption agreement made with Plaintiff Reed Taylor." Page 5.
The Court then held that "Given the substantial risk offinancialloss that all
of the parties will suffer if this matter is not addressed with a greater degree of composure
and temperance, the Court finds irreparable harm is likely ifplaintiff's conduct is not kept
in check while the critical issues are researched and resolved." Page 6.
The Court then determined that a preliminary injunction should be issued
against the plaintiff to restrict the conduct of the parties until they had had opportunity to
complete discovery and the issues, including the issue of any default would be decided
at a trial on the merits.
The relief that plaintiff seeks is totally contrary to and inconsistent with the
Court's OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS 'MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and should be denied for the reasons stated by the Court in the OPINION
AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
Plaintiff argues that the defendants are in default, but the Court has already
determined that the issue of whether the defendants are in default is the critical issue in
the case and should not be decided by the Court until after the parties have had an
opportunity to conduct discovery and present evidence at a trial on the merits.
It is clear that, if the defendants are not in default, the plaintiffis not entitled

to a preliminary injunction or any of the other relief sought.

L{68

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
P"R PT HvfThI A "R V ThJ IT Th.T rTT n l\.T

_ ')_

DATED this 19th day of March, 2007.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNTCHOLS, P.A.

BY:~~~~~~·~_
MICHAEL E. McNTCHOLS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3 100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

X

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
- - - - OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX)
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED 1. TA YLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE,
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person,

~

Defendants.

-cc
2
-(!)

Defendants alleging as follows:

c;:)

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1

.-cr.:

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor submits this Second Amended Complaint against the

I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.1

Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor ("Reed") is a single person and a resident of

Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.2

Defendant AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services") is an Idaho

corporation with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County,
Idaho.
1.3

Defendant AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance") is an Idaho

corporation with its principal place of business is located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County,
Idaho. AlA Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services.
1.4

Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, were husband and wife

during most of the relevant times (collectively "John") and are residents of Lewiston,
Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.5

Defendant JoLee Duclos ("Duclos")

IS

a single person residing

III

Clarkston, Washington.
1.6

Defendants Bryan Freeman ("Freeman") is a single person residing in

Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.7

The District Court has jurisdiction over this matter under I.C. § 1-705.

1.8

Venue is proper in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez

Perce County pursuant to

I.e. § 5-404.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2.1

R. John Taylor is, and was at all relevant times, an officer and director of

AlA Services and AlA Insurance. John is the majority shareholder in AlA Services.
III
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2.2

R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor were divorced through an Interlocutory

Decree filed on December 16, 2005, under which only a portion of their community
assets were divided and other property remains undivided.

This action involves

transactions, debts, claims, and/or causes of action which accrued prior to R. John Taylor
and Connie Taylor's dissolution and property subject to their dissolution and this action
remains undivided. R. John Taylor's actions were taken on behalf of the community.
2.3

Duclos is, and was at all relevant times, an officer and director of AlA

Services and AlA Insurance. Duclos is a shareholder in AlA Services.
2.4

Freeman is, and was at all relevant times, a director of AlA Services and

AlA Insurance. Freeman is a shareholder in AlA Services.
2.5

Reed was the founder and majority shareholder of AlA Services. In 1995,

John desired to redeem Reed's 613,494 shares of common stock in AlA Services through
a stock redemption agreement. Upon the closing of the transaction of AlA Services'
redemption of Reed's shares, John became the majority shareholder in AlA Services.
2.6

AlA Insurance, a subsidiary of AlA Services, is wholly owned by AlA

Services and where virtually all of AlA Services' revenues are derived. AlA Insurance is
lessee of the office building located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho.
2.7

On or about July 22, 1995, AlA Services and Reed entered into a Stock

Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement. Under the
terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement and related agreements, AlA Services agreed
to execute promissory note to timely pay Reed $1,500,000 Million in 90 days ("Down
Payment Note") and $6,000,000, plus accrued interest due and payable monthly at the
rate of 8'14% per annum ("Promissory Note").
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2.8

The Promissory Note was executed by John on behalf of AlA Services on

or about August 1, 1995. Under the terms of the Promissory Note, AlA Services was
required to timely pay all accrued interest monthly to Reed and the principal amount of
$6 Million was due and payable on or before August 1,2005.
2.9

Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, AlA Services and

AlA Insurance also agreed to contemporaneously execute a Security Agreement and
Stock Pledge Agreement, among other agreements and documents.

The Stock

Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement were all
either authorized by the Board of Directors of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance and/or
approved by a shareholder vote.
2.10

When AIA Services was unable to comply with the Stock Redemption

Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement, John (on behalf of AlA
Services) entered into negotiations with Reed regarding restructuring the obligations. In
1996, AlA Services, AlA Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption
Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement ("Restructure
Agreement"). Contemporaneously with the execution of the Restructure Agreement, the
parties executed an Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement") and an Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended
Security Agreement"). The Down Payment Note remained unpaid at this time and AlA
Services was in default.
2.11

Under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, the terms of the

Promissory Note remained unchanged and were not modified (including the $6,000,000
principal amount, due date, and required monthly interest payments). Under the terms of
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the Amended Security Agreement, Reed received a security interest in all of AlA
Services and AlA Insurance's commissions and AlA Services and AlA Insurance were
required to have a Lock Box for all commissions for the benefit of Reed.
2.12

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services

pledged all the outstanding shares in AlA Insurance to Reed as partial security for AlA
Services' indebtedness to Reed under the agreements. Under the terms of the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services' failure to timely pay Reed interest or principal
under the Promissory Note or Down Payment Note constituted an Event of Default. In an
Event of Default for failure to timely pay interest or principal under the Promissory Note,
AlA Services' insolvency, or AlA Services' failure to maintain the required Lock Box
(among other Events of Default), AIA Services right to vote the pledged shares of AlA
Insurance ceased and terminated and vested exclusively in Reed.
2.13

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Reed was

required to be a member of the board of directors of AlA Services until Reed was paid in
full or sufficient security was posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory Note. AlA
Services never posted bonds or other security for the payment of the Promissory Note. In
excess of six years, AlA Services, John, Duclos andJor Freeman have intentionally
refused to appoint Reed to the Board as required. Despite Reed's demands and AlA
Services' contractual obligations to keep Reed on the Board, AlA Services, John, Duclos
andJor Freeman have refused to appoint Reed to the Board of Directors of AlA Services
as required. Because Reed has not been on the Board as required, all actions taken by
AlA Services' Board were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AlA
Services; and such acts are the personal actions of John, Duclos andJor Freeman during
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their tenure on the Board of AlA Services.
2.14

Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services agreed to not

loan money to any affiliate other than a wholly owned subsidiary. AlA Services has
loaned money to or provided other services or benefits to affiliates and other parties in
violation of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and such loans or benefits were made
during times in which John, Duclos and Freeman were Board members.
2.15

During all relevant times, Reed was the largest and only significant

creditor of AlA Services. Because AlA Services has failed to timely and properly pay
Reed as required during all relevant times, John, Duclos and/or Freeman owe Reed
special obligations because of his status as AlA Services' largest creditor.
2.16

During all relevant times, the value of AlA Services was less than the

aggregate amount of its debts, which constitutes AlA Services' insolvency. During all
relevant times, AlA Services was in default of various provisions of the agreements with
Reed, insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During all relevant times,
AlA Services has failed to comply with the terms of the Promissory Note.
2.17

Instead of timely paying Reed as required, AlA Services, AlA Insurance,

John, Duclos, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had a security interest in to make
investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or provide services on behalf of John
and/or entities operated and/or partially owned by John.
2.18

On or about December 12, 2006, Reed provided AlA Services written

notice of default under various provisions of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement, including, without limitation,
AlA Services' failure to pay principal and interest due under the Promissory Note, failure
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to maintain the Lock Box, loaning money to non-wholly owned subsidiaries (including
guaranteeing the $15 Million revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc.), failure to provide and timely provide all required financial information, among
other defaults. AlA Services and AlA Insurance have failed to timely cure the defaults
and all applicable cure periods have expired. As of the date of this Second Amended
Complaint, the principal owed to Reed under the Promissory Note of $6,000,000, plus
accrued interest of over $2,000,000 had not been paid in full as required.
2.19

Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman,

and/or Duclos have failed to comply with the terms of the Restructure Agreement,
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement. Under the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the right to vote all of AlA Insurance's shares ceased
and terminated for AlA Services and became vested in Reed when AlA Services failed to
timely pay the required monthly interest payments due under the Promissory Note and its
subsequent failure to pay the $6,000,000 principal due under the Promissory Note on
August 1, 2005, as well as when AlA Services committed other Defaults under the
various agreements. AlA Services was in default long before Reed demanded to exercise
his right to hold a special shareholder meeting to vote the shares to appoint a new board
of directors for AlA Insurance.
2.20

On December 12, 2006, Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a

special shareholder meeting of AlA Insurance for the purpose of removing and
appointing new board members on December 26, 2006. AlA Services, AlA Insurance,
John, Duclos and/or Freeman refused to comply with Reed's demand for a special
shareholder meeting by representing that AlA Insurance's offices were closed on
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December 26, 2006.
2.21

Through a letter dated January 3,2007, John stated "I fully recognize that

[Reed) Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate, including calling a special
shareholders meeting."
2.22

On or about January 25, 2007, Reed hand delivered another demand for a

special shareholder meeting for the removal and appointment of the board of directors for
February 5, 2007, pursuant to his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
Through a letter from Duclos, AlA Insurance refused Reed's request and denied that he
had the right to call a meeting to vote the AIA shares. Despite Reed's demands, AlA
Insurance refused to hold a special shareholder meeting.
2.23

Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services and AlA Insurance failed to cure

the numerous Defaults under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, among other obligations (as
described above).· Through the date of this Second Amended Complaint, AlA Services
and AlA Insurance's Defaults were not timely cured and they remained in Default.
2.24

On February 22, 2007, Reed exercised his right to vote the pledged shares

by executing a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Insurance
removing John, Duclos and Freeman from the Board of Directors and appointed himself
the sole Board Member, pursuant to his right to vote the pledged shares under the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. Because AlA Services' right to vote the pledged
shares had ceased and terminated when it became in Default and failed to cure such
Defaults, the right to vote the pledged shares in AIA Insurance vested exclusively in
Reed and he exercised his right to vote the pledged shares pursuant to the Amended
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Stock Pledge Agreement and the Articles of Incorporation of AlA Insurance. Because
the shares pledged to Reed account for all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, Reed
had the authority to waive the notice requirement, notice period, and the formality of
holding a shareholder meeting.
2.25

In the weeks leading up to the filing of this action, Reed discovered that

more than one transfer of assets occurred during the time in which AlA Services had
failed to service its debt to Reed. In 2004, AlA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to purchase
Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services from Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., an
entity in which John was the single largest shareholder (John holds approximately 40% of
the outstanding shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.).

This transaction

inappropriately and/or fraudulently transferred $1,510,693 of AlA Insurance's funds to
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. when such funds should have been tendered to Reed
and/or used to pay the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services. This
$1,510,693 transfer occurred at a time in which AlA Services was insolvent and when it
was in Default on the monthly payments of interest due to Reed under the Promissory
Note. This $1,510,693 transfer also occurred at the same time that AlA Services' 401(k)
Plan (the "Plan") held over $750,000 in Preferred C Shares in AlA Services. No shares
were purchased or redeemed from the Plan, even though John and Duclos were the CoTrustees of the Plan at the time of the transfer.
2.26

Reed also discovered that John had purchased a parking lot and entered

into a lease agreement with AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance to lease the parking lot
from him for $1,250 per month. This transaction was also the transfer of funds to John,
funds which should have been paid to Reed during a time in which AlA Services was
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unable to service its debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent. The parking lot is not
even utilized by AlA Insurance or AlA Services.

There are other transfers and/or

transactions which Reed will itemize and detail at trial.
2.27

Based upon the above-referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together

with transactions referenced in the foot notes to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's
financial statements, there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans,
payments, advances and other actions which occurred during times AlA Services defaults
and inability to timely pay Reed and at times in which AlA Services was insolvent.
Upon information and belief, Reed believes that forensic accounting and further scrutiny
of AlA Insurance and AlA Services books and records will reveal additional improper
activities.
2.28

John has used AlA Services and AlA as his personal source of funds

and/or assets, including, without limitation, acts in which John has transferred assets to
their name; taken advances that John never paid back; transferred assets and/or funds to
other entities partially owned or controlled by John; entered into transactions which
constitute a violation of AlA Services' Articles of Incorporation; made transfers and/or
entered into transactions which benefited John and/or anyone or more of the other
Defendants; and provided services for entities partially owned by John and/or anyone or
more of the other Defendants without such actions being arms-length transactions. The
above acts occurred when John, Duclos, and Freeman were directors and/or officers of
AlA Services and AlA Insurance. All of the above acts occurred during times in which
AlA Services was not current with payments to Reed under the Promissory Note,
Default of other provisions, and insolvent.
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2.29

On February 22, 2007 (after executing the Consent in Lieu of Special

Shareholder Meeting), Reed executed a Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting to terminate
all officers, the employment of John, authorize the change of locks, and take such other
actions deemed appropriate. When Reed attempted to take action in accordance with the
Consents described above, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman
refused to abide by the Consents.
2.30

Donna Taylor, the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AlA

Services, subordinated all of her rights to payment of the redemption of her shares in
favor of the Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor.

III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACHES OF CONTRACT
3.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
3.2

AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or omissions and

failure to pay Reed the amounts owed and/or comply with the Promissory Note,
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure
Agreement constitute a breach of their contractual obligations owed to Reed.

AlA

Services, AlA Insurance, and/or John's acts and/or omissions constitute the breach of
obligations owed to Reed under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, Restructure Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and monies owed to
Reed.
3.3

As a result of AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or

omissions which constitute numerous breaches of contractual obligations, Reed has
suffered and is entitled to damages of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest in excess of
$2,000,000, in an exact amount to be determined at trial to be allocated between the
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
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defendants as the evidence and claims show at trial.

In addition, Reed is entitled to an

award of attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121.
IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
4.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
4.2

The

Defendants'

actions

constitute

fraudulent

transfers

and/or

conveyances under I.C. § 55-901, et seq. and/or the common law doctrine of Fraudulent
Conveyances.
4.3

As a result of John, Duclos and/or Freeman's participation

III

the

fraudulent transfers, John, Duclos and/or Freeman should be personally liable for all
fraudulent transfers, plus accrued interest, in an amount to be proved at trial.
fraudulent transfers should be avoided and/or rescinded, and all assets placed

All
In

a

constructive trust for the benefit of Reed.
V. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-MISREPRESENTATIONSfFRAUD
5.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
5.2

AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, and/or Duclos made

statements of fact regarding pay, finances, transfer(s), loan guarantees, and/or services
provided to other entities, transaction(s), payment of debts to Reed, and/or rights granted
to Reed by AlA Services or AlA Insurance; such statements of fact were false; such false
statements were material; AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman
knew or should have known the falsity of such statements; AlA Services, AlA Insurance,
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John, Duclos and/or Freeman intended to induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the
falsity of such statements; and Reed relied on such statements; Reed had a right to rely on
such false statements.
5.3

As a result of AlA Services, AlA, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's acts,

false statements, and/or omissions, Reed was damaged as consequence or proximate
result of such acts, false statements, and/or omissions.

VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONVERSION
6.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
6.2

AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's conduct

constitutes the willful interference with Reed's property and money which should have
been paid to him, without lawful justification, which deprived Reed of the possession of
such money and/or property.
6.3

As a result of the AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or

Freeman's acts and/or conduct, Reed has been severely damaged and is entitled to
damages proven at trial.

VII. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ALTER EGO
7.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
7.2

Because of the fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts and/or

omissions of John, Duclos, Freeman and/or other shareholders of AlA Services, the
corporate veil of AlA Services should be pierced thereby holding John, Duclos, and/or
Freeman and/or certain shareholders of AlA Services personally liable for all

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT - 13

l17Z-

indebtedness to Reed as equity requires such action.

VIII. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION-EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION
8.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
8.2

Donna Taylor is the holder of Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services,

and such shares were issued to her as a result of a dissolution action between her and
Reed. If not for AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's
fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts, Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares
would have been redeemed by AIA Services and/or AlA. As of the date of this Second
Amended Complaint, over $500,000 must be paid to Donna Taylor to redeem her Series
A Preferred Shares.
8.3

Reed is entitled to be equitably indemnified by AlA Services, John,

Duclos and/or Freeman for any sums owed to Donna Taylor because of AlA Services'
failure to timely redeem her Series A Preferred Shares as required.

IX. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ACCOUNT STATEDIMONIES DUE
9.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
9.2

In or about 2002 or 2003, John owed AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance

at least $307,271. In order to extinguish John's liabilities to AlA Services and/or AlA
Insurance, John debited Reed's Promissory Note with a payment of at least $307,271 and
credited John's indebtedness with a payment of at least $307,271. John did not obtain
Reed's approval or consent to transfer funds between John's indebtedness and Reed's
Promissory Note and John has not tendered payment of these funds to Reed. This debt
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constitutes a personal loan from Reed to John. This account stated and/or debt remains
unpaid, along with any others which may have occurred but which Reed is unaware of at
this time, the dates and exact amount of which will be proven at trial.
9.3

Reed is entitled to the payment of all amounts owed by John as a result of

all transfers between Reed's Promissory Note and John indebtedness from AlA Services
and/or AlA Insurance. Reed is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on all amounts owed
to him by John for all such accounts stated and/or debts from the date of such transfers
until payment in full is made to Reed.
9.4

As a direct and/or proximate result of John's acts and/or omissions, John

are in breach of their obligations to pay Reed and Reed is entitled to damages.
X. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-UNJUST ENRICHMENT
10.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
10.2

AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have retained

the benefit of their fraudulent, wrongful, improper and/or overreaching conduct and/or
transfers.
10.3

John and/or anyone or more of the other Defendants would be unjustly

emiched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets, securities, loans, advances and/or
other services received through AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, all of which funds
should have been paid to Reed.
XI. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
11.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
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11.2

Reed has a valid security interest in AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's

commissions, among other security interests. AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos
and/or Freeman fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly used funds, which should
have been paid to Reed, for investments, personal use, inappropriate transactions, loans,
advances, self-dealing, and/or other wrongful and/or inappropriate purposes.
11.3

AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's acts and/or

omissions resulted in John, Duclos and/or Freeman's acquisition of money, securities
and/or services which should have been paid to Reed but through their fraud,
misrepresentation(s), bad faith, and/or overreaching activities; and AlA Services, John,
Duclos, Freeman, and/or other entities' retention of the money, investments, securities
and property would be unjust.
11.4

Reed requests the imposition of a constructive trust for his benefit to

recover the proceeds of all such fraudulent, overreaching, improper, self-dealing,
wrongful and/or inappropriate transfers, acts and/or omissions.

XII. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION-DIRECTOR LIABILITY
12.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
12.2

John, Duclos and Freeman should be held personally liable for all

fraudulent, wrongful, improper, overreaching transactions, transfers, loans, advances,
loan guarantees and fraudulent conveyances which occurred during their tenure as
member of the Board of Directors and as officers of AlA Service and AlA Insurance.
III
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XIII. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
13.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
13.2

Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security

Agreement, and Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the pledged shares of
AlA Insurance (and all ancillary rights, including, without limitation, to vote the shares to
remove the board and take all actions related in any way to his right to vote the pledged
shares), sell the shares of AIA Insurance at public or private sale, judicially sell the
pledged shares in AlA Insurance, entitled to timely receive audited financial statements
and financial information, andJor seize all of the AlA Insurance and AlA Services'
commissions in the required Lock Box. When AlA Services became in Default, it lost its
right to vote the pledged shares of AlA Insurance and the right vested exclusively in
Reed.
13.3

Despite Reed's demands for AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos

andJor Freeman to comply with the provisions in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement, AlA Services, AlA Insurance,
John, Duclos andJor Freeman have refused to comply. Reed is entitled to the relief
afforded to him or reasonably contemplated under the foregoing agreements and such
other rights, remedies andJor relief as may be available under Idaho Code, including,
without limitation, any action or order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 et seq. andJor
Chapter 9 of Title 29 under Idaho Code.
13.4

Reed is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred, at or

before trial, in enforcing any provision of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
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Amended Security Agreement, andJor Restructure Agreement for relief sought before or
at trial.

XIV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Without waiving any claims, rights andJor remedies under any of the abovereferenced agreements, Reed respectfully requests the following relief:
14.1

For a judgment against AlA Services for the principal of $6,000,000, plus

accrued pre-judgment interest in excess of $2,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at
trial.
14.2

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the

Defendants from preventing Reed from exercising his right under the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement to vote the pledged shares in AlA Insurance and taking any ancillary
actions which relate in any way to voting the pledged shares, including, without
limitation, removing the board of directors of AlA Insurance and appointing a revised
board and such other actions he deems appropriate in his sole discretion as the exclusive
person entitled to vote all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance.
14.3

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the

Defendants from interfering with the actions taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007,
Consent in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance and the actions
taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of
Directors of AlA Insurance.
14.4

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants and

any entity owned, partially owned or operated by anyone or more of them from
interfering with, disturbing, and transferring any of AlA insurance's customers, contracts,
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agreements and business.
14.5

Until such time that Reed Taylor's vote of the pledged shares is honored

and he is permitted to operate AlA Insurance, Reed Taylor requests a preliminary and
permanent injunction against the Defendants as follows:
(a) Enjoining the Defendants from utilizing, transferring or disposing of
any funds, assets, labor, facilities or services of AIA Insurance for any
other person, entity or business, unless such transactions are armslength and payment is received by AlA Insurance prior to providing
such funds, assets, labor, facilities or services (e.g., no credit
arrangements for such activities).
(b) Enjoining the Defendants from disposing of, usmg, transferring or
utilizing any of the funds received from the lawsuit entitled In re:
Universe Liquidator Grain Growers Trust, et at v. Idaho Department
of Insurance a/k/a GGMIT suit. All funds from the foregoing should
be held in trust until further notice from the Court.
(c) Enjoining the Defendants from negotiating or entering into any loans,
credit arrangements, credit facilities, or borrowing any funds under
any loan, line-of-credit, credit facility, open account and the like for
which AlA Insurance is a guarantor or a signatory, unless utilized for
the exclusive benefit of AlA Insurance to provide funding for AIA
Insurance and approved by Reed Taylor or such other party appointed
by Reed Taylor or the Court.

III
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(d) Enjoining the Defendants from destroying, altering, deleting, purging,
and/or

removing

any

documents

(including

drafts,

proposals,

electronic files, email, back-up media and the like), property,
computers and the like from AlA Insurance's office.
(e) Enjoining the Defendants from advancing or lending any funds, assets
or services to R. John Taylor, 10Lee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie
Taylor or AlA Services without first obtaining written consent from
Reed Taylor or the Court.
(f) Enjoining the Defendants from entering into or negotiating any

substantive contracts or agreements without first obtaining approval
from Reed Taylor or the Court.
(g) Enjoining the Defendants from holding, calling or participating in any
shareholder meetings, board meeting, and/or executing any Consents
in Lieu of the foregoing without permitting Reed Taylor to vote the
pledged shares or take such other action permitted to him as the holder
ofthe right to vote all outstanding shares of AlA Insurance.
(h) Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets,
or services of AlA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers
or payments for the legal services for R. John Taylor, Bryan Freeman,
10Lee Duclos, and Connie Taylor.
(i) Enjoining R. John Taylor to only be entitled to reasonable
compensation for work performed for AlA Insurance.

R. John

Taylor's time expended for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and any
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other entities partially owned by him shall be paid by the appropriate
entity and not AlA Insurance or AlA Services.

G) Enjoining the Defendants from not having AlA Insurance and AlA
Services accurately and properly itemizing every employee's daily
time sheet to reflect the number ofhour(s) performed for AlA Services
and AlA Insurance and such other unrelated entities such as Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. and Sound Insurance.
(k) Enjoining the Defendants from such other actions as may be
reasonably contemplated from this Second Amended Complaint, the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended Security Agreement,
the Restructure Agreement and/or which would otherwise protect Reed
Taylor's interests.
14.6

For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants

requiring them to timely and promptly provide Reed Taylor with all financial information
required under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
14.7

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining John from entering

the offices of AlA Insurance, if necessary.
14.8

For such other relief or Court orders as Reed may request before or at trial

to enforce his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security
Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement, including, without limitation, any action or
order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 et seq. and/or Chapter 9 of Title 29 under Idaho
Code.

III
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14.9

For the avoidance of the improper and/or fraudulent transfers of funds,

assets and/or services from AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance to John, entities partially
owned by John, and/or any other party who received such transfers under I.C. § 55-916,
et seq. and/or other applicable legal authority.

14.10 For judgment against John for $307,271, plus accrued interest for the
money he owed AlA Services which was improperly paid by transferring his
indebtedness to Reed's Promissory Note.
14.11 For a judgment against John for all amounts, plus pre-judgment interest, in
an amount to be proven at the time of trial.
14.12 For judgment against John, Duclos, and/or Freeman, jointly and severally,
for all funds, assets, services, property and/or any other benefit fraudulently transferred
and/or fraudulently conveyed, and which such transferred may not be avoided, rescinded
and/or paid to Reed.
14.13 For judgment against John, Duclos and/or Freeman, jointly and severally,
for amounts owed to Reed in an amount to be proven at the time of trial because AlA
Services and AlA Insurance are alter egos of John, Duclos and/or Freeman.
14.14 For the imposition of a construction trust for the benefit of Reed on all
funds, investments, loans, advances, securities, property, transactions, services and/or
self-dealing which were fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly made for the benefit
of AlA Services, AIA Insurance, Duclos, Freeman, John, and/or other parties or entities,
which sums should have been paid to Reed.
14.15 For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants from
transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing of any improperly and/or fraudulently
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obtained and/or transferred assets under I.C. § 55-916, et seq. and/or other applicable
legal authority.
14.16 For judgment and/or relief for all claims which conform to the evidence
obtained through discovery and/or forensic accounting.
14.17 Foran award of Reed's attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory
Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121.
14.18 For such other relief as Reed may request before or at the time of trial
and/or that the Court may find just, equitable, or warranted before or at the time of trial.
DATED this y"}/day of March, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

BY.AI~~r---Roderick C. Bond
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ned A. Cannon
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Reed 1. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the contents of this
Second Amended Complaint, know the contents of this Second Amended Complaint, and
believe that the facts in this Second Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best
of my knowledge and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

.2iotay of March, 2007.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
LOffJ 6@
My commission expires: lI24/2/)12

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT - 24

483

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint on the following
parties via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) )1.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(vJ Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) ):1.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(J/f Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

(if

Signed thiS$a:y of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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Michael E. McNichols
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.
321 13 th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-6538
Facsimile: (208) 743-9295
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.
and R. John Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 07-00208
MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Defendants AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and John Taylor submit this
memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
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I.INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction is based on the previously filed
Emergency Motion (1) to Enforce Shareholder Vote and board of Directors' Resolutions, and (2)
to confirm Termination of Counsel for AIA Insurance, Inc. (the "Emergency Motion"); the
previously filed affidavits; and the testimony already received at the March 1, 2007 hearing on
ALA's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
These defendants have already filed their memorandum in opposition to the
Emergency Motion, and that briefing is hereby incorporated by reference.

Moreover, Reed

Taylor's Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeks relief on the exact same issues upon which the
Court has already granted injunctive relief.

In the March 8, 2007 Opinion and Order on

Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Court entered a preliminary injunction as
follows:
restrammg the Plaintiff, Reed Taylor, from harassing and/or
interfering with the management of the businesses known as AIA
Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation without the express
permission of Defendant John Taylor, nor act or attempt to act as a
director or officer of ALA Insurance Inc. Reed Taylor is also not to
harass or annoy, directly or indirectly, any employee of ALA
insurance Services Corporation or ALA Insurance Inc., in person,
by telephone, or by written communications.
Order, p. 6.
In reaching that decision, the Court weighed the likelihood of success on the
merits and the potential for irreparable harm.
Reed Taylor's Motion for Preliminary injunction seeks to obtain the exact
opposite relief as that already granted by the court, i.e., mandatory injunctive relief permitting
him to vote the shares of ALA Insurance and permitting him to take over operation of ALA
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Insurance. The Court's previous decision that the injunctive relief standard weighs in favor of
preserving the status quo pending resolution of the issues on the merits necessarily means that
Reed Taylor cannot satisfy the preliminary injunction requirement to obtain the mandatory
injunctive relief he seeks.

II.ARGUMENT
A.

Reed Taylor Continues To Improperly and Prematurely Seek Final Adjudication on
the Merits.
Although he calls the motion a "Motion for Preliminary Injunction," it is clear

that Reed Taylor is seeking much more than injunctive relief.

Unlike injunctive relief to

maintain the status quo -- as the Court has already granted -- Reed Taylor seeks to disrupt the
status quo, a result that is particularly disfavored.

Moreover, Reed Taylor continues to

miscomprehend that injunctive relief to maintain the status quo is much more easily obtained
than the type of mandatory injunctive relief that seeks to alter the status quo. See Anderson v.
United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979) ("A mandatory injunction goes well beyond
simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite (and] is particularly disfavored.") (citations
omitted).
Moreover, Reed Taylor is not asking the Court to simply weigh the risk of
irreparable harm against the likelihood of success on the merits. Rather, he is asking the Court to
now issue a final ruling on the merits. This is evident in the proposed order granting preliminary
injunction he has submitted to the court. That proposed order makes the following Conclusions
of Law:
1. AIA Services is in default of the obligations owing to Reed
Taylor pursuant to the agreements and contracts identified in
paragraph 4 of the above Findings of Fact.
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2. Reed Taylor, as the holder of the right to vote all of the
outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, was and is entitled to vote all
of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance without holding a
meeting pursuant to I.C. § 30-1-704 ....
3. Defendants, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, R. John Taylor,
JoLee Duclos, and Bryan Freemen, have no right to interfere with
the corporate actions taken pursuant to such Consents.

A motion for preliminary injunction is not the right time for a court to make such
determinations on the merits.

These issues can only be resolved after discovery and an

opportunity to fully brief the issues in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

B.

Reed Taylor Improperly Seeks to Obtain the Relief He Seeks in His Complaint
Without Bringing the Case to Trial.
On a related note, the injunctive relief sought by Reed Taylor -- an order allowing

him to vote lAI Services shares and take control of AlA Insurance -- would effectively give
plaintiff the relief he seeks without bringing the case to trial. Idaho Courts do not allow for such
a result:
A temporary injunction will not usually be allowed where its effect
is to give the plaintiff the principle relief he seeks, without
bringing the cause to trial; neither should a preliminary injunction
be dissolved where its effect would be such as to give the
defendant the relief he seeks without bringing the cause to trial.

Rowland v. Kellogg Power & Water Co., 233 P. 869,872 (Idaho 1925).
C.

The Preliminary Injunction Standard is Not Satisfied
As set forth in more detail in AlA's prior briefing, Reed Taylor cannot meet the

preliminary injunction standard. The Court has already found that there is significant risk of
irreparable harm if the status quo is not maintained pending resolution on the merits. Moreover,
significant complex questions must be addressed before Reed Taylor can establish that he is
entitled to the relief he seeks, including the central questions of whether AlA is in default and
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whether Reed Taylor has any right to vote the Shares of AIA insurance. See Harris v. Cassia
County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988, 993-994 (1984) ("the substantial likelihood of
success necessary to demonstrate that appellants are entitled to the relief they demanded cannot
exist where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt") (emphasis
added).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants ask the Court to deny Reed Taylor's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of March, 2007.

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 26th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

_ _ _ _ u.S. MAIL
_ _ _ _ HAND DELIVERED
_ _ _ _ OVERNIGHT MAIL
_ _.X
TELECOPY (FAX)

~CtfuN~

Michael E. McNichols
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV 06-02855
Plaintiff,
v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

AFFIDAVII OF REED TAYLOR IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
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ORIGINAL

COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)

I, Reed Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and

am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action.

I make this Affidavit on my personal

knowledge.
2.

JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and John Taylor are attempting to obtain

funds from AlA Insurance, Inc. to pay their legal fees and costs through a shareholder
vote of AlA Services Corporation. Under the Bylaws of the corporations, they are not
permitted to get their fees paid because they did not comply with various requirements
and my claims against them involve failed obligations and duties as directors and officers
of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. A vote from AlA Insurance, Inc.
must be obtained before money can be transferred from AlA Insurance, Inc. to AlA
Services Corporation.
3.

Attached as Exhibit 1 are true and correct copIes of the following

documents which I obtained from Kay Hanchett, who is presently a shareholder of AlA
Services Corporation and a former employee of AlA Insurance, Inc.:
(a)

Letter from AlA Services Corporation to Shareholders dated March
16,2007;

(b)

Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Services
Corporation dated March 16, 2007;

(c)

Letter from R. John Taylor dated March 1,2007;

(d)

Letter from JoLee Duclos dated March 16,2007;
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(e)

Resignation Letter from 10Lee Duclos from the Board of AlA Services
Corporation dated February 22, 2007;

(f)

Resignation Letter from 10Lee Duclos from the Board of AlA
Insurance, Inc. dated February 22,2007;

(g)

Letter from Bryan Freeman dated March 16, 2007;

(h)

Resignation Letter from Bryan Freeman to the Board of AlA
Insurance, Inc. dated February 22, 2007; and

(i)

Resignation Letter from Bryan Freeman to the Board of AlA Services
Corporation dated February 22, 2007.

4.

In the past, AlA Insurance, Inc. has leased an automobile for 10hn Taylor.

I have seen 10hn Taylor driving a brand new Porsche Cayenne. I have also seen the
Porsche Cayenne parked in 10hn Taylor's reserved parking space at AlA Insurance, Inc.
when I have driven by there running errands.

I researched the price of Porsche

Cayenne's and the starting base price is over $60,000 as advertised by various dealers on
the internet. This illustrates what 10hn Taylor is doing with money that should be paid to
me and at times when AlA Services is insolvent if the vehicle is being paid for by AlA
Insurance, Inc.
5.

The Defendants' attempts to unlawfully and inappropriately obtain funds

from AlA Insurance, Inc. to pay for their legal fees and costs and to fund the lease or
purchase of the new Porsche Cayenne illustrates that the status quo is inappropriate and
unlawful and further illustrates the ramifications associated with the Court's erroneous
injunction issued against me. The Defendants are utilizing funds which I have a valid
security interest in for inappropriate purposes. The Court also has many exhibits and
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testimony which supports the inappropriate corporate actions at AlA Services
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.
6.

I respectfully demand that the Court orders the Defendants be required to

post a bond or cash security of $2,450,000 to protect me from damages and attorneys fees
and costs which I will incur from being VvTongfully enjoined. As seen by the Court in my
recent Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, the Defendants will be fighting me
on every legal issue simply to fight and for no valid reason. This will result in additional
attorneys' fees and costs to me and the Defendants will also incur additional fees and
costs, which could be paid by AlA Insurance, Inc. to my detriment. The above security is
based upon John Taylor's testimony regarding the value of AlA Insurance, Inc. being
$2,000,000 plus, together with attorneys' fees and costs estimated to be over $450,000,
i.e., the Court must ensure that there is sufficient security to cover my legal fees and
costs, and all legal fees and costs paid by AlA Insurance, Inc. for Bryan Freeman, JoLee
Duclos and John Taylor.
DATED: This 26 th day of March, 2007.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26 th day of March, 2007.

Notary Public for the State of Idaho
'8tm
Residing at:
My commission expires: 1/2"1/20 i 2.

Le..un
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of the Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction and Plaintiff s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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AlA Services Corporation
One Lewis Clark Plaza
PO Box 538
Lewiston, Idaho 83501·0538
(208) 799·9000 FAX (208) 746·8159

AlA Services
March 16, 2007

Dear Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation.
As President and Chairman of AlA Services Corporation , I am calling a special meeting
of the shareholders. I ask you for your support in defending the Company, its whollyowned subsidiary, AlA Insurance, Inc., its directors and shareholders from a lawsuit that
has been filed by the former majority shareholder, Reed J. Taylor.
The former majority shareholder has filed suit in the 2nd District Court of Idaho against
the Company, AlA Insurance, Inc., directors, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and me.
The former majority shareholder alleges that the company is in default of its obligations
to him, that the directors have thwarted his efforts to allow him to legally take control of
AlA Insurance, Inc., and for other acts that have allegedly diminished the assets of AlA
Insurance to his detriment.
The Company and other defendants deny the accusations and have pledged to
vigorously defend the Company and themselves against the allegations. The Company
intends to file counterclaims against the plaintiff for damages for his continuous and
nefarious interference with the operations of the Company, inappropriate and damaging
actions with regard to the Company's agency force, and for slander against the business
to the public and the associations which we represent.
This special meeting has been called to authorize payment of attorneys' fees for the
current Board of Directors, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. Since the
former majority shareholder has sued all the current directors, we are asking for
shareholder authorization to expend corporate funds to defend against the action.
Idaho Code 30-1-853 provides that a corporation may advance funds to pay the
reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party to a proceeding because
he/she is a director. Usually this authority to advance funds for defending against
lawsuits is granted by the disinterested directors of the Board of Directors. In this case,
the entire Board is named in the suit. Therefore, through this vote of the shareholders,
we ask for your support of the resolution.
If you would like a copy of the complaint filed in this matter, please contact me at
208.799.9000. Thank you very much.

EX<fI113IT.
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AlA SERVICES CORPORATION
111 Main Street
Lewiston, 10 83501

NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS
TO BE HELD March 28, 2007
10:00 a.m. (Pacific Time)

To Shareholders:
A Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation will be
held at the offices of AlA Insurance, 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, in the
second floor conference room, at 9:00 a.m. (pn on Wednesday, March 28,
2007, for the following purpose:
1)

Authorization of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 301-853(3)(b) for R. John Taylor, JoLee K. Duclos and Bryan
Freeman.
.

9;~t~S:~~
JoLee K. Duclos
Corporate Secretary
March 16,2007

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
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R. JOHN TAYLOR
2020 Broadview
Lewiston,ID 83501

March 1, 2007
AlA Services Corporation
P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501
Re:

Reed 1. Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et. al.

TO: Directors and Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation

I'm writing this letter pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-853 and the Articles of
Incorporation and ARTICLE XI of the By-Laws of the corporation. I have been named
in this litigation as a defendant in my capacity as an officer and director of AlA Services
Corporation.
I'm writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of
conduct described in Idaho Code § 30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases that my conduct was never opposed to
the best interests of the corporation, that indemnification is permissible under the Articles
ofIncorporation of AIA Services Corporation and with respect to any employee plan, that
I reasonably believed that my actions were in the best interests of the participants and
beneficiaries of the plan.
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory
indemnification under § 30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under § 30-1-854 or 301-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in § 30-1-851, Idaho
Code.
Very truly yours,
r"

.'

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
RECONSIDERA TION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

JoLee K. Duclos
2345 Reservoir Road
Clarkston, W A 99403

March 16, 2007

TO:

R. John Taylor
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Services Corporation
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Insurance, Inc.

Dear Sirs:
I have enclosed a copy of the following documents:
);>
);>

Resignation as a Director of AlA Services Corporation; and
Resignation as a Director of AlA Insurance, Inc.

As you are aware, the above corporations, as well as me individually, are defendants in a
lawsuit filed in Nez Perce County under Case number CV-07-00208. I am writing this
letter pursuant to Idaho Code §30-1-853 and the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of
the above corporations. I have been named in this litigation as a defendant in my
capacity as an officer and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
I am writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of
conduct described in Idaho Code §30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases my conduct was never opposed to the
best interests of the corporation; and that indemnification is permissible under the
Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory
indemnification under §30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under §30-1-854 or §301-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in §30-1-8S1, Idaho
Code.
Sincerely,

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Resignation as Director of
AlA Services Corporation

TO:

The Board of Directors of AlA Services Corporation

I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Services Corporation,
effective 5:00 p.m. Pa~ific Standard Time, February 22,2007.
Dated this 22 nd day of February, 2007.

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Resignation as Director of
AlA Insurance, Inc.

TO:

The Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc.

I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Insurance, Inc .• effective
5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22, 2007.
Dated this 22 nd day of February, 2007.

J~{(:J~oJ

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Gol

Bryan Freeman
425 Crestline Circle Drive
Lewiston,ID 83501

March 16,2007

TO:

R. John Taylor
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AlA Insurance, Inc.

Dear Sirs:
I have enclosed a copy of the following documents:
}>
}>

Resignation as a Director of AlA Services Corporation; and
Resignation as a Director of AlA Insurance, Inc.

As you are aware, the above corporations, as well as me individually, are defendants in a
lawsuit filed in Nez Perce County under Case number CV-07-00208. I am writing this
letter pursuant to Idaho Code §30-1-853 and the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of
the above corporations. I have been named in this litigation as a defendant in my
capacity as an officer and director of AlA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
I am writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of
conduct described in Idaho Code §30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases my conduct was never opposed to the
best interests of the corporation; and that indemnification is permissible under the
Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory
indemnification under §30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under §30-1-854 or §301-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in §30-1-851, Idaho
Code.
Sincerely,

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Resignation as Director of
AlA Insurance, Inc.

TO:

The Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc.

I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Insurance, Inc., effective
5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22, 2007.
Dated this 22 nd day of February, 2007.

Bry

Freeman

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Resignation as Director of
AlA Services Corporation

TO:

The Board of Directors of AlA Services Corporation

I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Services Corporation,
effective 5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22,2007.
Dated this 22 nd day of February, 2007.

Bri n Freeman

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV 06-02855
Plaintiff,

v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TA YLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

) ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERlCK C. BOND - 1
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ORIGINAL

I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and

am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff Reed Taylor. I make this Affidavit on my
personal knowledge.
2.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the certified transcript

of the hearing on the Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in this action which
was held on March 1, 2007. I ordered this transcript on March 7, 2007, and did not
receive it until March 23,2007.
3.

On or about March 22,2007, my client provided me copies of a letter from

AlA Services signed by John Taylor (and related documents) which were mailed to
shareholders of AlA Services Corporation requesting approval for the company to pay
the attorneys' fees and costs of the directors in this action. Because of the nature of this
case and the accounting issues going back over a decade, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman's attorney fees and costs will easily exceed $250,000. These funds paid
from AlA Services Corporation would be obtained from AlA Insurance, Inc. as AlA
Services Corporation's sole source of funds to Reed Taylor'S detriment. In addition to
having the right to vote the shares of AlA Insurance, Inc., Reed Taylor has a valid
security interest in all commissions of AIA Insurance, Inc. It is also significant to be
mindful of the fact that John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman are not requesting
a shareholder vote from AlA Insurance, Inc.-the corporation where the funds will be
obtained to pay their attorneys' fees and costs.
4.

In addition, John Taylor testified that the value of AlA Insurance, Inc. in

terms of shareholder equity should be $2,000,000 plus (See Exhibit A, p. 126, 11 1-2).

5ot,
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND - 2

Based upon the value provided by John Taylor, any preliminary injunction granted which
enjoins Reed Taylor from voting the shares of AlA Insurance, Inc. should include
sufficient security to protect Reed Taylor for damages, attorneys' fees and costs should
he ultimately set aside such an injunction. I believe that Reed Taylor's attorneys' fees
and costs which he has incurred and will incur because of being enjoined will exceed
$200,000. In addition, the longer that Reed Taylor is prevented from voting the shares
and operating AlA Insurance, Inc., every dollar spent for inappropriate purposes is a
dollar that could have been paid to Reed Taylor.
5.

If the Court grants a preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor, the Court

should set security in an amount sufficient to cover Reed Taylor'S damages (the present
value of AlA Insurance, Inc.), his attorneys' fees and costs and the attorneys' fees and
costs incurred by John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, and Bryan Freeman because such funds
would never had been tendered for their defense but for a preliminary injunction
preventing Reed Taylor from taking any actions relating to his vote of the shares and
from being an officer and board member of AlA Insurance, Inc. Thus, the Court should
set a bond or cash deposit of $2,450,000 as security for any preliminary injunction
preventing Reed Taylor from taking any action pursuant his vote of the shares of AlA
Insurance, Inc.
DATED: This 26th day of March, 2007.

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERlCK C. BOND - 3

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26 th day of March, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction on the following party(s) via the methodes)
indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Signed this 26th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.

Roderic
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

3

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

4

Plaintiff,

)
)

5

vs.

) Case No. CV 07-00208
)

6
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AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho)
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC,
)
An Idaho Corporation; R. JOHN
)
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,
)
Individually and the community
)
Property comprised thereof;
)
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person;
)
And JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,)

10

)

Defendants.

)
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MARCH 1,2007, 1:30 P.M.

2

3
4
5

THE COURT: Good morning everybody, we are on the
record this morning in CV 07-208 entitled Reed Taylor versus
AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance Incorporated,

6

R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos.

7
8

This matter came before the Court last Monday on first of all a

9

order which I granted, and due to some scheduling problems, had

motion filed by certain defendants for a temporary restraining

one, was there default, and, two, did Mr. Reed Taylor have the
right to vote the shares are absolutely identical to all the
matters before the Court.
THE COURT: I did get that filing, Mr. Cressman,
and I also should note at this time because J intend to take
this up, Mr. McNichol's Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs
Emergency Motion and Motion to Reconsider That Order Granting

8
9
10
11

the Motion to Shorten Time, Mr. McNichols· supported that with a

12

to make clear as a preliminary matter. We received six

memorandum and also a request to shorten time to hear that, so

10
11
12
13
14

Plaintiff Mr. Reed Taylor which was entitled an emergency

13

affidavits yesterday afternoon and I don't have a written

motion seeking certain relief which I also in essence agreed on

14

motion to strike but we will be moving to strike the

15

short notice to hear at the same time as this preliminary

15

declarations of Duclos, McFarland and Peterson on various

16
17
18
19

injunction hearing. As I stated in court on Monday, J did not

16

grounds including the fact that it's not relevant, that they

have a great deal of familiarity with this file at that time, I

17

are conclusionary statements without foundation, that there is

received a number of submissions and J have now received a

18

hearsay. We will be moving to strike all but paragraph 5 of

number of additional submissions in anticipation of this

to schedule the hearing for the preliminary injunction for
today's date.
Also on Monday there was filed a motion by the

I guess I'd like to take that up first. Mr. McNichols.
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, one more thing I want

hearing. So J feel J have a little bit more familiarity with

19
20

the declaration of Aimee Gordon under the same grounds. And

20
21
22

it today than I did on Monday.

21

John Reed for some of the same grounds.

23

appearances on behalf of AlA Services Corporation, AlA

22
23

hearing, Mr. Reed is present here today. Rather than making

At this time Mr. McNichols is present having entered

the dec -- excuse me, I call them declarations, affidavits of

And also we understood this was an evidentiary

24

Insurance, and R. John Taylor. Mr. Hally is present having

24

objections to the lengthy affidavits, I think Mr. Reed should

25

entered a Notice of Appearance on behalf of the Defendant

25

testify, Mr. John Reed should testify -- I'm sorry,

7

5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

the way. We also have a preliminary matter, and that is we had

20
21

Connie Taylor. The other two defendants, Bryan Freeman and
JoLee Duclos are represented by Mr. Gittins who was present on
Monday for our hearing but is not present today. The Plaintiff
Mr. Reed Taylor is present along with his attorneys of record
Mr. Bond and Mr. Cressman. I should note the presence of the
Defendant Mr. John Taylor as well in the courtroom.
Mr. McNichols, are you ready to proceed this morning?
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the court please, I am ready to
proceed on certain of the motions that are pending, but I'm not

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

John Taylor. I do have problems with names sometimes.
THE COURT: I'm going to have the same situation.
MR. CRESSMAN: So we would as that Mr. -- all my
remarks if I said "John Reed," I meant "John Taylor," should
testify because we understood this was -- and then we can
cross-examine him on the affidavit or whatever his testimony
is, we can object to the relevancy or the lack of foundation to
hearsay, et cetera.
THE COURT: I understand. Well, might as well --

ready to proceed on the Plaintiffs emergency motion.

10

THE COURT: I understand. Thank you.

11

Mr. Cressman. Just so, I guess, preliminarily, Mr. Taylor,

Mr. Hally, you have recently entered an appearance

12

Mr. Taylor, I don't know either one of you real well, but I'm
going to be making some comments today and I'm going to have to

I guess I'll get to that objection in a little while,

on behalf of Defendant Connie Taylor and I have also seen the

13

submission that you made. I'm not gOing to ask you if you are

14

be identifying both of you. If I call you by your first names,

ready to proceed.

15

I am not intending any disrespect to either of you. I'm simply

16

trying to keep you straight. So it's not normally something I

Mr. Cressman and Mr. Bond, which one of you is

17

normally do, but it's probably the only way I'm going to be

18

able to keep everything straight today. So just as

filed a clarification with regard to the emergency motion

19
20

during the course of the day.

going to be carrying the ball this morning?
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, I will, your Honor, most of

Mr. Cressman just had problems, I'm going to try to avoid that

indicating that it was as was indicated in footnote 10 and in

21

22

the balance of the motion, also a motion for injunctive relief.

23
24
25

Just to clarify that, to the extent necessary, we filed a

22
23

motion to shorten time. I will point out, I think it's

24

Shorten Time. It is my intention to hear that at this time, so

evident, the two issues that are before the Court today, namely

25

in terms of the motion to order -- for an order shortening

With that, Mr. McNichols, I guess I'd like to take
up your motion to strike the Plaintiffs emergency motion and
the motion to reconsider the Order granting the Motion to

6/2-
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10

8

time, I grant that, Mr. MCNichols, and I'm going to allow you

2
3
4

to proceed on your motion at this time.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you, your Honor. If it
please the Court and Counsel, we ask the Court to strike the

5

Plaintiff's Emergency Motion because it is not a motion

6
7
8
9

recognized by or authorized by the Idaho Rules of Civil

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Procedure. It is not a motion for judgment on the pleadings

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

The reason is pretty similar because you cannot be sufficientiy
confident that they are right. And only if you are
suffiCiently confident that they are right and they would win
on the merits, can you grant a mandatory preliminary
injunction.
Now, I have another point and it's not in the
brief because I didn't think about it until this morning. And

It is not a motion for summary judgment because it does not

8
9

even allege that there are no genuine issues of material fact,

10

to equitable relief because the Plaintiff has unclean hands.

and as the Court now knows from the all the affidavits, there

11

The plaintiff and his aSSOCiates at 3:00 o'clock on a Sunday

are numerous genuine issues of material fact.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

and cannot qualify as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

It is also not a motion for a preliminary
injunction for a number of reasons, but I think primarily
because it does not request injunctive relief. It requests,
quote, "Enforcement of shareholder vote and board of directors
resolutions." That's the first thing it requests. And the
second thing it requests is, quote, "Confirmation of the
termination of Michael J. McNichols," and my firm, et cetera,
as counsel. So that's what it requests.
And it's unusual, and I think evident that they
are not requesting injunctive relief because they say that
there is no reason for a bond. It's hard for me to imagine any
injunctive relief that could be granted that would not require
the issuance of a bond.

that is the Plaintiff here seeks equitable relief of a
mandatory preliminary injunction, and Plaintiff is not entitled

morning entered the offices of AlA Insurance, Inc., with a
number of people including a locksmith and proceeded to change
the locks. The police were called -- were called by the
building manager, Mr. Courtney, whose affidavit you have. And
Mr. Courtney asked the police to arrest the Plaintiff. And the
police asked the Plaintiff who he was, and he said he was
John Taylor.
I have the police report that's been marked as an
exhibit, your Honor, and I would like to offer that. I have a
copy for counsel if they don't have it.
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, at this point I'm going
to object to any exhibits here. This is a -- it appears that
counsel is arguing the merits of whether the Plaintiff is
entitled to a preliminary injunction or not. I understood he

11

9

1
2

-- the next reason -- excuse me, let me -- sorry. If it were a

3
4

motion for preliminary injunction which we say it Isn't, but if

1
2
3

it were, it should be denied because, A, as I said a minute

4

Mr. Cressman's objection to the submiSSion of that exhibit at

5

ago, it doesn't seek injunctive relief. B, if it does seek

5

this pOint.

6
7
8
9

injunctive relief, it's not negative relief, it's not to

6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The next reason that the motion should be stricken

preserve the status quo, It's mandatory relief which is almost
never granted particularly in a preliminary injunction. C, the
third reason why, If it is a motion for preliminary injunction,
it would have to be denied is because it involves extremely
complex issues of fact and law. And preliminary injunctions
are almost never granted where complex issues of fact and law
exist because the Court is unable on three days notice to make
a determination that the moving party is clearly entitled to
relief on the merits.
And it's interesting, your Honor, that both
parties rely on the Idaho Supreme Court case of Harris versus
Cassia County. And that -- It's not a brand new case either,
it's a 1984 case, but the Court said there in part, "The
substantial likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that
appellants are entitled to relief they demanded, cannot exist
where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free
from doubt."
So if there are complex issues of fact and law,
the courts do not grant motions for preliminary injunction.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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was trying to strike our motion.
THE COURT: I agree. I'm not gOing to accept any
evidence at this point in time, Mr. McNichols, so I'll sustain

MR. MCNICHOLS: I'd like to make then an offer of
proof, your Honor, with this exhibit. May I at least offer and
hand it to the clerk so -- and I would tell your Honor that it
represents -- that it includes a statement by the officer that
he asked who the person was, and he said it was John Taylor,
and I won't go any further.
The third point I would like to make in support of
our Motion to Strike the Emergency Motion Is that hearing that
motion would be in excess of your jurisdiction. The motion is
totally outside of the pleadings. The pleadings in a civil
action in our state consist of the complaint and an answer,
perhaps a counterclaim and a reply. The complaint controls the
discovery in the case and controls the relevance of the
evidence to be admitted In the case. The hearing of the
Plaintiff's motion is essentially a trial on the merits. It's
not some preliminary relief, it's a decision on the merits of a
claim that is not included in the pleadings of a claim that was
first asserted 72 hours ago, as to which there has been no
opportunity for discovery, and as to which we have not had
adequate time to gather evidence and prepare for trial.

151~

14

12

And we suggest to your Honor that the holding of a

2

trial on the merits in response to a so-called emergency motion

3
4

would be outside of your jurisdiction. And 50 for those

5

hear that motion today, and instead of hearing it, to strike

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

reasons, we ask your Court to reconsider your earlier order to

it.
Now, as an alternative, as we mentioned in our
brief, if your Honor determines not to reconsider your deCision
to hear that motion and if you deCide to hear it, we would ask
your Honor to give us a period of ten days within which to
apply to the Supreme Court for a writ to determine whether your
Honor has the jurisdiction to hear an emergency motion raising
a claim that is not in the pleadings which essentially is -the deCision in which would be a trial on the merits after 72
hours after the motion is filed with no chance for an
opportunity to conduct discovery or prepare.
So, your Honor, we would ask you to reconsider
your motion, to shorten the time for hearing that motion, and
to strike it. Thank you very much.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. McNiChols.
Mr. Hally, do you have anything that you'd like to

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, they were served Monday with
the emergency motion and the declarations. They were served
yesterday with our notice -- or the day before that with a
Notice for Clarification and the Motion to Shorten Time setting
forth the hearing date on Tuesday. Yesterday they were served
with the same papers the Court got yesterday which included the
two volumes of exhibits and the memorandum. I might also add
that, you know, Mrs. Taylor is not germane to the matters
before us. She had no right to vote the shares of AlA
Insurance, all those shares were owned by -- the right to vote
was either held by Mr. Reed Taylor or AlA Services. She had no
right to get notice of any meetings of shareholders. And,
frankly, I don't understand what the purpose of her
participation would be in this hearing.
Second, getting now to the motion that was raised,
the Motion to Strike, this motion was cobbled together on a
very rapid basis when we understood that something was coming
down the pike. If I'd a had more time, your Honor, it would
have been done more artfully. We did put in footnote 10 the
relief that the same -- of the motion under the same reasoning,
Reed Taylor's also entitled to a TRO pursuant to Idaho Rule of

22

Civil Procedure 65, and all of the above arguments in evidence

time, we would join in motions filed by Mr. McNichols. I would

23
24

authorizes such relief. And we also address the bond issue

like to point out that especially in the alternative relief

25

there because no cost, damages, or attorney's fees would result

say relative to that motion?
MR. HALLY: Your Honor, especially looking at the

submitted in support of his motion fully supports and

13

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

requested that the hearing if you do not grant the motion to
strike, to at least stay the hearing for sometime. Although in
addition to allowing for a writ to be pursued to determine
whether or not you have jurisdiction. With regard to
Miss Taylor, to date we have not received formal notice of
today's hearing. We heard it through the grape vine that
hearing was occurring today. Miss Taylor is down in Boise.
haven't even had time to review all the documents that have
been filed, so we stand at a very precarious position of being
able -- if we move forward, we are simply not prepared.
And I have a hearing before Judge Stegner in this
courthouse on another -- on a summary judgment argument, and so
I cannot stay if this hearing goes beyond 10:00 o'clock. So we
would at least request if you do not grant the motion to
strike, to not allow the hearing to move forward today and
reschedule for another date. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Hally.
Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN; Yes, your Honor. First with
respect to Mr. -- counsel, the comments by Connie Taylor here
this morning. She was served with the pleadings, her counsel
was served with our pleadings Monday. They were served with
the brief -THE COURT: You are talking about Monday's

15

1
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5
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9
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15
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20
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22
23
24
25

pleadings?
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in issuing a TRO in favor of Reed Taylor, the Court would not
be required to order security to be posted for Reed Taylor.
And I would also add on the bond issue, because this
man's owed eight million dollars, any damages that might be
accrued against him would be significantly less than that if he
was to be found to have wrongfully acted and under prevailing
Idaho law, no bond should be required.
In order that there be no mistake on this issue,
we filed what was called a Notice of Clarification making it
very clear on Tuesday that our motion should be considered, one
for injunctive relief, and our injunctive relief should be
construed to maintain the status quo.
Now, we have a very different view of what the
status quo is than Defendants. The status quo here is the
result of shareholder action. It's not before the vote taken
by Mr. Reed Taylor, it's after the vote. And I might add, it's
after two notices of a shareholder meeting that under Idaho law
are required can be called by 20 percent of those holdings, the
voting rights, not the shares, the voting rights which the
Defendants denied him the opportunity.
Now, so No.1, Plaintiff's motion, I believe, is
proper before the Court under the equitable jurisdiction of the
court which is broad and sweeping. And in that connection,
I'll call the Court's attention to the Idaho case of Smith
versus Dickerson. It's the Idaho cite is 50 Idaho 477 PaCific

5Jtj
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18

16

cite 297, Pacific 402 which addresses is the broad equitable

2

powers of the court. It's also proper under CR 65 as indicated

3

in the motion originally and as indicated by the Notice of

4

Clarification which we have -- out of an abundance of caution,

5

we sought a motion to shorten time on that.

6

7

Now, there's a question that we are somehow not

1
2
3
4
5

default under various provisions of the restructure ag reement,

6

amended stock pledge agreement and amended security agreement

terms of the promissory note, i.e., they are in default."
Paragraph 2.17, "On or about December 22" -- and
the evidence will show that's really December 12, 2006, "Reed
provided AlA Services Corporation with a written notice of

8
9
10
11

which the Defendants relief rests. They have no answer. And

7
8
9
10

that is the nature of a preliminary injunction, there happened

11

amended complaint, the principle amount owed to Reed under the

12

to be a pending case and that's why they filed their situation

12

promissory note plus accrued interest of over two million
doliars has not been paid in full as required."

within the scope of the pleadings, and I would beg to differ.
And I would point out before I read the key portions of the
amended complaint to the Court that there is no pleading on

13

and events transpired, and that's why we are asking for

13

14

equitable relief here as well under the auspices of the

14

15
16
17
18
19
20

preliminary injunction statute.

the Defendants had, because it could not be farther from the

15
16
17
18

truth that the Defendants did not have full and complete notice

19

And the complaint, just so they had adequate
notice, and I wanted to address the notice of these issues that

for the failure of AlA Services Corporation to pay amounts due
under the promissory notice required. AlA Services Corporation
and AlA have failed to cure the default." Another issue here
today, there is a default. "As of this date of the first

The principle default, 2.18. "Despite Reed's
demands, AlA Services Corporation, AlA, John Freeman and/or
Duclos have failed to comply with the terms of restructure
agreement, amended stock pledge agreement," and skipping, "and
amended security agreement." Under the amended stock pledge
agreement, the right to vote all of AlA's shares terminated for

for more than three months -- or almost three months of the

20

AlA Services Corporation and became vested in Reed upon the

21
22

exact issues that are going to be heard by the Court today, and

21

occurrence of a defau It. AlA Services Corporation was in

I will address that in a minute. But first the amended

23

complaint, and I'm going to read sections beginning on

22
23

the shares, to appoint a new board of directors for AlA.

24

paragraph 2.8, and I don't know if the Court has that in front

24

The second issue, default, 2.19. "On December

25

of him.

25

2006 Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a special

default long before Reed demanded to exercise his right to vote

17

1
2
3
4

5
6
7

THE COURT: I do and I have reviewed both the
original complaint and the first --

19

1

shareholder meeting of AlA for December 26, 2006. AlA Services

2

Corporation, AlA, and/or John refused to honor Reed's request

3

by representing that AlA's offices were closed on

couple of words, "AlA Services Corporation and AlA also agreed

4

December 26th, 2006. On or about December 19,2007, Reed hand

to contemporaneously execute a security agreement and a stock

5

delivered another demand for a special shareholder meeting for

pledge agreement among other agreements and documents."

6

February 5 pursuant to his rights under the amended stock

MR. CRESSMAN: The complaint in 2.8 skipping a

Paragraph 2.9, second sentence, "Contemporaneously with the

7
8
9
10

pledge agreement. Through a letter from DuClos, AlA refused

8
9
10
11

we are going -- well, did he have a right to vote the stock,

11

Now, with regard to the relief sought, injunctive

12

second issue. First issue was there a default.

12

relief was sought in paragraph 13.17 for an injunction against

13

the Defendants from transferring, encumbering or otherwise

execution of the restructure agreement, the parties executed an
amended and restated stock pledge agreement." Amended stock
pledge agreement, that's -- that's one of the first issues that

13

Paragraph 2.11, "Under the terms of the amended

Reed's request and denied that he had the right to call a
meeting to vote the AlA shares. Despite Reed's demands, AlA
refused to hold a speCial shareholder meeting."

14

stock pledge agreement, AlA Services Corporation pledged all of

14

disposing of or improperly or fraudulently obtained and/or

15
16
17
18
19
20

the outstanding shares in AlA to Reed as partial security for

15
16
17
18

transferred assets, and/or under Idaho Code 5519, that's Sec,

all claims which conform to the evidence obtained through

cured, all of AlA Services Corporation's rights to vote the

19

discovery."

pledge shares, and AlA terminated and became immediately vested

20

21
22

in Reed. In addition to other means, the failure to timely pay

21

may request at or before trial and/or that the Court may find

Reed under the promissory note or down payment note constituted

just, equitable or warranted at or before trial."

23

a default."

22
23
24

operative facts were there, default, right to vote the shares.

25

I'll point out the exhibits here that were talked about on

AlA Services Corporation's indebtedness to Reed under the
agreements. The amended stock pledge agreement also provided
that upon the occurrence of a default which was not timely

24
25

Paragraph 2.15, last sentence. "During all
relevant times, AlA Services has failed to comply with the

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND
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and/or any other applicable legal authority.
Paragraph 13.8, "For judgment and/or relief for

Paragraph 13.10, "For such other relief as Reed

Under Idaho law, notice pleading is at issue, the

5/5

22

20

1

December 12 which is Exhibit F of Plaintiffs both to the

1
2

application for a preliminary injunction, the Court may order

affidavit of Mr. Reed Taylor and to the Plaintiff's, exhibits

3

the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and

Monday, I believe, the notice of default letter dated

"Before or after the commencement of a hearing of an

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

file her affidavit citing her objections and her interest in

19

20

this.

20

to the Supreme Court, so be it, but I believe the motion is

21
22

completely appropriate by Mr. Reed Taylor and should be

21
22
23
24
25

for this hearing today what is set forth -MR. MCNICHOLS: If the court please, I think I
should pose the same objection to counsel offering the exhibits
that he posed to my offer of exhibits.
MR. CRESSMAN: The point here is to indicate the
notice that the Defendants have had of these very issues.
THE COURT: Well, I believe that that's accurate.
This dispute did not just come up, I mean this has been
ongoing, I think, between the parties, and I understand that,
Mr. Cressman. So go ahead, but I understand that this is not
been -MR. HALLY: If I may -THE COURT: Mr. Hally, do you need to go attend
your other hearing?
MR. HALLY: I do need to leave and Miss Taylor did

THE COURT: Go ahead, you are excused, Mr. Hally.
Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Cressman, but you can go

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

ahead with your argument. But I want you to understand, I now

23

have had the last couple of days to review a lot of this stuff,

24

probably not the detail that I'd like to ultimately have, but I

25

consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even when
this consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon
an application for preliminary injunction which would be
admissible in the trial of the merits becomes part of the
record on the trial and need not be repeated upon the trial."
And so I believe the motion to strike is inappropriate.
There was notice both in the pleadings and actual notice for
almost three months of the two issues. Other than the right to
injunctive relief namely, has there been a default and, two,
does Mr. Taylor have the right -- Mr. Reed Taylor have the
right to vote the share. And there's a lot of other material
here but we can argue about who is making this more complicated
or not, but those are the two major issues, and that's what we
are here today, that's what we were here to talk about on
Monday, and so I don't see any prejudice to the Defendants.
was somewhat taken a back by their threat to take this matter

considered today as the Court indicated Monday.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cressman.
Mr. McNichols, anything else?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Yes, your Honor, I will be brief.

23

21

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

have reViewed this stuff so I know that this has been subject
of some discussion for a few months.
MR. CRESSMAN: Exhibit H indicates the issue that
Mr. Reed Taylor demands to vote the shares. Any demands to

1
2

the purported shareholder and director action was taken on

3

February 22nd, 2007, 17 days later. And the interesting thing

4

First Amended Complaint was filed on February 5th of 2007, and

is that I think that the extent of Counsel's argument on the

issue. In fact, it was addressed by correspondence by

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

John Taylor in response to his brother's demands. And, in

17

director, it certainly wouldn't have been true because it

fact, he addressed, one, whether there was a default and, two,

18

wasn't done until 17 days later. Could they say that he might

whether Reed had a right to vote the shares.

Civil Procedure, that he now wants your Honor to enforce that

vote the shares as of December 12 for the purpose of removing
the directors and thereafter withhold a meeting of directors to
remove the officers. Accompanying that on December 12th was a
notice of special shareholders meeting scheduling a meeting to
that effect, which notice said the same thing, the meeting to
be held December 26th. Thereafter on late January, another
notice was presented for a shareholder meeting on February 5,
the notice was identical, it required the same relief.
So the notice of the right to vote whether there
was a default and whether there was a right to address whether
Mr. Reed Taylor had a right to vote the shares was much in the

issue of whether the emergency motion is within the pleadings
is essentially an admission by him that it has to be within the
pleadings or it's in excess of your jurisdiction.
Now, is it the same to say that you -- that you
might do something in the future as to say you have done it in
the past and we want that past action, quote, "enforced" and,
quote -- it says "enforcement and confirmation." It is, of
course, impossible for the shareholder action to have been a
part of a complaint that was filed 17 days before the
shareholder action was taken.
Could they in their first amended complaint have
said that Reed Taylor has voted himself to be the sole

22
23

eVidence that will be heard today will be considered on the

19
20
21
22

merits pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2) which

23

action that had not yet been taken.

24

addresses consolidation of the hearing -- preliminary

25

injunction hearing with the trial on the merits. And it says,

24
25

complain that they don't tell us what number it's under, they

So we were not asking that this be heard on the
merits today, although I will call the Court's attention to the
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do that in the future, perhaps, but to say that he has done it
and he now asks the Court through some motion without number,
without description, without category in the Idaho Rules of

The emergency -- you know, they don't -- we
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still don't tell us what number it's under and that's because

1

this action that has taken place over the course of the last

there isn't any number for such a motion. It does not exist,

2
3

don't think that I as a Court should be in the position of

it is not recognized by our procedure, it is -- and I say this

weekend, and decision that I guess I'm reaching today is that I

with the most respect, it is outside of the jurisdiction of the

4

being asked to sustain that and especially being asked to

rou~

5

sustain it on such short notice and on decisions of such

6

magnitude as I'm being requested to do.

So we would ask your Honor to determine that it is
outside the pleadings and therefore outside your jurisdiction,

7

and the motion -- our motion should be granted and the

8

emergency motion should be stricken.
Thank you for your attention.
THE COURT: Well, as I said, I have a little bit
more confidence in my familiarity with some of the facts and
circumstances today than I did on Monday when we convened, but
I'm not going to say that I have the confidence that I would
like to have at the point and time when this may ultimately end
up in a trial situation. But the more that I have the

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

The Plaintiffs actions are what is being relied
on to make this an emergency for the Court, and I just simply
do not want to participate in that because I think if I did so,
I'm in essence inviting some escalation on behalf of
Mr. John Taylor in the area of self help and I want to avoid
that.
Especially where there exists provisions in the
law where shareholders who feel that their request for a
special meeting is not being honored, there is provisions in
the law for that shareholder to make application to a court to

17

opportunity to review the initial complaint that was filed, the

17

seek an order that the corporation hold a special meeting. And

18
19

amended complaint, and now the pleadings with the supporting

if that became an issue, I think that would have been the

20

decision to hear the Plaintiff's motion and I guess the more

21

decisions get made in haste or often times incorrect, I think,

22

and that's where I basically come out in terms of this motion

18
19
20
21
22

that, if Mr. Reed Taylor had come to me last Thursday and said

23

from the Plaintiff. I mean I'm a judge, I'm here to serve and

23

this is what I've got in mind for this weekend, can I go ahead

24

I try to certainly be accommodating, but in looking at this

24

and do this, I would certainly not have granted that request.

25

motion that is sought by the Plaintiff, I guess even if hearing

25

And what in essence the Plaintiff is asking me to do at this

documents that I have reviewed, I guess the more I question my

proper approach for the Plaintiff to take in this case. That
was not attempted.
I guess the best analogy that I can draw here is

27

25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

22

made over the course of recent months, and frankly that

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23

frustration on behalf of Mr. Reed Taylor is not inappropriate.

23

Plaintiff's motion that was entitled an "emergency motion"

24

But Mr. Reed Taylor is before the Court today really calling

24

seeking confirmation of certain actions. You go to judge's

25

upon the Court's equitable powers to act and sustain, confirm

25

school, they always teach you, the first thing you ask is do I

that motion is appropriate, I at least have a question in my
own mind as to whether or not I would have the jurisdiction to
grant that motion as requested by the Plaintiff.
The bigger problem that I guess I have is that the
only thing that made this what could be described as an
emergency was the actions that were taken by Plaintiff
Mr. Reed Taylor over the course of the weekend, I guess, is
what I'll describe it as, and those were actions that I think
certainly Mr. Taylor knew that was not going to be uncontested,
and it was going to have to be in front of a court at some
point in time.
As I said having reviewed this, I know that this
dispute's been ongoing for a while, I guess there's going to be
various theories on when default has taken place if it has at
all, that's been gOing on for quite sometime. But the bottom
line to me is, and this is frankly based upon the fact that I

17

have been corporate counsel, corporate management governs

18
19

a patient approach.

decisions like this I think require a great deal of thought and

20

Now, I am certain that Mr. Taylor,

21

Mr. Reed Taylor, was frustrated by the attempts that he had
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point in time is bless this after the fact, and to do it on
very short notice, and I'm not going to do that. I don't feel
that that would be appropriate on my part because, in essence,
that will be asking me on the limited familiarity that I have
with this at this point in time or could gain through a short
hearing, because I don't intend to be here for days on end
trying to sort through this on this temporary relief that's
being sought at the outset of litigation, I don't feel that I
would be comfortable in setting forth a decision that basica lIy
takes this multimillion dollar corporation, turns it on its
head and shakes it all about which is, in essence, what I think
the Plaintiff is asking me to do.
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, may I comment on a
couple of things here?
THE COURT: No.
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright.
THE COURT: I do not want to make hasty decisions
in any case and I do not especially want to make hasty
decisions where those deCisions have consequences of the
magnitude that could happen in the management of this -management and operation of this corporation. For that reason
I think I made a mistake in deciding to hear this, the

517

30

28
began to consider that possibility as I was able to review this

1
2

over the course of the last couple days.

3

have power to do this, and I didn't ask that question because I

2
3
4
5
6

jury room to talk about it. Mr. McNichols, you know where I'm
at and just let me know when you need me to come back, and I
guess I'd like to -- no, I won't say that. I won't put any

10

if the Plaintiff wants to proceed with that or perhaps -- I

11

mean I know you have been working hard on this for the last

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

couple days too, if you want to formalize that with a little

12

more work, Mr. Cressman, and resubmit it to the Court, perhaps

the Defendant's preliminary injunction since I have to have

19

that heard once I issue the temporary restraining order.

20
21
22

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

author of the police report and he hasn't arrived, so I don't

lot of intelligence in this room, would you guys like to take a

21

know exactly what we can do about that. I have a copy of the

So with that, I think I made a mistake and I'm
going to correct that mistake and I'm going to reconsider my
decision to hear the Plaintiffs motion on short notice. I'm

7

reversing that decision to hear the Plaintiffs motion on short

8
9

notice and I do not intend to hear it today.

23
24

I'm not going to strike it, Mr. Cressman, I mean

in an amended matter and on appropriate notice, I would
certainly hear it. I'm not going to strike the Plaintiff's
motion but I'm not going to hear it today on short notice.
So what that leaves us today with is a hearing on

Well, I'm just going to ask, I think I've got a

time limit. I'm going to be here, if you want to go ahead with
the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, come and
get me. Okay. We are in recess for awhile.
(Thereupon, a recess was taken at 10: 17 a.m. to
10:35 a.m.)
THE COURT: We are on the record in CV07-208,
Taylor versus AlA Services, Corporation and other defendants.
Mr. McNichols.
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, Counsel met
with Mr. Reed Taylor, the Plaintiff, and Mr. John Taylor, one
of the Defendants, and discussed a resolution and we are unable
to reach an agreement.
THE COURT: Alright. Are you ready to proceed
then on the preliminary injunction hearing, Mr. McNichols?
MR. MCNICHOLS: I am, your Honor, with one
reservation, and that is that we had a subpoena served on the

few minutes and discuss this and see whether you can reach some

22

subpoena and a copy of the return of service. I don't know

agreement on how things ought to stand today for the near

23

whether counsel truly doubt the authenticity of the exhibit or

future. Mr. McNichols?

24
25

not.

25

MR. MCNICHOLS: I'd be happy to, your Honor.

MR. CRESSMAN: Is that a question?

29

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

I'm not going to consider the Plaintiffs motion in whatever

9

form you want to say that --

understand, you are not striking the motion, we could note it

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

again?

12

MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, just a couple points of
clarification. We had asked that our motion be conSidered a
motion for preliminary injunction and we filed a motion to
shorten time to hear that today along with Defendant's motion
for preliminary injunction. Has the Court addressed that yet?
THE COURT: Well, I think I have by saying that

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22

31

1

THE COURT: Mr. Cressman?

MR. CRESSMAN: The other issue, just so I

MR. MCNICHOLS: The judge doesn't permit us to ask
questions of each other. We ask questions of the court.
MR. CRESSMAN: That's why I asked your Honor.
THE COURT: That's a question for me,
Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, your Honor, No.1, before I
address that, we had some preliminary matters with regard to
the affidavits.
THE COURT: I'm going to take those up in a
minute.
MR. CRESSMAN: And we can take those up. But I
don't want -- one, I don't understand why that issue is

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

that. If that's Significant, then I think we are going to have

MR. CRESSMAN: Sure.

21

the officer testify so he cannot make the same mistake that I

THE COURT: Alright. Well, I've got nothing else

22

made a few minutes ago. And the other -- I don't see how it's

THE COURT: If you want to notice it up on proper
notice.
MR. CRESSMAN: Next week or whatever we can be
back arguing it again, and, you know, that would -- you know, I
don't -- so I understand that and that's fine. Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. As to my request as to whether
you guys want to take a few minutes and discuss this,
Mr. Cressman?

relevant. I mean we agree that Mr. Reed Taylor was present on
-- sometime after 3:00 o'clock in the morning on Sunday and he
made an effort in conformity with the consent of the directors
to change the locks of the building after he had elected
himself as the sole officer of the corporation.
Now, I don't know if they are trying to say that
he identified himself as John Taylor, Mr. Reed Taylor disputes

23

going today, so -- and this is the courtroom that we are going

23

relevant. The issues that I see clearly are, one, is there a

24
25

to be in, so if you guys would just like to take a few minutes,

24
25

default and, two, did Mr. Taylor -- Reed Taylor have the right

you can be either be in here, or if you'd like to go to the
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to vote the shares, and if so, he was acting legally at that
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32

himself as John Taylor or Reed Taylor, then I guess we are

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Plaintiff might be concerned that John Taylor and the

going to have the officer.

8

management of the business might do something improper. And so

time.

2
3

But we admit, you know, that that event took place
but it was precipitated by events and frustration and we

4

believe it was legally taken under the vote and the failure to

5

vote and under the code of Idaho that allows for these things.

6
7
8
9
10

have the officer testify for purposes beyond just identifying

11

the document, I take it?

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

34

But if it's important to know whether Mr. Reed Taylor described

THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, you were seeking to

MR. MCNICHOLS: Well, to say that -- to say that
he had met the person who identified himself as John Taylor and
he now is the person that appears to be Reed Taylor.
I have a suggestion, your Honor. May I make a
suggestion?
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Let me -- and I don't have copies
of this, I'm sorry, let me give the Court my subpoena, the copy
of the subpoena and a copy of the return, and then let me ask
the Court to reserve a ruling as to whether that evidence, if
it were admitted, would cause you to make a decision different
from what you would otherwise make. Does that make sense?
Marginal, perhaps.
THE COURT: I understand what you are asking,

9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

not -- is not going to be of particular relevance to me.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. We then would like to
submit our motion for preliminary injunction on the affidavits
that were filed with the temporary restraining order and on the
subsequent affidavitS. And we have one more point to make,
your Honor, and that is we perceive that the Court and the

we are willing to voluntarily -- he and AlA Services, Inc., is
willing to voluntarily submit to a consent order. And I have a
proposal -- a proposed consent order for your Honor's
consideration, and I gave a copy of that proposed consent order
to counsel during our recess.
The consent order essentially orders Mr. Taylor to
conduct the business in a good and business like manner, not
engage in any action or transaction not in the ordinary course
of business, and not to permit it to do certain itemized things
here pending the continuance of the preliminary injunction. So
we would offer -- John Taylor offers and the corporation offers
to submit to that order in support of our request for the
preliminary injunction. And could -- if someone could give
that to the Court, I would very much appreciate it.
THE COURT: Mr. Cressman, with that, I'd like
to hear from you as to your -- sorry, I'm scrambling for a
cough drop here -- I'd like to hear from you as to your

33

1

2
3
4
5
6
7

MR. MCNICHOLS: That's what I would ask to do and
if I may, should I give this then to -MR. CRESSMAN: I understand and I have no reason
to believe he wasn't subpoenaed, the question is, is it
relevant, No.1, and if it is relevant, then we would like the
officer here because we understand the intent is to have

8

someone identify that Mr. Reed Taylor told somebody he was

9

John Taylor, and I don't think that's relevant anyway. But I

10

mean they were down there, they were changing the locks in the

11

building.

12

13
14
15
16

The police report is not attached, is it, to that
document?
THE COURT: No.
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, there were other people
there that knew Mr. Reed Taylor present including

17
18

Shane Courtney, who is in the courtroom. I mean it doesn't

19

mean people who are down there that know who he is, but in any

20

event --

make a lot of sense for Mr. Reed Taylor to tell somebody -- I

21

35

1

Mr. McNichols.

THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, I really don't -- I

22

don't think that would be of much relevance to me in terms of

23

my consideration on the preliminary injunction.

24

MR. MCNICHOLS: Alright.

25

THE COURT: I mean what was actually said there is

2
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objections as to any of the affidavits filed by the Defendants.
MR. CRESSMAN: Okay. Well, I will take them one
at a time.
THE COURT: Yeah, please do. I have been through
them.
MR. CRESSMAN: And I will start with the affidavit
of Miss Duclos and don't have any problem with the first two
paragraphs. Third paragraph, this gets into the issue of Crop
USA and AlA Insurance, and it also

the last sentence, it's

my understanding that the companies allocate salaries. I mean
there's no foundation, there's no proper testamentary
knowledge, and Crop USA is not a party in this litigation.
It's not a party to the contracts with Mr. Reed Taylor, and,
you know, whatever AlA Services or AlA Insurance has done with
Crop USA, it's just not appropriate and not relevant.
Second paragraph, you want me to take these -- go
through them serially?
THE COURT: Please, just as you are doing,
Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN: Paragraph four, you know, talking
about the respect for John Taylor and then she took a poll.
Well, the poll's hearsay, it's not relevant any way. I mean I
guess what they are arguing is this man's not entitled to be
paid his eight million dollars if people don't like him. The
whole paragraph about his reputation, I mean I think it's

.:5/1

38

36

1

completely inappropriate, it's hearsay, it's not relevant to

1

2
3
4

the issues before the Court.

5

on one or more occasion a director of one of the trusts being

6

extremely angry about contact made by the Plaintiff, no

7
8
9

foundation, no identification, clearly hearsay. Again, what

2
3
4
5
6
7

relevance does that have to whether Mr. Taylor is entitled to

8

vote the stock when -- as part of his security arrangements for

10

payment of eight million dollars that's owed to him. You know,

11
12

testimonial knowledge, hearsay.

13
14
15
16
17

NO.5, the same thing is for Paragraph No.5,
talking about what these trusts would do, a director being --

it seems like it's very farfetched, no foundation, not proper

Paragraph 6 says -- she just says I don't believe
him that he's going to do it appropriately. Well, "I have
witnessed many of the business ideas over the last several
years and have seen them fail" doesn't explain it, no
foundation, what's she talking about. In reality, your Honor,

require they at least produce what they are talking about.
So on those basis, we would ask, with the
exception of the first two paragraph of Miss Duclos' affidavit,
her affidavit be stricken.
THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, would you like to be
heard as to Miss Duclos' affidavit?
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, and
particularly if there are going to be objections to the rest of

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

considering and what I'm not because I agree with you there is
some irrelevant --

them, what I would suggest is that your Honor take the motions
to strike portions of the affidavit under advisement pending
the consideration of all the affidavits and all of the evidence
today and then rule appropriately.
THE COURT: Well, I think in order to get this
going, Mr. Cressman, I guess I'd just like you to go ahead and
state your objections to the various affidavits, and I agree
with you that there is some irrelevant hearsay information
contained in there, but rather than me trying to go through

18
19
20

AlA services, he obviously did something right. They had

21
22

they have twelve. He wasn't responsible for that, someone else

23
24

was. He obviously had something going for him and these type

23

of statements. The last sentence, "Plaintiff has burned so

24

25

many bridges in the past, I do not believe he can overcome the

25

1
2
3
4
5
6

problems created by that conduct and operate AlA Insurance in

1

object to -- well, as a foundational -- as to the third

its best interest." I mean absolutely no foundation, no

2
3

that there's been an audit every year for the last five years

4

to be correct, I don't have -- I think if she's going to talk

she's afraid of the Plaintiff in paragraph 7. Again, whether

5

about the income, we have got the income statements, the

she's afraid of him or not I think is irrelevant. I can't

6

financial statements in the record, I think those should be

7

believe she's afraid of him, but I guess -- you know, I guess

this man built up these companies, he was paid very significant
sums for his stock in 1995. He was the major shareholder of

twenty -- they had two hundred employees when he was there, now

these one at a time and tell me what I'm considering and what
I'm not, why don't you just go ahead and state your objections
and then I will -- I will kind of go through -- when I
ultimately rule on this, I'll go through and identify what I'm

MR. CRESSMAN: Next affidavit is Aimee Gordon. We
do not have the objections to the first two paragraphs. We

39
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8
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10
11
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19

discussion, inappropriate, irrelevant.
Let's see, then she says she's resigned because

that in Paragraph 5 of the declaration of Aimee Gordon, she

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

indicates about this reversing entry and she says she was

17

instructed by John to reverse the entry in the fourth quarter

-- well, I don't want to be sarcastic, that's not a good ground
for denying Mr. Reed Taylor the rights -- the contractual
rights he has because Miss DuClos is afraid of him.
Now she goes into alteration of documents and she
refers to a meeting with Mr. Gittins that she didn't attend,
she wasn't even at the meeting, she doesn't have testimonial
knowledge, she has no personal knowledge. And with regard to
this, again, I don't know how it's relevant. I will tell you

paragraph, other than the fact that I understand the statement

utilized rather than whatever she's stating here in -- you
know, that's a simple matter. I know John Taylor provided
those directly to Mr. Bond and we have listed those in the
exhibits.
You know, I don't know what the relevance is on
No.4, Mr. John Taylor obviously received a significant income
from this company or these companies, all the while his brother
isn't being paid, we seriously object to that and certainly
under status quo matter.
We don't have any objection to the 5th Paragraph
-- we don't have any objection to Paragraph 5. In the

20

of default on December 12th, 2006, sent by Attorney Pat Moran

21

to Mr. John Taylor. He realized he better clean that up.

22
23

There's a proper statement of what happened. Miss Duclos'

18
19
20
21
22

comments are irrelevant, without foundation and should be

23

Paragraph 7, the fact that some of

24

denied. I'm not even sure what she means by this spread sheet

24

Mr. Reed Taylor's sons have been employed in the past or are

25

because no spread sheet's attached. The best evidence rule

25

now employed, apparently one of his sons is employed by

of 2006. Well, obviously it was reversed following the notice
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Paragraph 6, "In the past years, Plaintiff has charged AlA for
the use of his airplane." I think that's right but we don't
know what years they are talking about. I mean, again, I don't
see what relevance charges for his airplane is and we'd ask
that be stricken.
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40

Crop USA. Again, I don't know what relevance that has to

2
3

anything. So we'd ask that Paragraph 7 be stricken.

4
5
6

-- really don't have any objection to the first two paragraphs.
The rest of it I think is completely irrelevant, about a

7

when Reed Taylor made his demands, she doesn't explain how she

8
9

became aware of that, what she -- why she was threatened and

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Next affidavit is Stephanie MCFarland. I assume

vagrant wandering around and a can of pepper spray. And then

she moved the can of pepper spray to the front of her desk in
plain sight I think is completely ridiculous without
foundation.
Paragraph 4, she was afraid of Reed, and that
the -- this clearly indicates into the extent that she's afraid'
of Reed, we believe that's inappropriate and not relevant.
With regard to the scheduled meeting on Monday the 5th, she
said it was unscheduled, the evidence will show it was clearly
scheduled. Gem State Security was hired to sit behind her desk
and the door was locked and the only access, so they clearly
barred Mr. Reed Taylor from holding the meeting that he had
scheduled, the second meeting on February 5th. So I guess we
don't have any problem to the last sentence, last two sentences
of that paragraph.
Paragraph 5 that she's afraid, again, doesn't want
John Taylor, I mean that's completely irrelevant. Will attempt
-- she thinks he will attempt illegal action. I mean no

1
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received two lengthy affidavits from John Taylor. And it was
not our intent that affidavits be considered, but because
Mr. Taylor's here and because of the combination of
inappropriate information contained in his declarations, we
believe that if these affidavits are considered, it would be
simply more -- much easier for us to control what's right and
appropriate and make appropriate objections if he testifies and
we can cross-examine him here today.
If that's not acceptable, I will go through these

which are much longer and make the similar objections to the
pertinent parts that are objectionable like the other four.
THE COURT: Well, I understood Mr. MCNichols was
not wishing to submit it on the basis of the affidavits, I'm
not, I guess, going to require Mr. McNichols to present
evidence if he doesn't wish to.
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright, then I'll make my
objections to those now and we will call Mr. John Taylor our
self.
THE COURT: Yeah, I will tell you that if you want
-- given the volume of information contained in John Taylor's
affidavits, if you wish to call him to the stand to inquire as
to the information of those affidavits, I'll certainly permit
that.
MR. CRESSMAN: Yeah. Well, I intend to call him
for some other reasons as well, but I will object --

41
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foundation, completely inappropriate. Paragraph 6, physical
force, and then her 6 and 7 are completely irrelevant. I will
not work, great, I mean what difference does that make, because
Stephanie McFarland won't work for him, he should not be paid
his eight million dollars is absurd.
Let's see here, Kent Peterson is the next one.
Mr. Peterson is with Crop USA and, again, he's saying that
something bad's going to happen to Crop USA if Mr. Taylor is
running AlA Insurance. I don't understand that. Crop USA is
not a party to this litigation, they are not a party to any of
these contracts with Mr. Taylor, and for that reason I think
that it's completely irrelevant and inappropriate that this
affidavit be considered.
And Paragraph 9, Mr. Peterson indicates that
Reed Taylor has no interest in Crop USA and Crop USA is not a
party to this lawsuit but must protect its property located at
the Lewis-Clark Plaza. Well, they could do that independently.
I mean if there's something that happens, then they can take
that, but they are not even a party here and the Court clearly
does not have jurisdiction over them. So those would be our
objections to those four affidavits.
Now, the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing on
Monday and we understood that the Court intended to put the
moving party to their test of establishing the very high burden
for a preliminary injunction, and late yesterday afternoon we
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MR. MCNICHOLS: May I be heard for a moment, your
Honor? Do we need to do both? Does both -THE COURT: I guess I don't want to hear your
objections to the affidavit if you are going to examine him as
well.
MR. CRESSMAN: I am going to examine him, I don't
know that I'm going to examine him on these pOints, but counsel
can certainly examine him.
THE COURT: Well, why don't we -- why don't we go
ahead and if are intending to call Mr. John Taylor, why don't
we take up your motions to strike relative to his affidavits
after you are done with your examination.
MR. CRESSMAN: Very good.
THE COURT: Alright.
Mr. McNichols, I do intend to take under
advisement the issues that have already been raised as to the
affidavits of Miss Duclos, Miss Gordon, Miss McFarland and
Mr. Peterson and only consider those portions of those
affidavits that I conSider relevant, so I have got those under
advisement. Any other evidence that you wish to submit at this
time?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Not at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. McNichols.
Mr. Cressman, any evidence that you would like to
present?

521
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1

MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, we would call John Taylor,

2
3
4
5

2

your Honor.

R. JOHN TAYLOR,

6

Having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole

7
8
9

truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to said cause,

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

testifies and says:
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Cressman.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Would you state your name and residence address for the

record, please.
A.

My name is R. John Taylor, 2020 Broadview Drive,

Lewiston, Idaho.
Q.

What is your employment, Mr. Taylor?

A.

I'm president of AlA Insurance and AlA Services Corp.

Q.

Any other employment?

A.

No.

20

Q.

Are you an officer of Crop USA?

21

A.

Yes, I am president of Crop USA.

22

Q.

Are you a director of Crop USA?

A.

I am.

-- I don't know where he's going, but I object on the grounds
that it's irrelevant.
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, quite the contrary, your
Honor, if these folks have borrowed money inappropriately, it
goes to the question of whether there's a default, and the
obligation's owing to Mr. Reed Taylor.
MR. MCNICHOLS: But your Honor--

10

DIRECT EXAMINATION

17
18
19

23
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25

3
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5
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THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, if you'd come forward,
please.

MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, this really
has nothing to do with the preliminary injunction. Counsel is

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to tell you both right

11

now, I am very uncomfortable on this limited hearing that I

12

intend to have today. I am very uncomfortable on trying to

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

Q.

And what percentage of shares in Crop USA do you own?

24

A.

Under 40 percent.

25

reach a ruling on whether there's been a default and who has
the power to vote shares. I'm going to tell you both that.
There has -- I have issued the temporary restraining order on a
limited number of areas -- well, what I'm -- I guess I'm going
to have to address the provisions of that temporary restraining
order as they would apply to the preliminary injunction. I'm
going to overrule your objection, Mr. McNichols. Go ahead,
Mr. Cressman.
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Q.

Slightly under 40 percent?

1

A.

Slightly under 40 percent as I recall.

2

O.

Do you recall the question?

Q.

Are you the largest single shareholder of Crop USA?

A.

No.

A.

Yes.

O.

Has AlA Insurance borrowed any funds from trust

Q.

And you are a director of both AlA Services and AlA

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Insurance?
A.

I am.

Q.

And is AlA Services the sole shareholder of AlA

Insurance?
A.

Yes.

O.

What is your -- give me your educational background if

you would, please?
A.

I graduated with an undergraduate degree in accounting,

I passed the CPA exams in 1972, then worked for an accounting
firm. And then went to law school in 1973 to 1976 and
graduated from law school and am currently a member of the bar,

13
14
15
16
17

although I'm not a CPA any longer.
O.

10
11
12

18
19

What undergrad school did you go to?

19
20

A.

Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.

O.

Where did you go to law school?

21

A.

Washington and Lee University.

22

O.

That's in Washington DC?

23
24
25

A.

It's in Lexington, Virginia.

20
21
22
23

O.

Virginia. Has AlA Insurance borrowed any money held in

24

25

trust for others for itself?
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BY MR. CRESSMAN:

accounts of others, held for others?
A.

It may have, yes.

Q.

It may have or it has?

A.

It has in the past, yes.

Q.

And how much money has it borrowed from such trust

accounts?
A.

Various amounts from probably a low, maybe four hundred

thousand.
Q.

Four hundred thousand. And you understand such

borrowing to be illegal, do you not?
A.

I do not.

O.

It's legal to borrow money from trust accounts?

A.

I'm not sure what you mean by a trust account. The

trust accounts of the insurance ind ustry is separate from the
trust accounts I think you are probably referring to, but the
accounts owned by trust are -- I think is what you are
referring to.
O.

Okay. You borrowed -- AlA Insurance has borrowed money

from those trusts?
A.

Those are Grain Growers and Association of American Soy

Bean Grower Association Trust which all transactions are

GZZ14 of 55 sheet
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1
2

reported to and audited each year. And those are not in the

1

lawsuit is ultimately in our favor, AlA would receive part of

nature of a trust that you would probably think of, but in the

2

those proceeds and those -- the final 140 thousand would be

3

nature of a business organization.

3
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returned to Grain Growers at that time. If we do not win the
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Q.

Have any board members of AlA Insurance complained of

that practice?
A.

Have any board members?

Q.

Of the trust, excuse me.

A.

Boy, I can't recall right now.

Q.

You can't recall any?

A.

I can't recall right now, no.

Q.

So you don't know whether they have or they have not?

A.

I can't recall right now.

THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Cressman. That
question was whether or not any board members of those trusts
had complained?
MR. CRESSMAN: Correct.
THE COURT: Thank you.
A.

Oh, his question was whether or not anybody from AlA

had -- AlA board had questioned that?
MR. CRESSMAN: I'm sorry I didn't -- I'm having
trouble hearing you.
THE COURT: I guess I have a different

23

understanding of what Mr. Taylor just had. Why don't you ask

24
25

11
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lawsuit, they will end up eating that amount.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to strike his nonresponsive.

THE COURT: Sustained. Ask the question again,
Mr. -BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Mr. Taylor, I asked you if anyone associated with the

trust complained of your practices of borrowing money from
their accounts?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And who?

A.

One of the board members from North Dakota.

Q.

From who?

A.

A board member from North Dakota.

Q.

What is the name of the board member?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Any others?

20

A.

Not that I recall.

21
22

Q.

Now, in July of 1995 -MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, could I ask a question

that question again, Mr. Cressman.

23
24

none of us will remember any of this testimony, could I ask a

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

25

question about this trust business? I think Counsel is going

now rather than try to remember this until the end when we --
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the -- I think the balance has been on there probably, God, I'm
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going to guess right now, sir, but probably nine years, eight
years since the lawsuit was initiated. And over the years in

Q.

Well, let me ask it both ways. Did anyone from AlA

Insurance or AlA Services object to AlA Insurance borrowing
funds from trusts?
A.

I don't recall.

Q.

Has anyone associated with the trusts from which the

moneys were borrowed, the four hundred thousand dollars that
you testified to, complained about that practice?
A.

Oh, that's - those are subject of discussion at every

one of our trust board meetings which we have one on Saturday
in Tampa, Florida, the Commodity Classic. We have those
account and balances between AlA advances or advances to the
trust are discussed at every quarterly meeting, There is a lot
of discussion on the issue. And there's a lot of discussion on
why it occurred or why and how it would be corrected.
In fact, the balances on the trust now that are owed to
-- that AlA owes to the trust are advances for legal fees on

to a different subject.
MR. CRESSMAN: I am going to a different subject.
THE COURT: No, Mr. Cressman's going to be allowed
to proceed, Mr. McNichols.
Go ahead, Mr. Cressman.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

In 1995 did you purchase your brother'S shares in AlA

Services?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

How was the transaction structured for the purchase of

the shares?
A.

It was structured as a redemption of shares by AlA

Services Corporation of Reed Taylor's shares.
Q.

And because of that redemption, you then became the

majority shareholder of AlA Services?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That was the intent of the transaction?

17
18
19
20
21
22

order to finance that lawsuit, we did not feel it was

23

appropriate that the trust bear the entire burden for that, so

24

AlA prosecuted that lawsuit from 1997 forward, and that is at

22
23
24

represented Services and did much of that work. I'm not -- and

25

the Supreme Court hearing now. If we win the lawsuit, if the

25

there was a law firm in Minneapolis who I don't recall the name

the Grain Growers and a lawsuit against the State of Idaho on
some reserves that has been going on for about ten years. And

A.

Yes.

Q.

Were lawyers involved in that transaction?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And who represented Mr. Reed Taylor and who represented
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AlA Services?
A.

Oh, I think Eberle, Berlin, a Boise based law firm

523
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1
2
3
4

of.
That represented who?

You know, I'm not sure. AlA paid the bills, I don't

know if it represented the underwriter or the specific parties.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Q.

A.

How much were the legal fees associated with that

Q.

transaction for AlA services?
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, I object on
the grounds of irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, the issue here -THE COURT: Sustained.

12
13

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

14

Volume 1. Is that the promiSSOry note dated August 1, 1995, in

15

the amount of six thousand dollars that remains unpaid to your

16
17
18

brother?

19
20
21
22
--23

Take a look at Exhibit A, would you please, in

Q.

It appears to be a copy of the original promissory

A.

note.

Aimee Gordon's declaration that the entire principle of six
million dollars remains owing?

Yes, I do. By Services, yes.

A.
Q.

.

Dovou -also-agree-thai: Tii addition to the

folks -- if Mr. Taylor -- Reed Taylor was rightful in his

2

action of voting the shares that he had a hundred percent

3
4
5
6
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prln-c1ple~ at

interest in and he was rightful because there was a default and
he was rightful in voting himself into the directorship and
officer, that's -- those key elements must -- if those are
proved by Mr. Reed Taylor, then he had every right to go down
there and do what he did. And they are trying to attempt to
ask us not to be able to prove those key issues. There was a
default, he rightfully voted those shares, those are the two
things we intend to prove to establish that they had no -- they
have no right to a preliminary injunction and that the TRO was

12
13

wrongfully issued.

14
15
16
17
18

then the motion for preliminary injunction should be denied,

19
20
21
22

And do you agree with the statement contained in

Q.

1

And if the issue's too complicated for the Court,

but this is -- we maintain it's very clear. In fact, we
maintain that the evidence is such without question and with
the clarity on those issues that a preliminary injunction could
and shou Id be issued in favor of Reed Taylor.
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. Go
ahead, Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN: Could the court reporter read the
question back for the witness, please.

23-

24

least according to her calculations, $2,189,614 in accrued

24

25

interest is also owing as of the end of December 31, 2006?

25

reaClbacK

- \Tfiere-upon;tfie-requestea qiJeSti6n\¥as
by the court reporter.)

A.

I think that yes, yes, I do.

55

53

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled. You can go ahead and
answer that, Mr. Taylor.
A.

I believe that's probably an accurate representation,

yes.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Does that include the interest on the three hundred and

seven thousand dollars that was earlier credited against
prinCiple but reversed by you in late December of 20067
A.

Yes, it does. For all time periods, yes.

11
12
13

dollars.

14
15

agreement was orally modified or this promissory note was

16

orally modified?

17
18

here we go into the default issue again and it's just not

Q.

I beg your pardon?

A.

The interest accrued as if -- is the entire six million

1
2

the question -- object to the question, your Honor, it calls

essentially read the document again.

should be issued. We are asking to enjOin him from doing the

21

things that are the subject of the TRO. And your Honor has

21

22

already announced you are not intending to make a deciSion on

22

MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object, your Honor,

relevant to the question of whether the preliminary injunction

Would you read out loud the last paragraph of the

12
13

19
20

Alright. Do you contend in these proceedings that this

Q.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

promissory note, please.
THE COURT: No, I'm not going to read from
documents. Documents are in front of me. I can read.
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright, thank you.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Did you understand that the promiSSOry note barred any

oral modification?
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object to the form of

for a legal conclusion. And, again, he's asking him to

THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Why do you feel you were entitled to orally modify this

note?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, calls for a legal
conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that,
Mr. Taylor.

A.

For several reasons. One is Reed and I have been

23

whether there is a default or not, so it's irrelevant, the

23

working together, had a great relationship for several years,

24

question is irrelevant.

24

we put together retirement program and we modified our

25

agreements from 1995 on several occasions. We have modified

25

MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I don't know how these
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58

56

1

don't know that I have to represent anything but I will so

out the terms of those agreements from time to time, and as

2

represent.

they were modified from time to time. And Reed and I had a

3

relationship that we did not have to at that time have to have

4

original note, that was my reason. If that's -- if that's the

everything in writing.

5
6

only note then, then I have no objection to it.

1

the agreement not only with documents but also with carrying

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Q.

Any other reason you believed you were entitled to

orally modify the terms of the promissory note?
A.

No, I think I just said what I -- that those are the

THE COURT: Exhibit A is admitted.

7
8

these then.

9

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

reasons.
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright. Now, your Honor, I want

MR. MCNICHOLS: The witness said that that was the

10

MR. CRESSMAN: Let me just run through some of

Q.

Mr. Taylor, take a look at Exhibit B. Is that the stock

evidence; and if there are any that are objectionable, I will

11
12
13
14

this is the true and correct copy of the original redemption

take those up specifically.

15

agreement. I haven't had time to review any of these

16
17
18
19

documents.

to be careful here that we get these documents into evidence,
and what I would do is I would move that all of the exhibits in
the two binders that we have provided be admitted into

THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, I guess I would take
the same approach to the exhibits as I have taken towards the
affidavits, and that is that I'm only going to be considering
those for whatever relevance and permissible purpose they may

redemption restructure agreement dated July 1st, 1996, which
bears your signature?
A.

I have no ability at this time to give whether or not

Q.

Well, take a look at it.

A.

And you want me to recall from memory something that I

signed twelve years ago?

20

be. With that, do you have any objection to the exhibits

20

Q.

21

contained in the -- identified as A through, I guess, AX.

21

A.

What did you say?

Q.

Isn't that the stock redemption restructure agreement

22
23
24

25

Isn't that what I stated, sir?

know what they all are. I got them late yesterday afternoon

22
23

you signed dated as of July 1, 19967 You Signed on behalf of

and did not review them. I have looked at the table of the

24

AlA Services Corporation with Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor.

contents this morning, but I haven't looked at the documents.

25

MR. MCNICHOLS: I do, your Honor, because I don't

A.

You know it appears to be a stock redemption agreement

59

57

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

1

So, you know, the note looks to be the note, I don't know
whether the note was amended or not. I thought the note was

2

amended and maybe it wasn't, but some of these documents I'm
sure were amended. But I just don't know where they were and

3
4

so I guess I object on the grounds that I have not have had an

5

MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no objection, your Honor.

adequate opportunity to read them and to look at them.

6
7
8
9

THE COURT: Exhibit B's admitted.

MR. CRESSMAN: Alright. Well, before I close,
your Honor, I'll ask him to identify each of the exhibits. 1
guess I have tried to shortcut that, maybe Counsel could assist
me and we can speed that along.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I thought also we weren't going to
have exhibits today. When I tried an exhibit earlier on,
Counsel raised this objection about exhibits.
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to consider what you

10
11

16
17
18
19

it's going to be.

16
17
18
19

MR. CRESSMAN: Alright. Well, Exhibit A has been

20

identified, we'd move that it be admitted.

21

THE COURT: Any objection?

21

22
23

MR. MCNICHOLS: Is the representation that it

22
23

wasn't amended?

24

25

24

MR. CRESSMAN: Well, the witness has testified

25

that was the note, and I as far as I know it hasn't been, but I
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(Thereupon, Exhibit B was admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

"Now with regard to this exhibit and with regard to your

testimony and apparently that you orally modified some
arrangements, taking a look at page 10 of Exhibit B, can you

fees in conjunction with this restructured agreement that was

15

ahead and have each identified.

THE COURT: Any objection to Exhibit B,
Mr. McNichols?

ask you this way. Is it true, sir, that AlA Services paid

guys want to submit. If that includes exhibits, that's what

Mr. Cressman, it sounds like you are going to go

MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit, your Honor.

12
13
14

15

20

signed by me, yes.

Page 56 to 59 of 2.11

tell us how much in attorney's fees were paid -- well, let me

fifty-five thousand dollars of Mr. Reed Taylor's attorney's

entered into one year after the original agreement was entered
into in July of 1995?
A.

I believe that's right.

Q.

Okay. Exhibit C, is that the amended restated stock

pledge agreement dated as of July 1, 1996, that you executed?
A.

This letter, yes.

Q.

Exhibit C?

A.

Yes.
MR. CRESSMAN: We move to admit Exhibit C.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.

525

62

60

2

(Thereupon, Exhibit C was admitted into evidence.)

1
2

3
4

MR. CRESSMAN: And attached to Exhibit C is

3

THE COURT: Exhibit C is admitted.

Exhibit A3, correct, sir?

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

MR. MCNICHOLS: No, it's Exhibit D, Counsel.
MR. CRESSMAN: Attached to Exhibit C is Exhibit
A3, correct, sir?
A.

Yes.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Just a minute. Just a minute.
Oh, I'm sorry.
THE COURT: You are talking about the last page of
Exhibit C, Mr. Cressman?

13
14

MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, sir.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm sorry, your Honor, because

15
16

Exhibit D also is entitled "Exhibit A-3."

17

of Exhibit C, Mr. Taylor.

18
19
20
21
22
23

THE COURT: Alright. Just look at the last page

MR. MCNICHOLS: I have it now, your Honor.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Is that your signature on that assignment separate from

certificate?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And by that assignment separate from certificate, you

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

24

were assigning and transferring to Reed Taylor six hundred --

23
24

25

excuse me, six thousand two hundred nineteen shares of AlA

25

THE COURT: That is to be identified then as
Exhibit E.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Now, please look at Exhibit Z. We have just gone

through the amended and restructured documents for the
transaction that took place in July of 1996. I'm now going to
ask you to identify the initial documents beginning with
Exhibit Z and I'll ask you is that the original stock
redemption agreement pertaining to the redemption of your
brother's shares dated July 22, 1995, signed by you?
A.

Yes, it appears to be.

Q.

Exhibit AA, is that the stock pledge agreement dated as

of July 22, 1995, for the original stock redemption transaction
between AlA Services and your brother signed by you?
A.

It appears to be, yes.

MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibits Z and Exhibit AA or admitted.
(Thereupon, Deposition Exhibits Z and AA were
admitted into eVidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Take a look at Exhibit AB, is that the secured

agreement dated as of July 22, 1995, pertaining to the original
stock redemption transaction with your brother signed by you?
A.

Yes.

63

61

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12

Insurance stock; correct?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Document speaks for itself, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Showing you Exhibit D, does that also bear your

signature as an assignment separate from certificate?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Dated as of July 22, 1995?

A.

Yes.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit D, your

Honor.

13

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.

14
15
16

THE COURT: Exhibit D is admitted.

17

(Thereupon, Exhibit D was admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Exhibit E, is that the amended and restated security

18

agreement dated as of July 1, 1996, signed by you on behalf of

19

AlA Services?

20
21
22
23

A.

Yes, appears so.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, my copy is to both
Exhibit Band E. The top it says Exhibit B and the bottom it
says Exhibit E.

24
25

MR. CRESSMAN: The bottom is the controlling
desig natio n.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit AB is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit AB was admitted into
evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Exhibit AC, is that a certification by you as of

August 15, 1995?
A.

Yes, it appears to be.

MR. MCNICHOLS: That's technically the 16 by
interlineation.
MR. CRESSMAN: It's what?
MR. MCNICHOLS: It's interlined to the Sixteenth,
I believe, above the signature.
MR. CRESSMAN: I was looking only at the first
page, but if the sixteenth is where the signature, that is the
case. Move to admit, your Honor.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection -- excuse me, did you
identify that?
A.

Yes.

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit AC is admitted.

23
24

evidence.)

25

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

(Thereupon, Exhibit AC was admitted into

5U
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66

64
Q.

2

Exhibit AD, is that an addendum to stock redemption

agreement, the original stock redemption agreement?

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

A.
Q.

Signed by you on or around July 22, 1995?
Yes.

Q.

And that note had -- was -- had

a maturity to be paid

before July 1 of 1996; correct?

A.

I don't recall the date of that.

Q.

You don't recall that it had a date and that the date

THE COURT: Exhibit AD is admitted.

8

9

(Thereupon, Exhibit AD was admitted into

13

transaction in July of 1995, in July of 1996 you amended the
transaction; correct?

23
24
25

Yes, I believe so.

6

10
11

evidence.)

Now, at the time a year later this after the original

A.

Yes.

Q.

And the reason it was amended was because the company

couldn't pay Mr. Reed Taylor?

A.

I don't recall that. There is --

Q.

Okay.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Excuse me, he didn't finish his

answer, Counsel.

A.

A.

7

14
15

20
21
22

involved a note for a million and a half; did it not?

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.

By MR. CRESSMAN:

16
17
18
19

2

MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit.

10
11
12

Q.

the two million in interest, the original transaction also

3
4
5

It appears to be, yes.

A.

1

I believe the reason it was amended and restated is

because Mr. Taylor decided that he did not want to retire.

A.

I do not recall that.

Q.

You do not -- is it true, sir, that the reason the

restructured agreement took place was so you could address the

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

fifty-five thousand of Mr. Reed Taylor's fees associated with

20

the restructured documents. How much in fees were paid by AlA

21

Services to its counsel for that transaction?

nonpayment of that note?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, it's been asked and
answered. He already asked him what the reason was and he said
the reason was his brother didn't want to retire any more.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Now, we already indicated that AlA Services paid

Q.

22
23
24
25

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

-- by that date it was not paid?

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

Q.

Because he what?

Now, you have indicated you believed that you have

A.

Did not want to retire, wanted back in the company.

1

Q.

How did having an amended allow him to be back in the

why the documents were done. I'm going to overrule the

2
3
4
5
6
7

objection. You can go ahead and answer that, Mr. Taylor.

8

of 2003, and that's the deal we have been working under ever

9

since.

Q.

67

65

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

company?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Documents speak for themselves,
your Honor.
THE COURT: I think he's talking about the reasons

A.

Well, as my understanding that at the time he decided

amended the transaction with your brother orally; correct?
A.

Orally and in writing, yes.

Q.

And when was that -- when was the last amendment that

you made with your brother?
The last -- we had a long period of renegotiation and

A.

all these documents and these entire loan documents from 2000,

2001 to clear to 2003. We finally settled on a deal in March

10

that he did not want to retire, and so he wanted to restructure

10

11

everything and this is what we ended up with.

brother?

12
13
14

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

11
12
13

A.

Yes.

Q.

And was that deal memoria Iized in writing?

14
15
16
17
18
19

A.

No, not to the extent of these type of documents, no.

Q.

After 2003, did you ever amend that agreement again?

20

A.

I don't think so.

21

Q.

So after --

15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25

Q.

As of the -- there was a down payment note of a million

five with the original transaction; correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that payment was not due whether it was Obligated

to be paid before July 1996; correct?
MR. MCNICHOLS: I object to that question.
can't understand it.
THE COURT: You need to redo that one,
Mr. Cressman. I don't understand that either.
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, I can.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

In addition to the six million dollar note that's at

issue now that remains unpaid per your earlier testimony and

Q.

In any extent?

A.

Yes, I believe that we will show that at trial.

Q.

Okay. What documents, sir?

A.

I don't recall those right now.

22

A.

Not in any material way.

23
24
25

Q.

Well, in any way, sir?

A.

I don't believe -- I don't believe we remanded that in
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Okay. And as of 2003, you had a deal with your

Q.
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any way since 2003.
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70

68

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Alright. Either orally or in writing?

1

A.

I don't recall of any right now.

Q.

Well, is it your testimony that after year 2003 you

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

never amended the agreement with your brother either orally or
in writing?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, asked and answered.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Q.

Q.

Do you know Mr. Ernie Dantini, sir?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Who is he?

A.

He used to be an accountant here in town. I think he

may have worked for AlA briefly but he worked for Reed to some
extent and continues practicing in Seattle as a CPA.
Q.

Was he Reed's accountant?

A.

I believe he was -- he had been Reed's accountant over

the last sometime.

18
19

Exhibit A, the promissory note. That promissory note was due

20

in full on August 1, 2005; correct, sir?

Q.

Okay. Now, let's go back here and take a look at

21
22

him now to interpret the written document. He's already

23

testified that the agreement was modified.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, objection, he's asking

24

MR. CRESSMAN: Well, this is --

25

MR. MCNICHOLS: The document speaks for itself.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

because each time we had a deal made, Reed raised the bar by
another million or half million dollars.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

What were the terms of the deal in '03?

A.

Terms of the deal in '03 is that the company would dig

itself out of the hole, work together to dig itself out of the
hole with Crop USA, rebuild its agency force. 1 think I
indicated in my affidavit, rebuild it's agency force and that
we would likely be able to begin catch-Up on the interest as
soon as we hit around thirty million of premium. And that we
would again be able to restructure and begin paying off AlA and
this debt as soon as we hit sixty to seventy million in premium
and that was our goal.
Q.

Any other terms?

A.

We would pay Reed fifteen thousand dollars a month plus

continuing paying for about ten thousand dollars in other
expenses during that interim period. And we would continue to
pay Donna, I think, four thousand a month which we would have
been now been able to raise that recently to, I think, ten
thousand a month.
Q.

Okay. Any other terms?

A.

Those are all I recall right now.

Q.

So that was the deal between your brother and AlA

Services in 2003?
A.

Yes.

1
2

Q.

When was that deal reached?

A.

March of 2003.

3
4
5
6

Q.

And where was it reached?

71

69

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that objection.
The document does speak for itself, Mr. Cressman.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

discussions with Ernie Dantini about revising the arrangement
between AlA Services a nd your brother?
A.

25

Since 200S I have probably talked to Reed or his

advisors on a weekly or monthly basis on revising the 2003
agreement.
Q.

So the answer to my question is?

A.

I can't recall the specific date, but I recall talking

about reVising the agreement on numerous and numerous
occasions.
Q.

Okay. Do you reca II discussing that with Mr. Dantini

that subject?
A.

I don't recall that specific day, but I recall

discussing variations of settlement or payoff or changing the
2003 deal on numerous occasions.
Q.

None of Which were consummated; correct?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object to that, your Honor, it

calls for a legal conclusion.

22
23
24

In October of 2005, do you recall having any

MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, he's already -THE COURT: Overruled. Mr. Taylor, you can answer
that.
A.

Yes, none of _. no, none of which have been consummated

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

Here.

Q.

Where?

A.

At our Headquarters.

Q.

Who was present?

A.

Reed and I.

Q.

Anybody else?

A.

Ernie Dantini was intricately involved off and on

giving tax advice and other advice. I don't think -- but there
would be no one else.
Q.

So it's your testimony that in March of 2003 you and

your brother sat down in your office and orally made that deal?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

I'd like you to take a look at Exhibit AI, please. Do

you recognize that exhibit as an e-mail from you to
Ernie Dantini dated October 7, 2005?
A.

It indicates it is. I don't remember.

Q.

I didn't hear the answer, I'm sorry.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I think he's taking some time to

read the exhibit, Counsel.
MR. CRESSMAN: That's fine.
A.

During 2005-2006 we had extensive discussions on

restructuring.

5'2.'8
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74

72

1

MR. CRESSMAN; Move to strike as nonresponsive,

2
3

your Honor.

4
5
6

document, Mr. Taylor, as --

THE COURT; He's just asking if you recogn ize the

A.

BY MR. CRESSMAN;

7
8
9

10
11
12

Q.

Is that an e-mail fromyoudatedOctober7.2005.to

Ernie Dantini -A.

I do not recognize this document.

Q.

You don't recognize it?

A.

No, I don't. It's on the wrong type of format for my

type of e-mails.

13

14
15
16

I do not recognize the document.

Q.

Well, take a look and read it and see if that refreshes

your recollection.
A.

I have read it, I do not remember sending this

document.

17

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

18
19
20

didn't anticipate that this would be an issue. But this is

17
18
19

obviously a critical document because it indicates that there

20

21

was no deal. It talks about a deal three years ago that was

21

MR. CRESSMAN; Okay. We are going to have a
problem, your Honor, getting Mr. Dantini over here today.

the witness, please.
(Thereupon, the requested question was read back
by the court reporter.)
A.

Yes, that would be a fair statement.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

And did you send e-mails to Mr. Dantini in connection

with those discussions?
A.

I'm sure I did, yes.

Q.

And do you recognize Exhibit AI as one of those e-rnails

that you sent to Mr. Dantini?
A.

I do not.
MR. MCNICHOLS; Asked and answered.
THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. CRESSMAN;
Q.

Mr. Taylor, let's me ask you to take a look at

Exhibit H please -- excuse me, Exhibit F, I'm sorry, F. Is
that a letter that you received addressed to you from an
attorney by the name of Patrick Moran on behalf of Reed Taylor?
A.

Yes.
MR. CRESSMAN; Move to admit Exhibit F, your

Honor.

22

never consummated, and I think it's very significant in terms

22

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.

23

of --

23

THE COURT; Exhibit F is admitted.

24

MR. MCNICHOLS; May I re -- no objection, sorry,

24

A.

25

I think--

25

THE COURT: Hang on.

your Honor.

75

73
MR. CRESSMAN: If the witness doesn't recog --

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19

20

refuses to recognize the document, then I need to bring the
recipient of it to identify it. And I don't have -- he's in
Kirkland right now, your Honor. Unless he -THE COURT; What are you asking?
MR. CRESSMAN; Well, I'm just advising the Court
that under the time schedule that we have today, it's probably
impossible to get Mr. Dantini here.
THE COURT; Alright. I understand.
MR. CRESSMAN; So -- and I also can't examine or
use this document that's not admitted but it -- as the Court -it's obviously a critical document.
THE COURT: Well, go ahead, Mr. Cressman, you've
made inquiry ofthe witness so -MR. CRESSMAN; Yes, there is, your Honor.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

But you do recall having discussions with Mr. Dantini

in 2005 or on or around October concerning restructuring your
brother's deal; is that a fair statement, sir?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

(Thereupon, Exhibit F was admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN;
Q.

And that letter advises of default?
MR. MCNICHOLS; Objection, the letter speaks for

itself, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

And you consider this letter as a notice of default;

did you not?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, your Honor, it's
irrelevant what he conSiders it. It speaks for itself.
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that,
Mr. Taylor.
A.

Do I consider this a notice of default from --

A.

Yes, but I don't consider us being in default. I think

MR. CRESSMAN: Yes.

the letter's inaccurate.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Okay. And as of the time you received that letter,

I think that I have testified that I have had extensive

20

isn't it true that over a million and a half in interest was

21

discussions, almost weekly discussions on re-doing the 2003

delinquent on the promissory note according to its terms

22
23
24

deal before and after the 2003 deal.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to strike as nonresponsive.

21
22
23

A.

No, sir.

THE COURT: Sustained.

24

Q.

It was not?

25

A.

No, it was not.

A.

25

MR. CRESSMAN: Would you read the question back to
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Exhibit A?

78

76

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11

Okay. Under the original terms of the promissory note

Q.

Exhibit A, was interest in excess of a million five owing?
Under the terms -- if you had calculated interest paid

A.

based upon the original, yes; based on the agreements made in
2003, no.
And after the letter of December 12th was received by

Q.

you, how much in interest has been paid by AlA Services to your
brother?
A.

We continue to pay about twenty-five thousand a month

on -- each month.
Q.

Okay. And after December -- the December 12th letter,

12
13
14
15

has any portion of the principle been paid to your brother?

16

that, your Honor, because he's asking him now -- oh, I'm

1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12

Q.

So your agreement in 2003 was based upon -- the

assumption was that he would be paid in 20077
A.

No, it was based upon the assumption that we would be

paid when we hit in the sixty to seventy million dollar premium
range.
Q.

Okay. And the "we" would be?

A.

Crop and AlA.

Q.

Crop and AlA. How was money from Crop going to be used

to pay your brother?

A.

It is always under the assumption that the two

companies would be put back together and that the companies
would be able to be -- to purchase that note or retire that

A.

No, it's not due yet.

13

note whether or not AlA or Crop, and depending on how this

Q.

When is it due per your 2003 agreement?

14
15
16

agreement was structured. The specifics I can't say now but

MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, I'm going to object to

the -- when we say "we," we mean both Crop and AlA has to hit
those premium goals, otherwise there's no money to pay it.

17

sorry -- well, there is more to it than that. I don't know

17

18
19

exactly how to make this objection because the 2003 amendment

18

is not the only agreement that determines when it is due.

19

A.

No, he doesn't.

20

There is another document.

20

Q.

AlA Insurance, Inc., doesn't have any interest in Crop

21

MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm going to object to

22

the speaking objections of Counsel.

23
24
25

going to take that as an objection and I'm going to overrule

THE COURT: I'm going to overrule your -- I'm

it, Mr. McNichols, because I think Mr. Cressman's question was

21
22

23
24
25

Q.

Okay. Mr. Reed Taylor doesn't have any interest in

Crop USA; correct?

USA, does it?
A.

No, it doesn't.

Q.

And AlA Services, Inc., doesn't have any interest in

Crop USA, does it?
A.

No.

Q.

So this is a completely separate entity; correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And I'm trying to understand was there or was there not

77

1

79

Q.

About or exactly or how?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

A.

Well, the payment of both the, A, preferred shares

11

related to the 2003 agreement. Mr. Cressman?

2
3

MR. CRESSMAN: That's correct.
THE COURT: AI rig ht. I'll overrule the objection.

4
5

that question.

6
7

that we put together back in 2003, it would be due and payable

I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Taylor, but go ahead and answer

A.

Based upon current assumptions and the marketing plan

8
9
10
11
12

which has to be paid first and the -- this note is payable upon

12

13

the ability to finance the -- based upon the amount of premium

13

14

that is written and under our current plans and under our

15

current projections, that would be August of 2009.

14
15

16
17
18
19

about two thousand -- August 2009.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

Q.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, I don't know what the
"this" is. There's a pronoun --

20
21
22
23
24
25

When you made this agreement in 2003 with your brother

in March, did you discuss when this would take place?

MR. CRESSMAN: When the payment would take place.
A.

Originally we had the plan that the payment would take

place in 2007, but because of the -- but we have not achieved
the premium goals that we had originally had thought we could
have in 2003.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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a fixed date when your brother was going to be paid in your
agreement with him in March of 2003?
A.

I will repeat again based upon the budgets we presented

in 2003 and as modified more recently, they were -- it was -he was to be paid when we hit sixty million dollars in premium.
Q.

And what was he to be paid?

A.

The balance of his note six million plus accrued

interest. Any unaccrued interest.
Q.

Now, there was a lock -- there's a lock box agreement

under the restructured agreements; correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And would you describe for the Court what a lock box

agreement is?
A.

A lock box agreement is a place where premiums are

deposited into a -- essentially a bank who then deposits money
into accounts, and then tells the insurance company how much
has been received on an individual basis.
Q.

And one of the terms of your brother's contracts was

that the commissions would be deposited into a lock box
account; correct?
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court, please, I'd object,
the agreement speaks for itself. And I want to object also on

53c
22 of 55 sheet

82

80

1
2

the relevance. And this is going to lead us and waste a whole

2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

bunch of time because there's been no lock box for ten years as

3
4

is shown, I believe, in one of Mr. Taylor's affidavits.
THE COURT: Where are we going with this,
Mr. Cressman?
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm trying to establish
a default for failure to maintain the lock box arrangement as

5
6
7

A.

Reed Taylor has served on the board of AlA and AlA,

Inc., over the last ten or twelve years at his pleasure. He
wanders on and off the board whenever he wants to. He can come
on the board any time he wants.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to strike as nonresponsive.
THE COURT: Sustained. Just -- Mr. Taylor, if you
could just address yourself to the question of whether that

of some settlement discussion.

indicates that they failed to keep the lock box arrangement.

8
9
10

11
12

was going to inquire of the witness if that was the case.

11

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

let you inquire as to that.

20
21
22
23

required by the documents that were executed in July of 1996.
I think Counsel's comment, I assume it was for the record,

THE COURT: Alright. I'm going to go ahead and

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Do you agree with your Counsel's statement?

A.

We have discontinued -- we had discontinued the lock

box in 1997 at the -- with the consent of Reed Taylor and
Ernie Dantini to -- because it was no longer necessary because
beginning December 1st, 1997, AlA collected all the premiums.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

A.

Reed Taylor's conference room.

20
21
22
23

24

Q.

Who was present?

24

25

A.

Ernie Dantini and myself.

25

We were no longer giving it to Centennial Life, it was a waste
of money and we all agreed to that.
Q.

Where did you agree with that with Mr. Reed Taylor?

offer has been made since December of 2006 other than as part

A.

No.

And obviously he has not been apPointed to the board;

Q.

correct?
A.

No.

Q.

And subsequent to the time you received the letter

Exhibit F, you have not provided Mr. Reed Taylor with audited
financial statements, have you?
A.

For which company?

Q.

For AlA Services.

A.

No. We discontinued having audited financial

statements for AlA Services in 1990 because AlA Services has
virtually no material assets except for AlA, Inc.
Q.

Did you since December 12th, 2006, have you provided

Reed Taylor with audited financial statements of AlA, Inc?
A.

No. But the auditors will be here next week and the

83

81

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

1
2

MR. MCNICHOLS: And Reed Taylor?
A.

And Reed Taylor.

audit will be prepared and sent probably by the end of March.
Q.

And over the last several years, have you -- is it true

10
11

A.

Oh, I have offered to make him a member of the board.

Q.

Since December?

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12

A.

Yes.

12

A.

No, same as last year.

Q.

As part of the settlement arrangement or otherwise?

Q.

Alright. Since you received the letter of

A.

Yes, as part of that at Rod Bond's office. I said he

13
14
15
16

9

13
14
15

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

December 12th letter, Exhibit F, that Reed Taylor was not a
member of the board of AlA Services?
A.

He was not at that time.

Q.

And is it true that since that time, since that letter

was received, he's not been made a member of the board?

can join the board. And he's been --

16
17
18

Is it true at the time of your receipt of the

Q.

As part --

statements of AlA, Inc?

A.

That's not true.

Q.

It's your testimony that you have?

A.

Every year for the last 12 years.

Q.

Who were the auditors for AlA, Inc?

A.

Oh, God, it's -- this - for the last two years it's

LeMaster and Daniels from Spokane.
Q.

Anybody new coming in this year?

December 12th from Mr. Moran, have you provided monthly income
tax statements for AlA Services to your brother?
A.

I don't know that. I have not personally, no.

THE COURT: Hold it, hold it. I've got a court

17

Q.

Alright. Are you aware that anyone else has done so?

reporter here who's trying to take down everything that gets

18
19

A.

I don't know that.

Q.

Since you received the December 12th letter, have you

19
20

said, so I just need one person talking at a time. Okay.

21

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

22

that you have not provided Reed Taylor with audited financial

20
21
22
23

Ask your question, Mr. Cressman.

Q.

Other than as part of settlement discussions with your

or anyone else provided Reed Taylor with weekly summaries of
new business?
A.

No, sir, we don't do that. That's all on computer now.

Q.

Since your receipt of the December 12th, 2006, letter

23

brother which took place in attorney's offices, have you

24

offered your -- or offered to or aPPointed your brother to the

24

from Mr. Reed Taylor's lawyer, have you provided him with any

25

board of AlA Services?

25

monthly statements of commission?
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6~1

86

84

1

A.

I don't think so.

1

2
3
4
5
6

Q.

Is AlA Services current on the payments to

him, I'm sorry, with the air conditioner here. I don't have
great hearing.

7
8
9

A.

Yes.

Q.

Would you take a look at Exhibit R, please.

2
3
4
5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Is this a loan and security agreement for Crop USA

Donna Taylor?

Insurance Agency, Inc?
A.

Yes.

10

Q.

For the amount of fifteen million dollars revolving

11

loan?

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

A.

Yes.

Q.

Which was guaranteed by AlA Insurance?

A.

Yes.

21

22
23
24
25

Q.

And you Signed it?

A.

Yes, I did.
MR. CRESSMAN: I move to admit.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit R is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit R was admitted into evidence.)

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Was any consideration received by AlA Insurance, Inc.,

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

A.

Yes.

23
24

Q.

What consideration?

25

A.

The loan proceeds from this helps rebuild the AlA/Crop

to guarantee this loan?

MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm not sure -A.

And they are very aware.
MR. CRESSMAN: I'm not sure he answered my

question. Let me restate it. I'm having a hard time hearing

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter. You can have
great hearing and it's still a problem in this courtroom.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Well, I do want to make an
objection now because I think counsel has misled us by arguing
that Section 3.6 says that the proceeds may be used solely for
the borrower and that's not how it reads to me. It deals with
specific debts for at least two other entities, and therein is
the problem of asking a witness questions about a multi-page
document.
THE COURT: Well, if you want to ask your question
again, Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN: Yeah.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

How much is owed on the obligation now?

A.

To this company?

Q.

Surge.

A.

Surge, I'm going to think it is five point two,

somewhere in that range.
Q.

And if the loan is in default, AlA would have to pay

87

85

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

USA agency force.
Q.

Explain that?

A.

In order to rebuild our agent force which had decimated

in the early 2000 period, as I indicated in my affidavit, in

1
2
3
4
5

order to rebuild this agency force, we need the funds to enable

6

AlA and Crop agents to be in the field. Some of these guys are

21
22
23

consistent with our agreement in 2003 with Reed. And because

24

the original focus of the plan for Surge, Crop USA, and AlA is

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

to rebuild an agency force to the extent that we had.

25

salaried and commissioned agents, some of them are agencies,
independent agencies. And so we hire these guys, get them on
board, regional managers especially, and through Crop's
financing, we were able to finance that operation and to pick
those guys up.
Q.

Were you aware that section 3.6 of the exhibit

precluded the use of funds by anyone other than the borrower
Crop USA?
A.

On -- of this document?

Q.

Yes.

18
19

objection.

20

A.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Again, your Honor -- I withdraw my

I am aware, yes. All of the expenditures by this

agreement are according to the business plans that we filed and
that they were reviewed by Surge, who is the lender, and all
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it; correct?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, calls for a legal
conclusion. Also calls for construing this document.
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that,
Mr. Taylor.
A.

Yes, I think that the -- AlA is the guarantor and if

Crop USA was not able to pay, then they would come after AlA,
sure, and me.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I think for the record we should
correct the statement that you made about what that paragraph
says. Are you willing to withdraw the statement you made?
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, counsel I think has an
opportunity to re-examine this witness and clarify anything he
wants. I'm kind of -- it's very difficult when he's arguing
and questioning during my portion of the examination.
THE COURT: Well, I think Mr. Taylor did at least
respond to that question and didn't re-ask it. So if you wish
to go back into that, Mr. McNichols, I guess you can, but I'm
not going to correct any record at this point.
Go ahead, Mr. Cressman.

MR. CRESSMAN: The last question related to a
default of the agreement and I think the witness answered that
question?
THE COURT: He did.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

53224 of 55 sheets

90

88

2

refers to an entry she states that in 2002 the principle was

1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

reduced of the note, the note held by your brother, by

3

$307,271, and then in December of last year you reversed that

4
5
6
7

Q.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

Now, in Aimee Gordon's declaration paragraph 5, she

entry. Why did you reverse that entry?
A.

Because it was caJled to my attention by Pat Moran that

the books were -- the actual amount due on Services books were
different than the sub journal entry. And I'll tell you why
the difference is if you are interested.
Q.

So after you received the notice of default from

11
12
13
14
15

Me. Moran, you caused to make that correction; is that true?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit AE, please.

A.

AE, okay.

Q.

Is that your response to the letter of Me. Moran

8
9
10

16

exhibit -- his December 12th letter?

he had requested for December 26, 20067

the witness is irrelevant.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, subject of intention of

THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead, Mr. Taylor, you
can answer that.
A.

Yeah, Reed hasn't -- as long as we are not in default,

Reed has no right to call a shareholder's meeting.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

And you understood the purpose of the shareholder's

meeting that he was seeking to call was to elect and remove the
existing directors and elect new ones; correct?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, your Honor, the
understanding of the witness is irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Mr. Taylor, take a look at Exhibit G. You received a

17
18
19

copy of this notice of special shareholder's meeting signed by

20
21

some that were faxed to the attorney's office at 4:00 in the
morning or something like that, but I don't know that I ever

eVidence.)

22

saw the original.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

23
24
25

Q.

Didn't it accompany Me. Miran's letter Exhibit F?

A.

The AG, is that what you are talking about?

Q.

No, GG.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

A.

I thought you said AG, I'm sorry, G.

Q.

And you got it on or around December 12th; correct?

A.

I believe so, yes.

Q.

Now in your letter to Me. Moran --

A.

Yes, yes, it is.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit AE is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit AE was admitted into

Q.

And in that letter is it not correct that you

acknowledged that Reed Taylor had a security interest and may

your brother; correct?
A.

You know, I don't think I ever did. I think there was

91

89

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Mr. Cressman.

23

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

24

25

have the right to take the actions outlined in your letter?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the document speaks for
itself.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Who drafted this letter, sir?

A.

I did.

Q.

And am I correct that in this letter you stated on the

last page that if your brother withdrew his request for a
shareholder meeting, you would agree to appoint him to the
board?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the letter speaks for
itself.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

And by this letter did you telJ your brother -MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection. Do I have to object

every time he asks, your Honor? I'm sorry, I'm going to object
to the question on the grounds that the documents speaks for
itself.
THE COURT: I have got to hear it first.

Q.

Mr. Taylor, by the last paragraph of your letter, did

you intend to refuse your brother the shareholder meeting that

20
21
22
23
24
25
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Yes, I recall that document.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Can you give us the exhibit
number, Counsel?
MR. CRESSMAN: I'm looking for it. Exhibit AE.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

You were addreSSing potential settlement with your

brother; correct?
A.

Yes, we had been discussing settlement of this matter

for a year, over a year.
Q.

Isn't it true that -- strike that. Isn't it true that

you advised Me. Moran that if an arrangement was reached, it
would be memorialized by lawyers?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the letter speaks for
itself, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, we'd move to admit
Exhibit G if we did n't cover that earlier.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no objection. That's the
shareholder notice, I have no objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Exhibit G is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit G was admitted into evidence.)

533

94

92

1

2
3
4

take a recess now. I guess does counsel just prefer to take

5

your Honor.

our lunch break at this time? Mr. McNichols?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Yes, that would be convenient,

6
7
8
9
10

I think it will probably be locked up during the lunch hour.

11
12
13
14

1:30 p.m.)

6

THE COURT: Alright. Why don't we just go ahead

there in 1995?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance.
THE COURT: Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN: Several reasons, your Honor. They
are maintaining that Mr. Reed Taylor doesn't know how to run
this business, and the testimony will show the number of

Well, I'm sure that it will be locked up during the lunch hour

7
8
9
10
11

for the benefit of themselves to the detriment of AlA

so we will be back in session then at 1:30.

12

Insurance.

and take a lunch break, Counsel, and we will just reconvene at
1:30. As I said, this courtrooms is going to be ours for the
day so you can just leave your materials if you like to because

(Thereupon, a lunch recess was taken from 12: 10 to

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

1
2
3
4
5

THE COURT: Mr. Cressman, I'm going to need to

THE COURT: Back in session this afternoon in
CV 07-208 Taylor versus AlA Services Corporation. We are in
the midst of examination as part of the hearing for a
preliminary injunction as sought by certain defendants and we
are in the examination of Mr. John Taylor.
Mr. Cressman, are you ready to proceed?
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, your Honor.

22

THE COURT: Go ahead.

23

MR. CRESSMAN: Before I commence with my

24

examination of continuing examination of Mr. John Taylor, over

25

the noon hour I have obtained an affidavit Mr. Ernie Dantini.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

employees then versus now. And in addition, it's relevant to
the transfer of business from AlA Insurance to Crop USA which
business could just as easily be performed by AlA Insurance but
has been taken by John Taylor and his cohorts and is being run

THE COURT: Well, I think I'm going to sustain
that as to the number of employees. Mr. Cressman, you may
proceed.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

The business of AlA Insurance has significantly

declined since 1995; has it not?
A.

As far as revenues, yes.

Q.

And Crop USA was formed when?

A.

1999, I believe.

Q.

And its business has been increasing?

A.

Recently, yes.

Q.

And employees of AlA Insurance work for both AlA

Insurance and Crop USA?

95

93

1

2
3
4
5
6

1

THE COURT: I have received that.
MR. CRESSMAN: You have received it?

2

THE COURT: Yes.

3
4
5
6

MR. CRESSMAN: I had a working copy, but does the
Court desire a working copy?
THE COURT: No, that won't be necessary, I don't

7
8

think. Thank you.

9

appears that although we talked about Exhibit E, I did not

MR. CRESSMAN: One other housekeeping matter, it

10

offer it and it was not admitted, so I would move for Exhibit E

11

to be admitted?

12
13
14
15
16

17
18

MR. MCNICHOLS: Just a moment, please, your Honor.
MR. CRESSMAN: Exhibit E is the amended restated
security.
MR. MCNICHOLS: It says Exhibit B on the top and
Exhibit E on the bottom, I remember it, and I have no objection
to it.
THE COURT: My notes indicate the same, that that

19

was not previously offered or admitted, so Exhibit E is now

20
21
22

admitted.

23
24

25

Q.

Are all of the employees of AlA Insurance also

A.

No.

Q.

Which employees of AlA -- excuse me, of Crop USA are

not employees of AlA Insurance?
A.

only.

9
10
11

Q.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Taylor, how many employees of AlA Insurance were

Q.

employees of Crop USA?

8

MR. CRESSMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

They perform services for both companies, yes.

7

(Thereupon, Exhibit E was admitted into eVidence.)

THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Cressman.

A.

There must be 20 people that are employees of Crop USA

Are there any salaried employees of AlA Insurance that

are not also salaried employees of Crop USA?
A.

I don't understand your question. Say that again.

Q.

Are there -- am I correct that there are no salaried

employees of AlA Insurance that are not also employees of Crop
USA?
MR. MCNICHOLS: I object to the form of the
question. There's a double negative in it.
THE COURT: I don't understand that either,
Mr. Cressman. Are you asking if there's any employees -salaried employees of AlA that only work for AlA?
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, yes, we can ask it that way.
Can you answer or his Honor's question.
THE COURT: Did you understand my question,
Mr. Taylor?
A.

Yeah, do any -- any AlA employees only work for AlA,

I'd say no.
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1
2
3
4

5

8

Is the same answer for --

A.

Well, no, that's not true. There are some that work

only for AlA.
Of the AlA sa laried employees, which of them work only

Q.

for AlA?

7

A.

23

The building people, people who maintain the building.

Q.

6

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

Q.

Okay.

A.

And then we have two policy --

Q.

Two what?

A.

Two policy holder service people who essentially do

only AlA business.
Q.

And of the other salaried employees of AlA, how many of

those are they in number, approximately?
A.

I would -- eight or nine.

Q.

And they work for both AlA and Crop USA?

A.

They are salaried with AlA but they perform services

for both.
Q.

Is there any reason why the business of Crop USA could

not be performed by AlA Insurance?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Why·- what?

A.

AlA Insurance does not hold any property casualty

24

licenses which are required to perform the services of Crop

25

USA.

1

Q.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Q.

And how long have they done that?

A.

For years.

Q.

In your workday, how much of your time is spent working

for AlA ••
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance.
MR. CRESSMAN: -- versus Crop USA?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A.

Depend. On some days I work almost all for AlA, other

days I work almost all the time for Crop USA.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Overall 50 percent, approximately?

A.

I would guess so.

Q.

What is your salary from Crop USA?

A.

None. I take no salary for Crop USA.

Q.

Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit F in Volume I

of the exhibits in front of you. I'm sorry, that's the wrong
exhibit. Bear with me here.
Let me ask you .- I'm sorry the exhibit I had asked you

20

to look at is Exhibit S. Is that a letter that you sent to

21
22

Donna Taylor dated October 1st, 2001?

23
24
25

A.

Yes.

Q.

Donna Taylor being the wife or ex-wife of Reed Taylor?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And in that letter did you advise her that you had

97

2
3
4

5
6

AssumIng they obtained those licenses, Is there any

reason why AlA Insurance could not perform that work?
A.

Under that and having the right people running it, yeah

-- no, sure it could always do it.
Q.

Okay. Are there any salaried employees of Crop USA

that work only for Crop USA?

7

7

A.

~~

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Q.

How many of those?

A.

Lots, you know, I can't remember how many employees we

15
16
17

have, but there must be about 20 employees, most of whom work
only for Crop USA.
Q.

Those are salaried employees?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And Is the number of employees of Crop USA more or less

In numbers I'm not -- trying to think, it's probably

about ha If and half now. The majority of the salaries are paid

18
19

by Crop USA, yes.

20

of Crop USA today more or less than the number of employees of

21
22
23
24
25

AlA In 1995?

Q.

Let me ask you this way. Are the number of employees

A.

Than in 1995 -- no, there's less now.

Q.

Less employees now. Alright. Does Crop USA and AlA

16
17
18
19
20

Yes, they do.

taken no salary that year?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the letter speaks for
itself.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Let me ask you to take a look at -- well, I'd move for

the admission of Exhibit S.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit S Is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit S was admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit T please. Is

that the consolidated tax return for AlA Service Corporation
for the calendar year which is also the fiscal year 2001?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Or pertinent portions thereof, excuse me?

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

And on the second page It lists your compensation for

2001; does it nnt?
A.

Yes, it does.

21

Q.

And it lists $224,139; correct?

22
23

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Okay. Was your statement in the previous exhibit

24
25

Insurance share a web Site?
A.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15

than the number of employees that AlA Insurance had In 1995?
A.

99

1
2
3
4
5
6
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